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On divided roadways, cross-median fatalities are disproportionately
overrepresented in fatal and serious injury crashes. Many state DOTs sought to mitigate
cross-median crash risk by installing cable median barriers. Despite increased crash rates,
studies evaluating crash rates before and after cable median barriers were installed
indicated excellent improvement in overall safety.
Although cable median barriers are intended to prevent serious cross-median
crashes, cable barriers can also contribute to serious injury and fatality crashes which
would not have otherwise occurred, including penetration and rollover crashes. In order
to reduce the frequency of undesirable penetration and rollover crashes occurring with
cable median barriers in a cost-effective way, a research study was commissioned to
study cable median barrier containment failures and methods of mitigating those failures.
Barrier placement in the center of 40 ft (12 m) or wider V-ditches resulted in the
highest penetration rate of 15%, but also resulted in the lowest rollover and severe crash
rates of 2.3% and 1.8%, respectively. The 85th percentile trajectory angle associated with
severe cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees. The highest penetration and rollover
rates were 16% and 13%, corresponding to large cars and SUVs, respectively. Generally,
vehicles with low bumper heights, high CG heights, and higher masses were involved in
statistically significantly more cable median barrier penetrations.

Recommended changes to full-scale crash test requirements include substitution
of large cars and SUVs for the small car and pickup trucks, as well as increasing the CG
trajectory angle at impact to 39 degrees. Minimum and maximum cable heights should be
15 in. (381 mm) and 35 in. (889 mm), respectively, to reduce penetration frequency.
Barriers should be installed as far from the travel way as practicable and preferably on
slopes between 6:1 and 8:1. By implementing these improvements, many additional lives
could be saved each year.
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CHAPTER 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cable median barrier crashes from a total of 12 states were analyzed. Crash data
included scene diagrams, photographs, and field measurements, crash narratives,
although the availability of data in each crash varied.
Major contributors to penetration crash propensity were identified: diving
underride, in which the front end of the vehicle dropped below the bottom cable; prying,
in which the vehicle profile caused cable separation or lifting; override; bouncing
override, in which the vehicle rebounded after contact with the back slope and bounced
over the top of the barrier; system failure, in which one component failure or design
failure prevented the cables from adequately engaging the vehicle; and large vehicle
crashes, such as tractor trailers, buses, and single-unit trucks into TL-3 systems.
Major contributors to rollover were identified: steep median slopes, in which the
slope caused unstable bouncing or abrupt changes in slope profiles acted as trip points for
the tires; broadside skid, in which the vehicle was skidding with a sideslip angle of nearly
90 degrees prior to contact with the barrier; contact with post, in which the post acted as a
trip point; and other factors such as towing trailer units, median anomalies, or with large
vehicles such as tractor-trailers, buses, or motor homes.
Recommended improvements to cable median barrier systems included:
minimum top cable height of 35 in. (890 mm); maximum top cable height of 15 in. (381
mm); minimum of 4 cables supported by posts; higher lateral cable-to-post attachment
strength at bottom and lower strength at top; low strong-axis strength post sections; and
to eliminate cable entrapment in a vertical slot in the post when initial cable contact
occurs at a post location.
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A summary of factors and how they contributed to penetration, rollover, and
severe crash probability is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Major Conclusions, Cable Median Barrier Systems
Factor

Penetration

Effect of Factor on Rate of
Rollover
Severe Crashes

Weather/Road Conditions
Clear, Dry
Increase
Increase
Increase
Rain/Snow
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
System Type
Generic 3-Cable
Lowest
Highest
Lowest
Brifen TL-3
Unk
Low
Moderate
CASS TL-3
High
High
Moderate
CASS TL-4*
Moderate
High
Moderate
Nucor TL-3 at 15' Post Spacing
High
Moderate
High
Nucor TL-4*
Moderate
Unk
Moderate
Safence*
Unk
High
Low
Gibraltar*
High
Unk
Low
Season
Winter
Lowest
Lowest
Lowest
Summer
Highest
Highest
Highest
Wide Median Approach Slopes**
Flatter than 10:1
High
Moderate
Unk
10:1-8:1
Low
Moderate
Unk
8:1-6:1
Lowest
Lowest
Unk
Steeper than 6:1
Higher at Steeper Slopes Higher at Steeper Slopes
Unk
Barrier Placement
Near Shoulder
High
Highest
Highest
On Approach Slope/Back Slope
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Center of Median
Highest
Lowest
Lowest
CG Velocity Vector
Below 20 Degrees
Low
Moderate
Low
20-40 Degrees
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Above 40 Degrees
High
High
High
Orientation Angle
Greater than Velocity Vector
Highest
Moderate
High
Similar to Velocity Vector
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Less than Velocity Vector*
Low
Moderate
Unk
Vehicle Type
Small/Mid-Size Car
Moderate
Low
Low
Large Car
High
Lowest
Moderate
SUV
Moderate
Highest
Moderate
Pickup
Moderate
High
Low
Van
Moderate
High
High
Large Truck/Tractor Trailer
High
High
Very High
Vehicle Weight Relative to Type of Vehicle (i.e. cars, utility vehicles)
Heavier than Average
High
Low
No Effect
Approximately Average
Moderate
Moderate
No Effect
Lighter than Average
Low
High
No Effect
Vehicle Roll and Yaw Moments of Inertia Relative to Type of Vehicle (i.e. cars, utility vehicles)
Higher than Average
High
Low
Unk
Approximately Average
Moderate
Moderate
Unk
Lower than Average
Low
High
Unk
* Data not statistically significant. Actual average result may vary from what is shown.
** Data was collected relative to TL-3 Nucor NU-CABLE system with 15 ft post spacing.
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CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Problem Statement
A cross-median crash is the most severe type of run-off-road event in the United
States. Cross-median crashes represent approximately 2% to 5% of all divided interstate
crashes; yet fatalities and serious injuries occur in as much as 30% of these crashes. With
the significantly disproportionate number of severe crashes occurring due to crossmedian crash events, many states have turned to cable median barriers to reduce the risk
of these types of severe crashes.
Cable median barriers have been extensively studied to determine the costeffectiveness of installation, in-service performance, rates of severe injury and fatality
reduction, and maintenance and post-impact performance evaluation. For examples of
these studies, the reader is encouraged to review those references noted in Chapter 15.
However, cable median barriers are median obstacles as well. They can place
occupants at increased risk of severe injury or fatality if the barriers fail to adequately
contain and redirect errant vehicles, resulting in rollover or vehicular penetration through
the barrier. Furthermore, these barriers are also involved in many non-rollover, nonpenetration fatalities and serious injuries, though no concerted effort has yet been made to
determine the causes of these serious and fatal injuries.
Many industry experts expect the total mileage of cable median barrier to double
within the next 10 years. As total cable median barrier mileage continues to climb, there
is an opportunity to prevent many penetration, rollover, and serious injury or fatality
crashes by improving barrier design, installation guidelines, and crash-testing guidelines
to mitigate crash concerns with these barrier types.
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2.2 Research Objective
The objective of this study was to evaluate a significant number of cable median
barrier crashes across a broad spectrum of states to determine containment failure
causality, design improvements, placement guidelines, and improved full-scale testing
procedures to improve motorist safety performance.
2.3 Scope
In order to accomplish the research objective, a series of tasks were undertaken,
and are summarized as follows:
(1) Cable barrier crash data were requested from many states with prominent
histories of studying cable median barrier;
(2) Crash data were analyzed and segregated by state, vehicle type, vehicle class,
impact conditions, median geometry, barrier type, crash result, crash severity,
and containment failure mechanism; and
(3) Containment failure mechanisms of cable barriers were evaluated extensively
using a combination of scene diagrams, crash narratives, photographic
evidence, site measurements, and crash reconstruction techniques.
Additional studies are planned in the future to address specific vehicle types in
vehicle-to-barrier interactions which may aggravate penetration or rollover tendencies.
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the U.S. freeway system was designed and constructed in the 1950s and
1960s. During this time, it was common to build high-speed facilities with 30-ft (9-m)
and 40-ft (12-m) wide medians. With the low traffic volumes found on those freeways
during this period, the frequency of tragic cross median crashes was low. The California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) conducted a study to determine the benefits of
using cable barrier in these relatively narrow medians [1]. This study indicated that
barriers could not be justified in medians wider than 50 ft (15 m). Caltrans repeated this
study several times between 1973 and 1993. Each time, the authors arrived at the same
conclusion; barriers were not cost-effective when installed in medians wider than 50 ft
(15.2 m), despite rising traffic volumes. However, findings from the 1997 version of this
study were quite different and recommended that barriers be placed in medians as wide as
75 ft (22 m) [2]. The primary change between the 1997 study and the preceding study
from 1993 was the elimination of the national speed limit law. Elimination of this law
produced a speed limit increase on most rural freeways of 15 to 20 mph (24 to 32 km/h).
This magnitude of speed increase could easily explain the large increase in cross-median
crashes and the differences in the benefits of using cable median barrier.
Following a trend of a high rate of cross-median crashes and associated fatalities,
the North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) investigated the use of median
barriers between 1997 and 2004, to mitigate the severity of median crashes and to reduce
the frequency of cross-median crash events [3-4]. This pilot study analyzed 400 miles
(644 km) of interstate with barrier, which included 175 miles (282 km) of cable barrier
and an additional 44 miles (71 km) of cable barrier and W-beam combinations.
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Researchers observed a 71% drop in the number of cross-median crashes and associated
fatalities or serious injuries due to the introduction of these cable median barriers. The
total drop in severe and fatal injuries was 35% over this same period, while moderate
injuries increased by 26%. The reason for the disparity between the drops in crossmedian crash rates and severe crash rates is that any barrier system which can be struck
by an errant motorist is a roadside obstacle. Every roadside obstacle can contribute to the
number and frequency of severe crashes. Researchers postulated that by installing cable
median barriers, 95 cross-median crashes were prevented and more than 100 lives were
saved annually. The barriers prevented a large number of cross-median crashes and were
ultimately successful in significantly reducing cumulative severe injury or fatality (A+K)
crash frequency.
A similar study was conducted at Rowan University in 2005, identifying types of
median barriers and crash histories for New Jersey Department of Transportation [5].
Although a net safety improvement was noted after median barrier installations, the crash
frequency increased. Also, researchers noted that after cable barrier hits, maintenance
personnel were slow to repair barriers often allowing the cables to sag to the ground in
impact regions for up to several weeks.
The Wisconsin DOT investigated the correlation between cross-median crashes
on the number of cross-median fatalities [6]. Researchers observed that between 2001
and 2003, Wisconsin roads and highways experienced 53 fatalities and more than 600
injuries in 631 cross-median crashes. Although most divided roadways were consistent
with Wisconsin and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) design standards, cross-median crashes were observed to be relatively
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independent of median width, average daily traffic (ADT), and lane width. The study was
further expanded to determine median barrier warrants based on median widths [7].
Results were similar to the studies in North Carolina and California, in which many
roadways with medians as wide as 70 ft (21 m) were applicable for median barrier
installation.
A statistical analysis was conducted on cross-median crashes in the state of
Minnesota between 2005 and 2008 to determine effectiveness of countermeasures as well
as to validate or change the recommendations provided by AASHTO in the 2002 and
2006 Roadside Design Guides. Cross-median events were tabulated based on site
statistics and used to generate statistical models of median encroachment frequencies [8].
The encroachment frequencies were then applied to models of freeway and rural
expressway roads in the Roadside Safety Analysis Program (RSAP), and used in a
benefit-to-cost analysis of median barrier types. Because Minnesota did not tabulate
cross-median events directly on crash report forms, statistical data selection methods
were used to determine frequency of cross-median encroachments based on subsamples.
Based on the data analysis, cross-median events were most common during the period
between December and February, when snowfall and ice formation was prevalent on
Minnesota roads and medians. By reducing friction, vehicles that departed the roadway
were unable to come to a stop before entering opposing travel lanes, despite typically
lower travel speeds. Probabilities of vehicle collision, median encroachment, crossmedian encroachment, and ADT were factored into a simulation using the Monte Carlo
technique, and the model was recommended for evaluation against existing crash studies.
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Cable barriers have long been recognized as an effective way of preventing
vehicles from encountering side slopes which increase the risk of serious crashes as well
as embankments and separating traffic on high-speed facilities. Crash data analysis has
indicated that cable barriers provide the highest overall level of safety when compared to
concrete safety shapes and steel beam guardrails [9-10]. Further, study of guardrail
performance on slopes indicated that cable barriers can perform effectively when
installed on slopes as steep as 5:1 [11], while metal beam guardrails did not demonstrate
crashworthy performance on 6:1 slopes. Finally, cable barriers were the least expensive
barrier option for use in medians of high-speed freeways. In view of the positive safety
performance, capability of performing when installed on sloping medians, and low
construction costs, it was not surprising that many highway agencies in the U.S. have
decided to implement cable barriers whenever it was necessary to prevent cross-median
crashes through depressed median ditches. As of today, the DOTs in more than 40 states
have adopted this policy, and many of them have installed more than 100 miles of barrier.
Industry experts have begun to predict that the installed base of cable median barrier in
the U.S. will more than double over the next 7 to 10 years.
Even though cable median barrier has garnered a positive performance record, the
high number of crashes that occur in narrow medians on high-speed, high-volume
freeways still produces significant numbers of serious injury and fatal crashes involving
cable barrier. A study of more than 5,000 cable barrier crashes over a two-year period
found 12 fatal and 25 serious injury crashes [12]. Surprisingly, only half of the fatal
crashes involved vehicles penetrating through the barrier and entering opposing traffic
lanes. The remaining fatalities appeared to be related to impact with the cable barrier
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itself. Although the rate of six fatal crashes per year represented a 90% reduction in fatal
crash rates when compared to the time prior to installation of cable barrier, these six fatal
crashes per year would indicate that as many as 250 fatal crashes occur annually when
extrapolated to data nationwide. Furthermore, crashes into the barriers indicated in this
study had a lower-than-average rate of severe and fatal crashes compared to the national
average of states surveyed in this study.
Further, if industry experts are correct and the installed base of cable barrier
doubles over the next decade, up to 500 motorists could die annually during cable median
barrier crashes within 10 short years. If this situation is to be avoided, improved cable
barrier designs and deployment guidelines must be developed while construction of the
barriers is still ongoing. The first step in developing better barrier designs and placement
guidelines is to discover the primary causes associated with cable barrier crashes that
produce fatalities and serious injuries.
In recognition of the critical need for a better understanding of the causes of cable
barrier penetrations and serious injury and fatal crashes, the Mid-America Transportation
Center (MATC) funded the study described herein. The goal of this study was to take the
first step toward improving cable median barrier performance by determining the factors,
such as impact conditions, vehicle type, median slope, and barrier placement, which tend
to produce cable barrier penetrations and serious injury and fatal crashes. The MidAmerica Transportation Center and the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility expect to
utilize the findings from this study to develop better barrier designs and prepare
guidelines for barrier implementation that can significantly reduce serious injury and fatal
crash rates involving cable median barrier.
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CHAPTER 4 STATE BARRIER INSTALLATION GUIDELINES
4.1 Summary of Barrier Installation Practice by State
Each state surveyed in this study indicated guidelines by which cable median
barriers were to be installed in the states. While all current state design standards are
reflective of the state-of-the-art with respect to cable median barrier placement in divided
medians to mitigate barrier underride, override, and rollover frequency, some historical
systems were constructed prior to this important guidance. Those systems may not reflect
the standards identified in this chapter.
The information presented in this report is accurate and current to the best
knowledge of the reporting authors. However, state design and installation guidelines are
available from state DOTs and should be consulted for the most up-to-date, accurate, and
detailed design standards available. This guide is not intended for use as a reference
manual. It is intended to summarize the current practices of states for overall comparison.
Iowa DOT currently requires cable median barriers to be placed 12 ft (3.7 m)
from the edge of the travel way. Iowa requires that on narrow ditches approximately 30 ft
(9.1 m) or less, that ditches be filled and slopes graded to 8:1 in front of the cable median
barrier. The barrier is then installed adjacent to the median centerline. On wider medians,
Iowa DOT requires that the approach slope to the barrier from the adjacent travel lanes be
graded to 8:1, and the slope behind the barrier be tapered to match the existing slope with
a slope shallower than or equal to 4:1. The grading in front of the cable median barrier is
10 ft (3.0 m) or wider.
Missouri DOT permits the use of high-tension cable median barriers on 4:1 slopes
when those systems were eligible for installation based on acceptable crash testing
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results. Low-tension cable median barriers on steep slopes are eligible for replacement,
and new or existing low-tension, 3-cable median barriers may only be installed on 6:1 or
flatter slopes. Barriers are installed on slopes based on median widths. For medians
greater than 30 ft (9.1 m) wide, barriers could be installed at least 8 ft (2.4 m) from the
edge of the travel way and up to 4 ft (1.2 m) down the approach slope. For medians less
than 30 ft (9.1 m) wide, median barriers are placed within 1 ft (0.3 m) of the center of the
ditch. Vegetative barriers are located up to 2 ft (0.6 m) behind the barrier system.
Ohio DOT requires barrier installation a minimum of 12 ft (3.7 m) from the travel
way and 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, on 6:1 or flatter V-ditches. Cable
median barrier could also be placed adjacent to the shoulder if the shoulder was
sufficiently wide. Shoulder placement is required on slopes steeper than 4:1. The
maximum slope behind the barrier relative to adjacent travel lanes is 4:1. The maximum
post spacing permitted is 15 ft (4.6 m).
Oklahoma DOT permits cable median barrier installation on 6:1 V-ditches or
flatter. Generally, cable median barriers are only placed on medians which permitted at
least 8 ft (2.4 m) on both sides of the median barrier without encroaching into adjacent
travel lanes, but there is consideration for narrower medians on the grounds that small
encroachments into opposing travel lanes are more desirable than cross-median crashes.
Barriers are not permitted between 1 ft (0.3 m) and 8 ft (2.4 m) of the center of the ditch.
Oregon DOT permits limited installations in 4:1 V-ditches where crash testing
indicated acceptable performance. Oregon DOT prohibited the use of cable median
barriers in median V-ditches between 1 and 8 ft (0.3 and 2.4 m) from the center of the
ditch. Barriers are always recommended to be placed as far from the travel was as could
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be practically installed. Median slopes are generally clear of debris, smooth, and
frequently seeded with grass.
Texas DOT recommends barrier placement as far from the roadway as practical.
Barriers may be placed within 1 ft (0.3 m) of the center of the median, or more than 8 ft
(2.4 m) from the center of the median. Barriers are not permitted for installation in
medians less than 24 ft (7.3 m) wide. Also, slopes in front of and behind the barrier are
not permitted to be steeper than 6:1. On tight curves with radii of 650 to 2,500 ft (198 to
762 m), post spacing is required to be 6 ft – 8 in. (2.0 m) on center. For radii between
2,501 and 5,500 ft (762 to 1,676 m), cable barrier post spacing is 10 ft (3.0 m) on center,
and for larger radii standard post spacing was utilized.
Utah DOT requires that cable median barriers be placed 1 ft (0.3 m) from the
ditch center, 8 ft (2.4 m) from the ditch center, or between 8 and 16 ft (2.4 and 4.9 m)
from one edge of the travel way. Utah DOT complies with recommendations from studies
which indicated that the best capture behavior and rollover management indicated that the
optimum placement was between 8 and 15 ft (2.4 and 4.6 m) from the edge of the road.
In stepped medians, offsets are usually made with respect to the higher-elevated roadway.
Cable median barriers are not used on medians with slopes steeper than 6:1.
Washington DOT required that cable median barriers be located 0 to 1 ft (0 to 0.3
m) of the center of the ditch, beyond 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, or near
roadway shoulders. Barriers located at ditch shoulders are required to have a minimum
clearance of 8 ft (2.4 m) from the roadway, and barriers were not permitted between 1 ft
and 8 ft (0.3 m and 2.4 m) of the center of the ditch for slopes between 10:1 and 6:1.
Cable median barriers could be installed on approach slopes of 6:1 or flatter, but required
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a minimum of 1 ft (0.3 m) lateral offset from the slope break point of a slope steeper than
6:1. Cable median barriers are also required to have a minimum top cable height of 35 in.
(889 mm) and a bottom cable height not greater than 19 in. (483 mm). In general, cable
barriers are always recommended to be located as far from the roadway as practicable.
Wisconsin DOT required that cable median barrier be placed 4 ft (1.2 m) from the
slope break point in 4:1 V-ditches, although frequently cable median barrier is not
selected for such steep terrain. Currently, cable median barrier is limited to installations
on 6:1 V-ditches, and when cable median barrier is necessary on roadways with 4:1 Vditches, typically two installations of cable median barrier are used adjacent to each
shoulder. On 6:1 V-ditches, cable median barriers are located a minimum of 8 ft (2.4 m)
from the center of the ditch, due to drainage and erosion concerns and to reduce risk of
underride or override from vehicles traversing through the center of the median.
4.2 Reference Definitions
Unless defined explicitly, the following definitions were utilized:
1. Shoulder
The shoulder was defined as relatively flat extension of the roadway outside of
the travel lanes in which no hazards were located. Shoulders could be paved or unpaved.
The edge of the shoulder was defined as a transition in slopes from the roadway to the
median. If no transition was present, the median was described as “flat” and the entire
median was treated as if the two roadway shoulders intersected.
2. Approach Slope
Approach slopes were defined as the first slopes encountered by errant vehicles
departing the roadway into the median after traversing the shoulder. In stepped medians
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in which there was only one median slope, the entire slope was considered an approach
slope. Vehicle travel direction was always consulted in crash data analysis to determine
the correct approach slope and vertical grade encountered. The barrier was considered to
be on the approach slope if the barrier was more than 3 ft (0.9 m) from the edge of the
shoulder.
3. Center of Ditch
The center of ditch referred to the area of the ditch spanning between 4 ft (1.2 m)
on either side of the ditch slope transition between approach and back slopes. This
definition does not necessarily refer to the physical centerline of the V-ditch. For ditches
with flat centers more than 4 ft (1.2 m) wide and less than 15% of the ditch width, the
entire flat center of the ditch was considered the ditch center.
4. Back Slope
The back slope, if present, was the slope encountered by a vehicle after crossing
the center of the V-ditch. Back slopes were not relevant on all crashes involving cable
median barrier redirection if the barriers were installed on traffic-side shoulders,
approach slopes, or near the center of the ditch. In sawtooth medians in which back
slopes had different slope rates than the approach slope, distinctions were made between
each slope rate. As with approach slopes, travel direction of the errant vehicle was
consulted when identifying which slope was an approach slope and which slope was a
back slope. A barrier was considered to be on the back slope if the barrier was more than
3 ft (0.9 m) from the opposite-side shoulder.
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5. Penetration
A barrier penetration was defined as a crash in which the impacting vehicle
traversed completely from one side of the barrier to the other side, such that no cables
were in advantageous positions to redirect the vehicle if it continued to move toward
opposite travel lanes. A potential penetration was similar, except that the vehicle came to
a stop before completely passing from one side of the cable median barrier to the other;
nonetheless, no cables were in advantageous positions to redirect the vehicle.
6. Rollover
A rollover was defined as a crash in which the impacting vehicle made a
minimum of one quarter-revolution about the longitudinal axis. In addition, to be
considered a rollover, the vehicle must have had at least one side or the top/roof contact
the ground to be considered a rollover.
7. Failure
Cable median barriers are generally designed to safely redirect or capture vehicles
with controlled lateral displacement of the barrier. As such, barrier failures were defined
as crashes in which any of the following events occurred: penetration, rollover, or
serious injury or fatality of an occupant in a vehicle striking the cable median barrier.
However, a barrier failure does not necessarily indicate a poor crash result. For
example, a barrier containment failure consisting of a penetration may result in property
damage only to the impacting vehicle and potentially one or two cable median barrier
posts. If the occupant of the impacting vehicle is unharmed, the barrier containment
failure would not be considered hazardous. Furthermore, if the vehicle which was
involved in a penetration event did not traverse into opposing travel lanes and the crash

14
injury level was not severe, the barrier may have satisfactorily prevented a cross-median
crash; in this instance, the barrier containment failure still resulted in acceptable overall
performance and the crash outcome was positive.
Though the nature of cross-median crash prevention can be speculative, history
has shown that even with penetration rates as high as 10% and rollover frequency as high
as 8% of all crashes, overall median severity on many roadways improved after cable
median barrier was installed. This was particularly true if a relatively high rate of
fatalities was already present due to cross-median crashes. Neither penetration nor
rollover containment failures indicate that the barrier is unsafe, but instead refer only to
the breach in containment experienced by the impacting vehicle.
Barrier systems were located consistent with the state design standards. The only
exceptions to this identification were with respect to systems installed before newer
design guidelines became available between 2004 and 2007. Such barrier systems were
analyzed and included in the results because of potential significance to the outcome of
this report.
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CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY OF CABLE BARRIER CRASHES
5.1 Description of Study
A total of 12 states responded to a survey request for crash data regarding cable
median barrier crashes. A total of more than 25,000 crashes were received which
documented periods between 1996 and 2010. In addition, approximately 6,000 crashes
with sufficient information were extracted for further evaluation. The state DOTs which
provided data for this study were: Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Washington, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Oregon, Utah, Kentucky, and Wisconsin.
Between 2007 and 2009, 7,093 cable median barrier crashes were reported in
Missouri, and of those crashes, 174 involved serious injuries or fatalities. Hence, the
combined serious injury and fatal crash rate for cable barrier in Missouri was found to be
2.5%. This finding was consistent with prior crash studies of cable barriers that indicated
low crash severities for cable barriers when compared to other types of barriers. For
example, the combined serious and fatal injury rates for guardrail and bridge rail crashes
in Kansas were 4.9% and 3.6% respectively [13].
Crash reports were obtained for all 174 crashes involving serious or fatal injuries
in the Missouri database, of which 169 of the crash reports contained detailed drawings
of the crash scene, including measurements of vehicle position near points of departure
and impact and vehicle tire marks laid down as the vehicle approached the barrier. A
careful examination of these crashes revealed that the cable barrier significantly
contributed to occupant injury in 128 of the crashes. The remaining 46 crashes involved
other mechanisms for occupant injury, including vehicle rollover prior to the barrier
impact, impacts with another vehicle before leaving the travelway, and acute health
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problems of the driver and occupants unrelated to the crash. When crashes involving
injuries produced prior to striking a barrier are eliminated from the database, the
combined serious and fatal injury crash rate was reduced to 1.8%.
Using reported lengths and widths measured by investigating officers at points of
vehicle departure from the road and at the point of impact with the cable median barrier,
crash scene diagrams were scaled to account for varying longitudinal and lateral
compression to fit the boundaries of the scene diagram, which generated approximate,
dimensionally representative crash scene drawings. Then, approximate scaled crash
scenes were used to generate vehicle trajectory information up to the point of impact with
the barrier system. Trajectory data included the vehicle CG trajectory angle, sideslip
angle, and the angle between the vehicle's longitudinal axis and the barrier. This
information was used to build a database of crash impact conditions to evaluate
vehicle/barrier interaction.
A set of 22 crashes in North Carolina were provided and had exact scene
measurements, photographs of the vehicle and system, median slope measurements,
median widths, and vehicle information. The CG trajectory and orientation angles were
also recorded for these crashes. The 22 crashes consisted only of penetrations; this dataset
was not a random sample.
An additional 890 cases were extracted from a crash database in the state of Ohio,
whose locations were observable using the Google Street View application. Slope data
digitized from topographical surveying were used to obtain median geometries at each
crash location, which was located using a combination of mile markers, latitudes and
longitudes, feature references, and information from indicative scene diagram
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representations. As with the Missouri database, unrelated crashes were excluded from the
analysis. Photographs of the crash scene and vehicle were requested for all crashes in
which photographs were taken of the scene, and those photos were released through the
Ohio Department of Public Safety, with additional cooperation from the Ohio State
Patrol.
A tabulated database of crashes was obtained from the Oklahoma DOT, including
crash results, roadway locations, and barrier types that were struck. Crash reports were
not available for the crashes listed, and vehicle year, make, and model were not available
for release under Oklahoma law. Due to limited funding, the purchase of crash report
copies was not pursued.
A tabulated database of cable median barrier crashes was received from the State
of Washington and covering a period between 1996 and 2008, with an additional
tabulated list of model, make, and year of the vehicles involved in cable barrier crashes.
Crash reports for serious injury and fatal crashes in the state were also provided. The
database included information regarding the crash result and the manner of collision,
along with an extensive investigation of injury tabulation. As with Oklahoma, the
majority of crashes did not have a scene diagram or a narrative available to definitively
identify crash injury causation, mechanisms of barrier containment failures, and potential
data overlap. Nonetheless the database was useful for evaluating crash statistics, overall
barrier performance, and installation practices.
The Iowa DOT provided a tabulated database of cable median barrier crashes and
results between 2006 and 2009, along with scene diagrams and crash narratives.
Although precise scene diagram measurements were not available, make, model, and year

18
of vehicles striking the cable median barrier were provided. Precise geographical
locational measurements were provided for each crash to identify the exact location of
the crash site for further investigation.
The Illinois DOT provided a crash database to evaluate propensities for crossmedian collisions, as well as a tabulated list of cable barrier crashes between 2005 and
2008 in the state of Illinois. Scene diagrams and narratives were not provided, and no
median information was available. However, precise geographical location measurements
were also available and the crash sites were located, allowing precise determination of
barrier usage at each site.
The Texas DOT provided a large block of crash data regarding all crashes, not
only cable median barrier crashes on divided median roadways between 2003 and 2009.
Unfortunately Texas law, which is similar to Oklahoma, does not permit the free
exchange of sensitive crash data such as scene diagrams, crash narratives, and occupant
information. Because the crash data could not be used to determine crash causation or
object struck, the Texas data were limited in scope to crash statistics for only broad
evaluations.
The Oregon DOT provided a crash summary database for cable median barrier
crashes in Oregon through 2007. This information included crash severity and relative
risk based on the total number of crashes, as well as crash statistics measured by DOT
researchers.
Similarly, the Kentucky Department of Public Safety (DPS) provided lists of
crash reports available for sorting. However, since this information was received later in
the analysis, the crash results were only used for generating statistical comparisons.
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The Utah DOT provided a database of scene diagrams, crash narratives,
impacting vehicle makes, models, and years, road segment traffic volumes, and crash
statistics. Photos and annotated scene diagrams with survey measurements were available
for purchase through the Department of Public Safety, but the available funding for the
project prohibited this extra expense. Utah also provided information regarding barrier
type for installations throughout the state.
The Wisconsin DOT provided crash reports, scene diagrams, and a webcam video
of a single cable barrier penetration event in the state of Wisconsin. Each cable barrier
crash was located using a geographical state surveying tool, and locations of each crash
were identified. Included in the crash reports were vehicle make, model, and year.
It is possible that a number of critical injury and fatal crashes involving cable
median barriers were incorrectly coded and therefore excluded from the database.
However, prior experience with crash reports associated with barrier crashes would
indicate that it is not common that a police officer fails to indicate the barrier was struck
for a crash involving serious injuries and fatalities. Therefore, it was assumed that the
number of crashes missing from the database was relatively low. Further, even if a
significant number of unreported severe crashes do occur, there is no reason to believe
that omitted cases would have a bias in any characteristic other than injury severity.
Because police officers are likely to spend more time investigating serious injury and
fatal crashes, the bias would reduce the risk of case omission as the severity increased.
5.2 Cable Barrier Impacts
In each state, cable barrier crashes were examined to determine if the barrier
failed to adequately capture or redirect the vehicle without subjecting occupants to
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serious injury or fatality. For the purpose of analysis, three categories were created:
penetration crashes, rollover crashes, and severe injury or fatality (A+K) crashes.
Severe A+K crashes were defined as crashes when at least one occupant of the
vehicle impacting the cable barrier experienced a severe or disabling injury or fatality. An
effort was made to exclude crashes in which the fatality or severe injury was not caused
at least in part by the reaction of the cable barrier. Cable barrier crashes in which the
vehicle was not redirected and passed from the impact side to non-impact side of the
barrier were classified as penetration crashes. Crashes in which the vehicle either
protruded under, between, or over the top of the barrier but came to rest before all four
tires passed to the non-impact side were classified as potential penetrations, since
repeated crashes with the same conditions would likely cause at least one penetration to
occur. Rollover crashes required that vehicles made at least a one-quarter revolution
about the longitudinal axis before coming to rest. Rollover crashes in which the vehicle
tripped before impacting the barrier impact or in which the rollover was unrelated to
cable barrier performance were excluded.
The crash set was further segregated in the event that a rollover occurred
contingently with a penetration. The overlapping data set was segregated into mutually
exclusive causative factors, using scene diagrams, crash narratives, vehicles, and median
information to determine which factor was the predominant or causative factor in
penetration and rollover crashes. If a vehicle penetrated through the barrier before rolling
over on the median back slope, opposing travel lanes, or other post-penetration impact
location, the major causative factor was determined to be a penetration. However, if it
was determined that the vehicle overturning caused or contributed to the vehicle
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penetrating through or over the top of the barrier, the major causative factor was
identified to be a rollover. Separate efforts were made to determine the injury causes of
A+K crashes due to contact with a barrier element, rollover, ejection, or other factors.
5.2.1 Weather and Road Conditions
Cable barrier crashes tabulated from each state DOT were investigated to evaluate
the frequency of weather-related crashes compared to annual numbers of days with
rainfall and snowfall in each state. The frequency of adverse weather effects in surveyed
states are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Some states were characterized by a wide variation in
regional annual snowfall and rainfall, based on data by NOAA National Climate Data
Center for annual precipitation.
The standard deviations in average days with snowfall were as large as the
average number of days with snowfall for some states. In some locations, the number of
days with snow or rain could vary from one region to another by a factor of 10 [14].
Conversely, states in the lower Midwest and coastal regions did not have large variations
in days with rainfall or snowfall, such as Missouri, North Carolina, and Washington.
Oklahoma averaged only 61 days with minimum rainfall of 0.01 in. (0.25 mm)
and three days with minimum snowfall of 0.1 in. (2.5 mm). States with the lowest relative
deviation based on the norm were located in the Midwest, including Ohio, Illinois,
Missouri, and Iowa, with the one notable exception of Washington.
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Table 2. Average Number of Days with Rainfall in Select Surveyed States
Average Number of Days with Minimum Rainfall of
0.01 in. (0.3 mm) 0.1 in. (3 mm)
0.5 in. (13 mm)
Illinois
94.5
64.1
26.2
Iowa
82.2
53.1
21.4
Missouri
89.6
63.8
28.5
North Carolina
115.5
79.1
33.1
Ohio
118.7
75.4
25.5
Oklahoma
61.4
44.6
24.2
Utah
55.0
25.1
4.9
Washington
104.9
62.1
19.9
Wisconsin
123.3
75.4
23.3
State

Frequency of Days with Minimum Rainfall of
Average
0.01 in. (2.5 mm) 0.1 in. (2.5 mm) 0.5 in. (2.5 mm) Deviation
25.9%
17.5%
7.2%
10.2%
22.5%
14.5%
5.9%
11.1%
24.6%
17.5%
7.8%
10.4%
31.6%
21.7%
9.1%
11.9%
32.5%
20.6%
7.0%
10.4%
16.8%
12.2%
6.6%
21.6%
15.1%
6.9%
1.3%
57.7%
28.7%
17.0%
5.5%
8.9%
33.8%
20.7%
6.4%
66.0%

Table 3. Average Number of Days with Snowfall in Select Surveyed States
State
Illinois
Iowa
Missouri
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Average Number of Days with Minimum Snowfall of
Frequency of Days with Minimum Snowfall of
Average
0.1 in. (3 mm)
1.0 in. (25 mm) 5.0 in. (127 mm) 0.01 in. (2.5 mm) 0.1 in. (2.5 mm) 0.5 in. (2.5 mm) Deviation
11.9
6.9
0.8
3.3%
1.9%
0.2%
47.6%
16.9
11.0
1.3
4.6%
3.0%
0.4%
22.6%
6.5
4.2
0.5
1.8%
1.2%
0.1%
42.5%
2.7
1.9
0.4
0.7%
0.5%
0.1%
172.2%
17.9
9.4
0.8
4.9%
2.6%
0.2%
68.9%
3.0
2.1
0.3
0.8%
0.6%
0.1%
75.2%
19.2
15.5
3.0
5.3%
4.3%
0.8%
113.6%
27.2
17.2
2.1
7.5%
4.7%
0.6%
39.3%
11.8
8.4
1.9
3.2%
2.3%
0.5%
195.0%

Monthly and annual precipitation were also tabulated by the states participating in
the research study, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. An approximate distribution of cable
median barrier located on a NOAA precipitation map is shown in Figure 1. Since most
states surveyed were in the central plains to Midwest region, the annual yearly
precipitation is similar for Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin, though Wisconsin had
locally larger rain and snow accumulation due to proximity to Lakes Superior and
Michigan. However, because Wisconsin is west and south of the Great Lakes, the
additional precipitation is highly localized, with as much as 140 in. (3,556 mm) of snow
falling annually at the southern-central portion of Lake Superior and 40 to 50 in. (1,016
to 1,270 mm) falling in most of the remainder of the state. Most cable median barrier in
Wisconsin was located around Fon du Lac, Wisconsin.

23
Whereas the average precipitation in Oklahoma was relatively large, most of the
cable median barrier was located around the Norman and Oklahoma City areas. Rainfall
in these regions is less frequent and with lower accumulation than in the eastern part of
the state.

Table 4. Average Monthly Precipitation in Select Surveyed States
State
Illinois
Iowa
Missouri
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Jan
1.8
0.9
1.8
3.8
2.3
1.5
1.0
5.9
1.0

Feb
1.9
1.0
2.0
3.5
2.1
1.6
1.1
3.7
1.0

Mar
2.6
1.8
2.9
4.1
2.9
2.8
1.3
3.9
1.7

Average Monthly Precipitation, 50th Percentile (in.)
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
3.4
4.4
3.8
3.6
3.2
2.7
2.7
3.2
3.2
4.3
4.5
3.9
3.6
3.0
2.2
1.8
3.8
4.8
4.2
3.7
3.3
3.3
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.6
4.1
4.7
4.6
3.9
3.2
3.4
3.5
4.3
3.9
3.8
3.2
2.8
2.6
3.0
3.1
4.6
4.2
2.6
2.6
3.2
2.9
2.2
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.3
1.0
2.9
2.3
1.8
0.7
0.7
1.5
3.6
6.2
2.8
3.4
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.3
2.6
1.9

Dec
2.3
1.2
2.4
3.6
2.8
1.8
1.0
5.6
1.3

Annual
35.7
31.3
38.7
45.8
37.1
33.0
12.2
38.9
30.1

Dec
3.8
6.5
1.7
0.3
4.3
0.6
9.0
6.9
9.8

Annual
13.1
23.7
6.2
2.0
19.1
1.7
40.5
20.4
40.6

Table 5. Average Monthly Snowfall in Select Surveyed States
State
Illinois
Iowa
Missouri
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Jan
5.1
6.7
2.3
0.7
7.0
0.8
9.1
5.6
10.6

Feb
3.0
5.6
2.0
0.6
4.3
0.2
8.2
2.9
8.7

Mar
1.1
3.5
0.3
0.2
2.9
0.2
5.8
1.5
7.0

Apr
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
2.8
0.7
1.3

Average Monthly Snowfall, 50th Percentile
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

(in.)
Oct
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.2
0.1

Nov
0.1
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
4.5
2.4
3.0

Ohio’s annual precipitation was higher because of close proximity to Lake Erie,
which occasionally resulted in more than 5 in. (127 mm) of rain or 12 in. (305 mm) of
snow within a span of a few days in some cable median barrier locations. In general,
southern parts of the state recorded higher precipitation totals, due to contributions from
gulf and coastal storm systems.
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Figure 1. Seleected Approx
ximate Barriier Locationns with Annuual Precipitattion Estimattes
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additional scrutiny to identify the cause of the poor barrier performance. The process of
selection and causality used in this study is described in greater detail in Chapters 8 and
11.
Results of each state were segregated by weather conditions (i.e., snowing,
raining), road conditions at the time of the crash (i.e., wet, snow-covered, slush), crash
severity, type of cable barrier system that was struck, the date of crash, and the barrier’s
performance. The results are tabulated in Tables 6 through 11. Primary barrier
containment failures were identified and segregated by predominant weather and road
conditions. By considering only primary barrier failures, secondary events such as
penetration following rollover were excluded from the analysis. Primary barrier failure
segregation also served the purpose of establishing mutually exclusive categories of
penetration or rollover crashes; this was useful in determining what driving conditions
were associated with the predominant cause of barrier containment failures.
Since some states had significant volumes of data and others had smaller data
sets, a crash volume weighting factor was used to bias results toward states with more
crashes when each state’s crash results were averaged together. Weighting factors applied
to determine the approximate average rate cable barrier containment failures consisted of
an average of the aggregate percentage of failures in each state with the aggregate
percentage of failures of all states. This process weighted data from states with large
volumes of crash data, but still incorporated data from states with limited available crash
databases to draw from. The average rate of vehicular penetration through the barrier was
approximately 9.3% when penetrations were the primary barrier containment failure. In
contrast, the composite average rate of vehicle rollover as a primary containment failure

Table 6. Crash Result in States by Predominant Weather Condition
Weather Condition
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
150
Rain
48
Snow or Sleet
100
Fog or Mist
4
Strong Crosswind
2
Unknown or Other
1
Total
305

Illinois
1
Penetration
-

Rollover Crashes
8
60
0
10
3
52
0
1
0
3
0
0
11
126

Iowa
Penetration
4
1
4
0
0
0
9

Rollover Crashes
1
404
0
164
1
274
0
7
0
0
0
9
2
858

Ohio
Penetration
46
10
18
2
0
2
78

Oklahoma
2
Rollover Crashes Cross-Median
30
1147
26
3
415
7
1
190
1
1
13
0
0
4
0
2
11
0
37
1780
34

Rollover Crashes
48
479
6
43
4
397
1
3
1
3
0
2
60
927

Utah
Penetration
26
2
10
0
0
0
38

Rollover Crashes
42
1105
1
290
8
225
0
20
0
1
0
6
51
1647

Washington
Penetration Rollover Crashes
139
94
44
45
7
3
24
11
49
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
210
115
97

Wisconsin
Penetration
7
0
5
0
0
0
12

Rollover
4
0
2
0
0
0
6

Weather Condition
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
150
Rain
48
Snow or Sleet
100
Fog or Mist
4
Strong Crosswind
2
Unknown or Other
1
Total
305

Illinois
1
Penetration
-

Rollover Crashes
5.3%
60
0.0%
10
3.0%
52
1
3
0
3.6%
126

Iowa
Penetration
6.7%
10.0%
7.7%
7.1%

Rollover Crashes
1.7%
404
0.0%
164
1.9%
274
7
0
9
1.6%
858

Ohio
Penetration
11.4%
6.1%
6.6%
28.6%
22.2%
9.1%

Oklahoma
2
Rollover Crashes Cross-Median
7.4%
1147
2.3%
1.8%
415
1.7%
0.4%
190
0.5%
14.3%
13
4
22.2%
11
4.3%
1780
1.9%

Rollover Crashes
4.2%
479
1.4%
43
2.1%
397
7.7%
3
25.0%
3
2
3.4%
927

Utah
Penetration
5.4%
4.7%
2.5%
4.1%

Rollover Crashes
8.8%
1105
2.3%
290
2.0%
225
20
1
6
5.5%
1647

Washington
Penetration Rollover Crashes
12.6%
8.5%
44
15.5%
2.4%
3
10.7%
4.9%
49
10.0%
15.0%
0
0
1
12.8%
7.0%
97

Wisconsin
Penetration
15.9%
0.0%
10.2%
12.4%

Rollover
9.1%
0.0%
4.1%
6.2%

Table 7. Crash Result in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Weather Condition
Iowa
Penetrations
4
1
4
0
0
0
9

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
1
404
46
0
164
10
1
274
18
0
7
2
0
0
0
0
9
2
2
858
78

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
30
479
26
3
43
2
1
397
10
1
3
0
0
3
0
2
2
0
37
927
38

Rollovers Crashes
42
44
1
3
8
49
0
0
0
0
0
1
51
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
7
0
5
0
0
0
12

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
4
987
83
0
220
13
2
772
37
0
11
2
0
6
0
0
12
2
6
2008
137

Rollovers
77
4
12
1
0
2
96

Crashes
60
10
52
1
3
0
126

Iowa
Penetrations
6.7%
10.0%
7.7%
0.0%
0.0%
7.1%

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
1.7%
404
11.4%
164
6.1%
1.9%
274
6.6%
7
28.6%
0
9
22.2%
1.6%
858
9.1%

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
7.4%
479
5.4%
1.8%
43
4.7%
0.4%
397
2.5%
14.3%
3
3
22.2%
2
4.3%
927
4.1%

Rollovers Crashes
8.8%
44
2.3%
3
2.0%
49
0
0
1
5.5%
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
15.9%
10.2%
12.4%

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
9.1%
987
8.4%
220
5.9%
4.1%
772
4.8%
11
18.2%
6
12
16.7%
6.2%
2008
6.8%

Rollovers
7.8%
1.8%
1.6%
9.1%
16.7%
4.8%
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Crashes
60
10
52
1
3
0
126

Table 8. Crash Result in States by Predominant Road Condition
Crashes
127
63
113
2
305

Illinois
1
Penetrations
0

Iowa
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
8
44
4
1
15
2
2
67
3
0
0
0
11
126
9

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
2
333
40
0
260
18
0
261
20
0
4
0
2
858
78

Oklahoma
Utah
2
Rollovers Crashes Cross-Median Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
30
1575
24
56
364
21
5
39
9
0
99
5
2
164
1
4
457
12
0
2
0
0
7
0
37
1780
34
60
927
38

Washington
Wisconsin
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
35
888
115
79
26
5
1
3
398
57
12
7
1
0
13
344
38
23
63
6
5
0
17
0
1
1
0
0
51
1647
210
115
97
12
6

Crashes
127
63
113
2
305

Illinois
1
Penetrations
0.0%

Iowa
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
6.3%
44
9.1%
1.6%
15
13.3%
1.8%
67
4.5%
0
3.6%
126
7.1%

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
4.5%
333
12.0%
260
6.9%
261
7.7%
4
1.6%
858
9.1%

Oklahoma
Utah
2
Rollovers Crashes Cross-Median Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
9.0%
1575
1.5%
3.6%
364
5.8%
1.9%
39
23.1%
99
5.1%
0.8%
164
0.6%
2.4%
457
2.6%
2
7
4.3%
1780
1.9%
3.4%
927
4.1%

Washington
Wisconsin
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
9.6%
888
13.0%
8.9%
26
19.2%
3.8%
3.0%
398
14.3%
3.0%
7
14.3%
2.8%
344
11.0%
6.7%
63
9.5%
7.9%
17
1
5.5%
1647
12.8%
7.0%
97
12.4%
6.2%

Table 9. Crash Result in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Road Condition
Road Conditions
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
44
Wet or Pooling Water
15
Snow, Slush, or Ice
67
Unknown or Other
0
Total
126

Iowa
Penetrations
4
2
3
0
9

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
2
333
40
0
260
18
0
261
20
0
4
0
2
858
78

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
30
364
21
5
99
5
2
457
12
0
7
0
37
927
38

Rollovers Crashes
35
26
3
7
13
63
0
1
51
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
5
1
6
0
12

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
1
767
70
0
381
26
5
848
41
0
12
0
6
2008
137

Rollovers
68
8
20
0
96

Road Conditions
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
44
Wet or Pooling Water
15
Snow, Slush, or Ice
67
Unknown or Other
0
Total
126

Iowa
Penetrations
9.1%
13.3%
4.5%
7.1%

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
4.5%
333
12.0%
260
6.9%
261
7.7%
4
1.6%
858
9.1%

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
9.0%
364
5.8%
1.9%
99
5.1%
0.8%
457
2.6%
7
4.3%
927
4.1%

Rollovers Crashes
9.6%
26
3.0%
7
2.8%
63
1
5.5%
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
19.2%
14.3%
9.5%
12.4%

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
3.8%
767
9.1%
381
6.8%
7.9%
848
4.8%
12
6.2%
2008
6.8%

Rollovers
8.9%
2.1%
2.4%
4.8%
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Table 10. Average Rates of Barrier Containment Failure by Predominant Weather
Condition
Weather Condition

Penetration Rollover

No Adverse Effects
Rain
Snow or Sleet
Average Failure Rate

9.8%
6.9%
6.7%
9.3%

6.7%
2.1%
2.1%
5.1%

Table 11. Average Rates of Barrier Containment Failure by Predominant Road Condition
Road Condition

Penetration Rollover

No Adverse Effects
Wet or Pooling Water
Snow, Slush, or Ice
Average Failure Rate

11.5%
9.9%
6.1%
9.3%

6.8%
2.5%
3.8%
5.1%

mechanism was approximately 5.1%. When considering the rates of actual vehicle
rollover and penetration over the barrier and relaxing the mutually-exclusive primary
failure mechanism restriction, the composite rate of penetrations and rollovers rose to
approximately 9.9% and 8.1%, respectively.
Three key conclusions were drawn from the data:
(1) Dry, clear conditions were associated with the highest rates of penetration or
rollover. Rollover crash outcomes were more dependent on the prevailing
weather conditions and road conditions than penetration crash outcomes.
During adverse weather conditions or when roads were not dry and clear,
penetration and rollover propensities diminished. This is likely because travel
speeds are reduced during inclement weather, and errant vehicles have
generally lower CG trajectory angles.
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(2) In general, the number of rollovers and penetrations was lower during wet or
snowy weather. Although states with higher annual precipitation experienced
higher annual rates of vehicle penetration through the barrier systems, the
locations of the cable median barriers in wetter states affected crash
likelihood. As the volume of both rain and snow increased, median geometries
tended to become steeper to assist with drainage off of the roadway. Steep
median conditions aggravate penetration and rollover propensity.
(3) Reductions in vehicle rollovers during inclement weather were caused by a
significant decrease in contact friction between the tires of the vehicle and the
wet or snow-covered ground. When contact friction was decreased, the roll
moment applied to the vehicle in sliding conditions was significantly reduced.
In penetration crashes, however, the vehicle was unable to slow down as
effectively when the ground friction was reduced. Furthermore, the vehicle
was able to rotate to very high orientation angles on wet or snowy ground
relative to dry ground. The largest rate of reduction of penetration crashes
related to adverse weather events is due to reduced travel speeds, and
particularly a reduction in the effective impact angle present at the time of the
crash. During dry road and median conditions, oversteering tended to produce
high CG trajectory angles into the barrier and high orientation angles, since
the ground-tire friction could produce large lateral forces on the vehicle. On
low-friction wet or snow-covered ground and road, even in clear weather, less
lateral force was available to redirect the vehicle’s path, and CG trajectory
angles were reduced.

30
5.2.2 Weather Conditions and Barrier Type
Rates of barrier containment failures by type of barrier were also investigated to
evaluate the effect of weather on vehicle redirection. A comparison of crash results by
barrier make and weather condition is shown in Table 12. Additionally, a comparison of
crash result by barrier make and road condition is shown in Table 13. Since rollovers
were frequently coded with crash results in DPS reports, rollover characteristics were
available even when no scene diagrams were provided in some states. However,
penetrations are not currently tabulated explicitly by most responding officers or DOTs,
and thus a scene diagram was required to make the proper crash result determination. As
a result, the total number of applicable crashes in the penetration database was
substantially lower than the number of crashes in the rollover database.
It was observed that various proprietary barrier systems had markedly different rates of
penetration and rollover. Although its database was limited in scope, the Brifen Wire
Rope Safety Fence (WRSF) had the lowest rate of penetration when compared to other
high-tension systems. Conversely, Nucor Marion Steel’s NU-CABLE system with three
cables had a large database of hits and a considerable number of penetrations, with a
penetration frequency of 9.7%. Additionally, the CASS and generic systems had
intensive crash histories covering a broad geographical area, whereas the Nucor, Brifen,
and Gibraltar systems were largely restricted to narrow geographical regions which
affected distributions of weather patterns. Although Gibraltar’s penetration frequency
was higher than the Nucor system, the Gibraltar database too small in size to concretely
determine penetration frequency and thus potential “outlier” cases contributed significant
uncertainty.

Table 12. Crash Result per System in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Weather Condition
Weather Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Rain
Snow or Sleet
Fog or Mist
Strong Crosswind
Unknown or Other
Total

Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes Penetrations Frequency
3020
224
7.4%
969
59
6.1%
243
13
5.3%
28
6
21.4%
0
0
8
0
4268
302
7.1%

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Trinity CASS
Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency
56
3
5.4%
333
40
12.0%
1134
112
9.9%
29
2
6.9%
131
8
6.1%
189
26
13.8%
33
3
9.1%
213
15
7.0%
652
33
5.1%
0
0
7
2
28.6%
16
2
12.5%
1
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
2
25.0%
5
0
119
8
6.7%
692
67
9.7%
2002
173
8.6%

Weather Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Rain
Snow or Sleet
Fog or Mist
Strong Crosswind
Unknown or Other
Total

Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency
542
53
9.8%
159
7
4.4%
81
3
3.7%
8
2
25.0%
0
0
5
0
795
65
8.2%

Crashes
991
338
194
9
3
9
1544

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
39
3.9%
446
29
6.5%
1183
3
0.9%
168
3
1.8%
209
4
2.1%
288
2
0.7%
661
1
11.1%
11
1
9.1%
17
1
33.3%
3
0
6
0
9
2
22.2%
5
48
3.1%
925
37
4.0%
2081

Trinity CASS
Rollovers
Frequency
94
7.9%
1
0.5%
18
2.7%
1
5.9%
0
0
114
5.5%

Table 13. Crash Result per System in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Road Condition
Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes Penetrations Frequency
437
53
12.1%
214
28
13.1%
135
14
10.4%
9
0
795
95
11.9%

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Trinity CASS
Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency
37
3
8.1%
278
34
12.2%
879
93
10.6%
36
2
5.6%
212
15
7.1%
313
37
11.8%
46
3
6.5%
199
18
9.0%
793
43
5.4%
0
0
3
0
17
0
119
8
6.7%
692
67
9.7%
2002
173
8.6%

Road Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Wet or Pooling Water
Snow, Slush, or Ice
Unknown or Other
Total

Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency
437
45
10.3%
214
9
4.2%
135
10
7.4%
9
1
795
65
8.2%

Crashes
1269
80
193
2
1544

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
45
3.5%
374
30
8.0%
951
1
1.3%
262
4
1.5%
313
2
1.0%
284
3
1.1%
800
0
5
0
17
48
3.1%
925
37
4.0%
2081

Trinity CASS
Rollovers
Frequency
76
8.0%
7
2.2%
31
3.9%
0
114
5.5%
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Road Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Wet or Pooling Water
Snow, Slush, or Ice
Unknown or Other
Total
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Unfortunately, it was misleading to separate barrier statistics by manufacturer
without a more intensive investigation into site details and state crash histories. Some
states primarily use one type of barrier system. Since impact conditions and vehicle type
can vary widely, these factors can lead to different propensities for penetration or rollover
due to median geometries, traffic volumes, weather patterns, and barrier placement.
5.2.3 Weather and Time of Year
The number of crashes into cable barriers was plotted with severity against week
number of each crash to determine if there was any additional adverse effect from the
time of year, and by extension specific weather patterns, on crash severity and frequency.
The result is shown in Figure 2. A significant spike in crashes was noted between
December (beginning in week 47) and February (ending week 9), which was likely
related to an increase in low-severity crashes during snowy or icy conditions. Crash
frequency was also largely related to cultural patterns as well. For example, the spike in
crashes during week 12 corresponds to the approximate time frame for collegiate spring
breaks. However, no distinct pattern of fatalities could be discerned except for a small
rise during summer months, which may be due to an increased number of vehicle miles
traveled.
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Figure 2. Crash Frequency and Severity by Week Number
For a different perspective, crash severity was also plotted by month, as shown in
Figure 3. The number of crashes was significantly higher in the winter months, especially
in December, when the first snows of each winter season usually fell. Monthly averages
of fatalities were approximately constant between January and April, with increased
numbers of fatalities in June, July, and September. This is likely the result of summer
vacations and travel which is more common in the summer. The analogous drop in
fatalities and crashes in August is likely due to the end of summer travel and vacations
and correspond to the impending start of the school year.
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Crash Frequency and Outcome by Month
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Figure 3. Crash Frequency and Severity by Month
5.2.4 Slope Characteristics
A frequently-cited parameter for the likely cause of barrier containment failures
was related to median slopes and barrier placement within medians. Median slopes were
investigated in several different states to determine the relative contribution to the crash
result. Whenever it was possible, median geometries were obtained exactly using site
details collected by DOT personnel or using geotechnical surveying equipment. Ohio
DOT was able to provide geodetic survey information for all roadways with cable median
barrier installed. In other states, selected site tours and investigation using barrier
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geometries, photogrammetry, and reference configurations were applied to photographs
of cable barriers at crash sites observable using the Google Maps street view application.
The 857 cable median barrier crash records between 2007 and 2010 from Ohio
were tabulated to determine the relative frequency of penetration and rollover crash
events by median geometry. Crash results were tabulated by median geometries at the
crash sites and are shown in Tables 14 through 16. Higher slope rates tended to increase
penetration propensity, but there was a large number of penetrations which occurred on
flat slopes or near roadway shoulders. Surprisingly, crashes into cable median barriers
located on the back-side median ditch resulted in fewer penetrations than when the
barrier was installed in either the ditch center or on the approach slope of the median.
However, independent of barrier placement in the median, barriers placed in medians
with flat approach slopes always had an equal or higher rate of penetration than barriers
located on an approach slopes with slope rates between 6:1 and 10:1. Since FHWA
currently permits barriers to be placed on 6:1 or shallower approach slopes, these findings
suggest that sloped median crashes occurring in medians wider than 40 ft (12 m) may not
be as critical as was first estimated.
Very few rollovers occurred on moderately steep slopes. Rollovers were more
frequent on the shallower slopes. More than 71% of the rollovers occurred on approach
slopes of 8:1 or flatter. Alternatively, 13% of rollovers occurred on medians with
approach slopes steeper than 6:1. However, 56.7% of all crashes on Ohio roadways
occurred on roads with slopes of 8:1 or flatter, and steep median crashes constituted
13.9% of all crashes.
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Table 14. Crash Results for Flat or V-Ditch Medians with Barriers on Traffic-Side Slopes

Barrier on Traffic‐Side Shoulder or Slope
Approach Slope Crashes Penetrations % Penetrations
Steeper than 6:1
73
12
16.4%
6:1‐8:1
129
9
7.0%
8:1‐10:1
118
6
5.1%
Flatter than 10:1
174
17
9.8%
All Crashes
494
44
8.9%

Rollovers
3
1
6
9
19

% Rollovers
4.1%
0.8%
5.1%
5.2%
3.8%

Table 15. Crash Results for V-Ditch Medians with Barriers in Center of Ditch
Barrier within 4 ft (1.2 m) of Center of V‐Ditch
Approach Slope

Steeper than 6:1

Backside Slope
Steeper than 6:1
6:1‐8:1

8:1‐10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1‐8:1
6:1‐8:1
8:1‐10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1‐8:1
8:1‐10:1
8:1‐10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
Flatter than 10:1 6:1‐8:1
8:1‐10:1
Total
All Crashes

Crashes
1

Penetrations Penetrations Rollovers Rollovers
1
100.0%
0
‐

6

0

‐

0

‐

6
4
17
7
19
11
8
45
6
15
11
10
42
2
2
20
24
128

2
0
3
1
1
1
2
5
1
1
2
3
7
0
0
4
4
19

33.3%
‐
17.6%
14.3%
5.3%
9.1%
25.0%
11.1%
16.7%
6.7%
18.2%
30.0%
16.7%
‐
‐
20.0%
16.7%
14.8%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
2
2
3

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
9.1%
‐
2.4%
‐
‐
10.0%
8.3%
2.3%
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Table 16. Crash Results for V-Ditch Medians with Barriers Installed on Back Slope
Barrier on Opposite Slope of V‐Ditch
Approach Slope

Backside Slope
Steeper than 6:1
6:1‐8:1
Steeper than 6:1
8:1‐10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1‐8:1
6:1‐8:1
8:1‐10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1‐8:1
8:1‐10:1
8:1‐10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
Flatter than 10:1 6:1‐8:1
8:1‐10:1
Total
All Crashes

Crashes
12
9
4
4
29
6
30
14
14
64
12
18
23
15
68
3
14
57
74
235

Penetrations Penetrations Rollovers Rollovers
0
‐
0
‐
1
11.1%
0
‐
2
50.0%
0
‐
1
25.0%
1
25.0%
4
13.8%
1
3.4%
0
‐
0
‐
1
3.3%
0
‐
2
14.3%
0
‐
1
7.1%
1
7.1%
4
6.3%
1
1.6%
0
‐
0
‐
1
5.6%
0
‐
3
13.0%
3
13.0%
1
6.7%
1
6.7%
5
7.4%
4
5.9%
0
‐
0
‐
0
‐
1
7.1%
7
12.3%
2
3.5%
7
9.5%
3
4.1%
20
8.5%
9
3.8%

For moderately steep slopes of 6:1 to 8:1, the vehicle tended to travel toward the
center of the ditch (i.e. to the lowest point), since that is an energetically favorable
position due to minimization of gravitational potential energy. Barriers installed on these
slopes applied redirective forces which were largely parallel with the slope because of the
orientation of the vehicle at impact. Whereas the initial applied load on the vehicle due to
cable barrier systems was large, if the vehicle’s orientation angle was not excessive, the
slope tended to counteract the roll moment applied by the barrier on the vehicle. This was
historically evident in most full-scale crash tests conducted on level and sloped terrain.
Following redirection, vehicles departing cable barrier systems tended to redirect at very
low angles [16-18]. Low-angle redirection on a 6:1 slope caused a subsequent continued
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engagement between the vehicle and the barrier, and the reactive force from the cable
barrier largely balanced the overturning moment from the slope, improving vehicle
stability. The competing roll influences are explained in greater detail in Chapter 11.
Occasionally, based on orientation angle, the vehicle yawed counterclockwise
toward higher orientation angles (i.e., yawing with the left-front and right-rear corners
leading) near a post location. When the yaw occurred on a slope, the vehicle pitched
forward to allow the rear wheels to rise consistent with the slope, which increased local
tire-ground friction. On shallower slopes, the resistance was decreased, and on steeper
slopes, resistance increased significantly. For moderate slopes such as 6:1 to 8:1 slopes,
the increase in resistance due to yaw motion on the slope was not trivial but did not
contribute to rollover; instead, these slope rates tended to resist yaw rotations to 90
degree orientation angles, then increased yaw tendency thereafter. If the vehicle did not
trip as the vehicle orientation approached 90 degrees to the barrier, the vehicle stabilized
and the trailing end of the vehicle rotated into the barrier and became the leading end. On
flat or nearly flat slopes, there was no re-stabilizing slope which could shift the vehicle
toward tracking in either frontal or rear directions. Instead, the increase in trailing-end
tire friction due to tire slip tended to arrest the yaw motion of the vehicle near an
orientation angle of 90 or 270 degrees and initiate rollover.
A statistical analysis was conducted on the slope data to determine how crash
outcome depended on median approach slope rate. A chi-squared test on crashes in Ohio
indicated that occupants of vehicles involved in penetration or rollover crashes were 5
times more likely to be seriously injured or killed than occupants involved in nonpenetration or non-rollover crashes. Further segregation of the crash data and additional
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statistical tests indicated that penetration crashes were 3-times more likely to produce
serious injury or fatality, and rollover crashes were 10-times more likely to involve A+K
injuries, than non-penetration or non-rollover crashes.
Other chi-squared tests for independence were performed on the penetration and
rollover frequency as a function of slope steepness. The chi-squared test for
independence indicated that penetration frequency was not independent of slope
steepness at the 10% confidence level, and rollover frequency was not independent of
slope steepness at the 4% confidence level. An analogous but equally true statement
would be that the risk of penetration would be correlated to slope steepness in no less
than 90% of the cable median barrier crashes, and the risk of rollover would be correlated
to slope steepness in no less than 96% of the crashes. However, the functional nature of
the correlation was not a factor in this test.
Further investigation of the correlation demonstrated two trends which were
supported by crash data in all of the participating states. In general, the highest risk of
barrier penetration and rollover risk either occurred on slopes steeper than 6:1 or slopes
flatter than 10:1. When the relative risk of rollover in each category was plotted against
slope steepness, an asymptotic-like relationship was obtained in both system failure
types. The penetration and rollover risk plots and interpolated risk curves obtained from
this effort are shown in Figures 4 through 6. The lowest risk for both penetration and
rollover combined occurred on median slopes between 7:1 and 6:1, and the risk increased
for both steeper and flatter slopes. Rollovers were more frequent on level ground than on
steep slopes in this study, although there were a limited number of very steep slopes in
this database. Penetrations were much more frequent on steeper slope rates; this was
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expected and was consistent with the current state-of-knowledge of cable barrier design
with respect to vehicle motion on slopes.
However, divided medians in Ohio were frequently wider than 50 ft (15 m). As a
result, the bouncing and underride tendencies aggravated in narrow medians less than 40
ft (12 m) wide were not present in this database. Caution should be used when applying
these results to narrow median applications.
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Penetration Risk

Statistical Risk of Result

Rollover Risk
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Figure 4. Statistical Analysis of Penetration and Rollover Risk by Median Slope
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Approximately 80% of the crashes in the Ohio database occurred on Nucor NUCABLE barrier systems. Precise slope data were not available at the time of this study
from most of the other states and barrier systems involved in this research effort.
Nonetheless, a concerted effort was made to tabulate approximate median conditions in
other states with different barrier systems.
A database of Missouri median conditions available at all sites was beyond the
scope of this study, but median geometries for serious crashes involving penetrations or
rollovers were tabulated. The Missouri DOT had approximately 950 miles of lowtension, 3-cable median barrier installed on interstate roadways. Even though the vast
majority of Missouri’s interstate system has V-ditches with slopes as steep as 4:1, many
severe penetration and rollover crashes occurred on shallower slopes. Missouri’s severe
crash data is shown in Tables 17 and 18. Unlike Ohio, many Missouri medians were
relatively narrow, with widths of 40 ft (12 m) or less.
Table 17. Missouri’s Severe Penetration Crash Median Slope Summary

Approach Slope
4:1-6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
All Severe
Penetrations

Severe Penetration Crashes
Barrier Installed On
Shoulders (Both)
1
1
0
1
3
7%

Approach Slope
4
5
2
2
13
31%

Center
5
9
6
2
22
52%

Opposite Slope
1
1
1
1
4
10%

All Severe
Penetrations
11
16
9
6

26%
38%
21%
14%
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Table 18. Missouri’s Severe Rollover Crash Median Slope Summary

Approach Slope
4:1-6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
All Severe
Rollovers

Severe Rollover Crashes
Barrier Installed On
Shoulders (Both)
1
2
0
0
3
11%

Approach Slope
0
1
3
2
6
21%

Center
3
6
3
3
15
54%

Opposite Slope
0
0
4
0
4
14%

All Severe
Rollovers
4
9
10
5

14%
32%
36%
18%

Despite the limited data set, some tendencies were clear. Barriers installed on
approach slopes relative to traffic flow of encroaching vehicles in Missouri were more
frequently involved in penetration crashes, and the most common location for penetration
was when the median barrier was located near the center of the slope. This is not
surprising, and the same effect was observed in the Ohio median slopes database.
Barriers installed on approach slopes, back slopes, and the center of the V-ditch were
subject to the greatest variation in front-end height and impact orientation angles of the
impacting vehicle [19]. Since a large number of low-tension, 3-cable median barrier
installations in Missouri were located near the center of relatively steep, narrow Vditches, it was not surprising that center impacts were most common in both the severe
penetration and severe rollover crashes. However, a proportionate distribution of crashes
on each slope type was not available, so estimates of the rates of penetrations or rollovers
based on slope steepness were not applicable.
Approximately 46% of all severe rollover crashes and 64% of all severe
penetration crashes occurred on slope steeper than 8:1; this indicates that rollovers were
less frequent on the steeper slopes than penetrations were. The slopes flatter than 8:1
were relatively infrequent in Missouri where cable median barriers were installed, but
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still accounted for 54% of all severe rollover crashes. General observations about median
slope performance were not applicable in Missouri, since the database did not incorporate
non-severe crashes. However, variations in the results of the Ohio and Missouri databases
were likely due to four reasons: (1) Missouri used a standard low-tension, 3-cable
median barrier with S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) steel posts, which are stronger in weak-axis and
strong-axis bending than most proprietary system posts; (2) the Missouri database was
limited to only severe crashes; (3) slopes flatter than 6:1 were infrequent; and (4) medians
were typically narrower in Missouri than in Ohio.
5.2.5 Impact Conditions
Vehicular impact conditions were investigated by performing crash
reconstructions with available scene diagrams and photographic evidence, when
available. A total of 110 severe crashes with enough information to reconstruct the crash
were analyzed in the State of Missouri. Vehicle CG trajectory, orientation, and sideslip
angles were calculated. Unfortunately, roadway curvature data were not available, which
would allow for comparison of expected and actual CG trajectory angles; however, most
roadways were straight in this study.
The CG trajectory angle was defined as the angle formed between the vehicle CG
path and a tangent line to the barrier at the point of impact (POI). Vehicle orientation
angle was defined as the angle formed by a driver’s line of sight (LOS) and a tangent line
to the barrier at the POI or equivalently, the angle between the vehicle’s centerline and
the barrier tangent. The sideslip angle represented the degree to which a vehicle was
“tracking,” a condition in which the rear tires follow the tracks of the front tires. Sideslip
angles were measured between the CG trajectory angle and the orientation angle of the
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vehicle at the POI. For both trajectory and orientation angles, vehicle heading toward the
median was positive ranging between 0 and 180 degrees; heading angles directed away
from the median ranged between 180 and 360 degrees.
Trajectory angles were plotted by orientation angle and sideslip angle, and are
shown in Figures 7 and 8. Although sideslip angles between the path of the vehicle and
heading can exceed 90 deg, high sideslip angles were generated by non-zero yaw rates;
this is assumed to be an effectively non-tracking impact condition. Moreover, if the
driver was conscious and aware to steer the vehicle in avoidance maneuvers, a large
number of drivers will also instinctively apply the brakes and attempt to stop an errant
vehicle, which further contributes to non-tracking behavior. The threshold between when
a vehicle was considered tracking and non-tracking was determined to be approximately
20 degrees based on analysis of non-tracking behavior on crash results [20].
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Figure 7. CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles in Severe Cable Median Barrier Crashes
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Figure 8. CG Trajectory and Sideslip Angles in Severe Cable Median Barrier Crashes
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The trajectory angle distribution was very high relative to other studies conducted
on severe crash results. The severe CMB crash results were compared to the distribution
of severe crash results in the 2010 NCHRP Report No. 665 database [21]. Historically,
the roadside safety community collectively agreed that the 85th percentile impact
condition for both speeds and angles could be regarded as a practical worst-case impact
scenario to evaluate roadside hardware. As has been discussed in depth, selection of
practical impact conditions should not be subjective and should evaluate a system’s
capacity to capture, contain, or redirect the majority of impacting vehicles [22]. In
NCHRP Report No. 665, the 85th percentile impact condition was a 25-degree departure
angle relative to the roadway at 62.1 mph (100 km/h). The departure angle was selected
in lieu of the impact angle when determining appropriate testing conditions. This angle
was selected for many reasons, including:
(1) Initial impact location was affected by proximity of the struck object to the
sides of the road. Impacts far from the road permit the vehicle to slow down to
low speeds, reducing the crash severity that would normally occur with a
barrier or roadside feature at much closer proximity.
(2) In many multiple-impact events, selection would have to be applied to
determine which event was most significant, which introduces both
subjectivity and error. Energy contributions were frequently very difficult to
partition to individual impacts.
(3) Barrier crashes were undersampled in the NCHRP Report No. 665 database.
The small barrier crash data set prohibited meaningful statistical analysis out
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of barrier crash results. Furthermore, the majority of the barrier impact events
were at much higher speeds than occurred in typical barrier crashes.
(4) Some impacts, such as rollovers, did not have a clearly defined orientation
angle prior to impact, and interpretations of the effective location of impact
varied widely. Vehicle orientation during these types of crashes was
frequently difficult to determine. Orientation and departure angles were not
only easier to measure at departure, they were often more meaningful, since
crash testing has historically been conducted with fully-tracking vehicles.
CG trajectory and orientation angles at the first impact location obtained from the
NCHRP 665 database were much closer to the corresponding angles at impact measured
in the severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri. The 85th percentile CG trajectory
angle of severe cable median barrier crashes was determined to be 39 degrees at impact.
By contrast, a CG trajectory angle of 25 degrees, which is the current standard in the
Manual for Assessing Safety Hadware (MASH), represented the 69th percentile of crash
conditions in Missouri. If current MASH crash tests were conducted at the same speed
but the angle was increased from 25 degrees to 39 degrees, the impact severity (IS) of the
crash would increase by 120%. Few cable median barriers have been subject to this level
of scrutiny.
The CG trajectory and orientation angle plot was segregated by crash result into
“Penetration”, “Rollover”, or “Other” categories. The segregated database is shown in
Figure 10, and a detail view for vehicle orientation angles greater than -10 degrees is
shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 10. CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles by Crash Result
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Of all the severe cable median barrier crashes, 43% occurred with sideslip angles
in excess of 20 degrees. Approximately 40% of penetration crashes were non-tracking at
impact with the barrier. Severe penetrations occurred more commonly at higher CG
trajectory angles than severe rollovers. The median CG trajectory angle in severe
penetration crashes in Missouri was 24 degrees, and the 85th percentile angle was 46
degrees.
Surprisingly, in Missouri, 63% of the severe rollover crashes that were caused by
the cable median barrier occurred with CG trajectory angles less than 20 degrees. The
median CG trajectory angle for the severe rollover crashes was 16 degrees, and the 85th
percentile CG trajectory angle was 35 degrees.
Very few crashes occurred with “overcorrecting” and non-tracking impact
conditions in which the driver of the vehicle was attempting to steer the vehicle away
from the barrier. This type of orientation tended to promote a more “broadside” impact
condition, where the side of the vehicle makes first contact with the barrier instead of the
front or back ends. This was likely a product of the generally steep terrain found in
Missouri’s medians, and relatively narrow medians typically measuring 40 ft (12.2 m)
wide. Drivers who steered into the median would then find it very difficult to steer away
from the barrier and back up the approach slope, which could have contributed to fewer
“overcorrecting” impacts.
Alternatively, “oversteering” impacts, in which the orientation angle of the
vehicle was larger than the CG trajectory angle, were very common. Approximately 51%
of severe penetration crashes, 53% of severe rollover crashes, and 49% of all severe
crashes had “oversteering” conditions. Comparatively, 83% of severe penetrations, 85%
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of severe rollovers, and 82% of severe non-penetration, non- rollover crashes with nontracking impact conditions were “oversteering” crashes. The high number of oversteering
crashes in the median was a reflection of median geometry and roadway conditions.
Vehicles which strike a cable median barrier located near the center of a V-ditch have a
minimum lateral offset that must be traversed before impact, which tends to bias crash
results toward higher CG trajectory angles. This crash condition was reflected in realworld crash results, but suggests that future testing of cable median barriers should be
conducted for both tracking and non-tracking impact conditions.
The crash set was further evaluated by considering the relationship between CG
trajectory angle and containment rate for severe crashes. A cumulative distribution plot of
CG trajectory angle for severe penetration and rollover crashes as well as severe nonpenetration, non-rollover crashes is shown in Figure 12. A statistical analysis was
conducted on the CG trajectory angle distributions, and a probability curve for likelihood
of penetration or rollover crash results in severe cable median barrier crashes is shown in
Figure 13.
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Figure 12. Cumulative Distribution of CG Trajectory Angles by Severe Crash Result
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In all severe crashes, there was a minimum of a 49% risk of penetration or
rollover at very small CG trajectory angles to a high risk of penetration or rollover at
large CG trajectory angles. As the CG trajectory angle approached 90 degrees, the risk of
penetration or rollover crash results in severe cable median barrier crashes approached
100%, indicating that with a 90 degree CG trajectory angle and a severe crash result,
every crash would be expected to be either a penetration or rollover.
5.2.6 Comparison of Missouri and North Carolina
Additionally, a subset of crashes in North Carolina was analyzed, consisting of
entirely penetration-related crashes. The penetration crashes were not randomly selected,
but typically were investigated in greater detail either when DOT staff saw crash results
on newscasts or when crashes were spotted by a field observation team. The investigative
teams typically measured median profiles, center-of-cable heights, which side of the lowtension 3-cable median barrier was struck (i.e., side with one or with two cables), tire
trajectory marks, and the number of posts damaged. Researchers were then able to
determine departure and impact CG trajectory and orientation angles, and observed a
higher number of “backside” penetration crashes, in which the barrier was penetrated
more often when struck on the side of the barrier with one supported cable. Photographs
were taken of both the vehicle and barrier system involved in the crash.
The subset of crashes investigated, totaling 22 in all, were plotted in a distribution
and compared with the severe crashes in Missouri, as shown in Figure 14. The North
Carolina sample also tended toward higher angles than the NCHRP 665 crashes, but the
sample size was too small to make judgments about the distribution. Preliminary attempts
to determine correlations using chi-squared tests were not statistically significant but
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trended toward significance (i.e., p values between 0.4 to 0.7), and it is likely that the
distributions would be similar if additional data were obtained.
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Figure 14. Comparison of North Carolina, Missouri, and NCHRP Crashes
5.2.7 Crash Severity
The relative severity of crashes on each barrier type is shown in Tables 19
through 21. Penetration Severe Crash Contributions (PSCC) and Rollover Severe Crash
Contribution (RSCC), along with Penetration Severity Increase Factors (PSIF) and
Rollover Severity Increase Factors (RSIF) metrics, were created to evaluate the relative
severity risk of each type of crash outcome based on the barrier system. PSIF, PSCC,
RSIF, and RSCC metrics are explained on page 57.
The severe crash contribution factors represent the total contribution of
penetration and rollover crashes to all severe crash outcomes. Both PSCC and RSCC
were summed to analyze relative severities. If the sum of PSCC and RSCC approach
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100%, it would correspond to a situation in which every severe crash outcome was
determined solely by penetration or rollover crash occurrence. If the sum of PSCC and
RSCC was low, it would indicate little correlation between crash outcome and crash
severity, instead suggesting other factors were more significant to severe crash outcome.
The PSIF was calculated from the ratio of the frequency of severe penetration
crashes to the frequency of severe non-penetration crashes. Likewise, the RSIF was
calculated from the ratio of the frequency of severe rollover crashes to the frequency of
severe non-rollover crashes. In this way, the ratio of the severities of penetration and
rollover crashes were determined. As a result, a PSIF of 1.0 corresponded to a case in
which the penetration crash had an equivalent risk of severe injury or fatality as a nonpenetration crash. The highest average PSIF was 13.2 for low-tension, 3-cable median
barrier, and the highest RSIF was 12.0 for the Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF).
In general, higher PSIF and RSIF corresponded to lower average severity non-penetration
and non-rollover crashes. The aggregate A+K crash severities for each system were
reported, even when PSCC, RSCC, PSIF, and RSIF were not available.
When data were not available for either rollover or penetration data sets, data
subsets were created for each group and the results were compared to the composite
totals. For every barrier except the low-tension cable median barrier, the subset
distributions were nearly identical to the aggregate. Subsets of the low-tension cable
median barrier crash results are compared in Tables 19 through 21.

Table 19. Crash Severities by System Type and Penetration Crash Outcome
Injury Severity

Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 1

Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 2

Brifen WRSF TL-3

Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3

Trinity CASS 3-Cable

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Killed (K)

3

0.4%

3

100.0%

19

0.6%

10

52.6%

6

0.4%

-

-

3

0.4%

0

-

19

1.0%

7

36.8%

Disabling Injury (A)

13

1.6%

7

53.8%

25

0.7%

9

36.0%

34

2.2%

-

-

26

3.7%

7

26.9%

33

1.7%

5

15.2%

Moderate Injury (B)

59

7.4%

12

20.3%

164

4.9%

33

20.1%

109

7.0%

-

-

81

11.4%

10

12.3%

125

6.4%

13

10.4%

Slight Injury (C)

76

9.6%

12

15.8%

462

13.8%

37

8.0%

139

9.0%

-

-

58

8.2%

5

8.6%

173

8.9%

19

11.0%

Property Damage Only (O)

644

81.0%

63

9.8%

2688

80.0%

110

4.1%

1263

81.4%

-

-

543

76.4%

43

7.9%

1593

82.0%

129

8.1%

Severe Crashes (A+K)

16

2.0%

10

10.3%

44

1.3%

19

9.5%

40

2.6%

-

-

29

4.1%

7

10.8%

52

2.7%

12

6.9%

Total Applicable Crashes

795

-

97

12.2%

3358

-

199

5.9%

1551

-

-

711

-

65

9.1%

1943

-

173

8.9%

CONTRIBUTION

62.5% PSCC

43.2% PSCC

-

24.1% PSCC

23.1% PSCC

PENETRATION FACTOR

13.7 PSIF

12.8 PSIF

-

3.5 PSIF

2.6 PSIF

Table 20. Crash Severities by System Type and Rollover Crash Outcome
Injury Severity

Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 1

Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 2

Brifen WRSF TL-3

Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3

Trinity CASS 3-Cable

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Killed (K)

3

0.4%

0

-

19

0.6%

-

-

6

0.4%

1

16.7%

3

0.3%

1

33.3%

20

1.0%

6

30.0%

Disabling Injury (A)

13

1.6%

3

23.1%

25

0.7%

-

-

34

2.2%

10

29.4%

35

3.7%

7

20.0%

35

1.7%

9

25.7%

Moderate Injury (B)

59

7.4%

22

37.3%

164

4.9%

-

-

109

7.0%

13

11.9%

93

9.9%

12

12.9%

130

6.4%

26

20.0%

Slight Injury (C)

76

9.6%

10

13.2%

462

13.8%

-

-

139

9.0%

7

5.0%

64

6.8%

7

10.9%

176

8.7%

13

7.4%

Property Damage Only (O)

644

81.0%

27

4.2%

2688

80.0%

-

-

1263

81.4%

18

1.4%

749

79.3%

7

0.9%

1661

82.1%

44

2.6%

Severe Crashes (A+K)

16

2.0%

3

4.8%

44

1.3%

-

-

40

2.6%

11

22.4%

38

4.0%

8

23.5%

55

2.7%

15

15.3%

Total Applicable Crashes

795

-

62

7.8%

3358

-

-

-

1551

49

3.2%

944

-

34

3.6%

2022

-

98

4.8%

CONTRIBUTION

18.8% RSCC

-

27.5% RSCC

21.1% RSCC

27.3% RSCC

ROLLOVER FACTOR

3.0 RSIF

-

12.0 RSIF

7.4 RSIF

7.7 RSIF

PSCC = Penetration Severe Crash Contribution; ratio of number of severe penetration crashes to number of all severe crashes
PSIF = Penetration Severity Increase Factor; ratio of percent risk of A+K crash in penetration crashes to non-penetration crashes
RSCC = Rollover Severe Crash Contribution; ratio of number of severe rollover crashes to number of all severe crashes
RSIF = Rollover Severity Increase Factor; ratio of percent risk of A+K in rollover crashes to non-rollover crashes
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Table 21. Risk Factor Summary for Barrier Systems
Low-Tension
3-Cable

Brifen
WRSF

Nucor
Trinity CASS
NU-CABLE

PSCC
RSCC
TOTAL
PSIF
RSIF
AVERAGE

48.1%
22.8%
70.8%
13.2
3.0
8.1

27.5%
12.0
-

24.1%
21.1%
45.2%
3.5
7.4
5.4

EFFECTIVE A+K

1.8%

2.6%

4.1%

Gibraltar

Safence
(4-Cable)

23.1%
27.3%
50.3%
2.6
7.7
5.2

-

-

2.7%

2.9%

2.2%

Although Gibraltar barrier systems were represented in the database, less than 100
total crashes and less than 15 total penetration crashes were available for analysis on the
Gibraltar data. The Safence database was at the level of statistical significance (295
crashes); however, the number of penetrations was unknown and the tolerance on the
number of A+K crashes in the rollover database was significant; the variation in a single
crash at the A+K level would produce 0.4% difference in net A+K rate. Therefore,
PSCC, RSCC, PSIF, and RSIF were not calculated for these systems. Additionally, very
few Brifen crashes were available for examination with respect to penetration
frequencies, which rendered the PSCC and PSIF less useful.
The “effective” A+K rate was a obtained by averaging the A+K ratios in the
datasets, if average state-level data were available; otherwise it was equal to the sum of
severe crashes divided by the total number of crashes. Since Missouri’s A+K ratio was
known, it was included when calculating the effective A+K ratio, even though all cable
median barrier crashes were not included in the data set.
Based on the metrics created to analyze the crash results, several important but
surprising conclusions were made. First, the barrier system with the lowest average
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severity was the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier system. The maximum statereported frequency of severe crashes on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier was
2.0%. Even this maximum number was lower than every other barrier type analyzed in
every other state.
Second, rollover severity was higher on high-tension systems than on the lowtension, 3-cable median barrier, on average. This was unexpected since the low-tension,
3-cable median barriers have the highest rates of rollover of all barrier systems. Although
the proportionate number of rollovers was high, these crashes included “tip-overs” in
which vehicles made less than 3 quarter-turns. When rollover crashes involved less than 3
quarter-turns, the rollovers were generally low-speed, and as such had a significantly
lower risk of severe injury than higher-speed rollovers. The rollover mechanism most
commonly associated with low-speed rollovers was contact with post members. Since the
low-tension cable median barrier uses the stiffest post in weak-axis bending, it is not
surprising that rollovers occurred more frequently, but with lower average severity, than
high-tension systems. A more complete discussion of rollover crashes is provided in
Chapter 11.
Third, severe penetration and rollover crashes had the highest representation of all
severe crashes on low-tension cable median barriers. This indicated that the number of
non-rollover, non-penetration severe crashes on low-tension cable median barrier was the
lowest of all barrier types evaluated. Alternatively, this statistic indicated that
uncontrolled or unknown types of serious injury mechanisms, such as occupant contact
with system components or high-exit angle redirection crashes, were minimal.
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A closer examination of the non-penetration and non-rollover severe crashes with
cable median barriers frequently incorporated occupant contact with posts supporting
cables, unbelted occupant ejection, occupant compartment intrusion not caused by
penetration or rollover events, and high lateral or longitudinal accelerations due to cable
tension. All of these factors were more pronounced in the high-tension cable barrier
system crashes than in low-tension system crashes, indicating that increased cable tension
may have led to an increase in A+K crashes.
Consideration of barrier placement may explain some of the differences in barrier
performance. An analysis on the severity of crashes based on barrier location was
conducted in Ohio. Crashes were tabulated based on barrier location in the median as
Traffic Side, Center, or Opposite Side positions. Crashes with barriers included in the
Center category were within 4 ft (1.2 m) of the center of the median. All installations
further than 4 ft (1.2 m) from the median were either classified as Traffic Side or
Opposite Side installations, depending on the vehicle’s direction of travel. A summary of
the performance evaluation of crashes in Ohio is shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Crash Severity by Barrier Location

Barrier Location

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

A+K Injuries

Traffic-Side
Center
Opposite-Side
Traffic- and Opposite-Sides

235
128
494
729

8.7%
14.1%
7.7%
8.4%

4.5%
3.1%
3.8%
4.3%

4.9%
1.6%
3.4%
4.4%

It was determined that the highest crash severity occurred with traffic-side
installations, with an effective A+K rate of 4.9%. Barriers installed in the median center
had an effective A+K rate of 1.6%, whereas barriers installed on the opposite side had an
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effective A+K rate of 3.4%. Chi-squared tests conducted comparing the Traffic and
Opposite Side crashes to Center crashes were on the bounds of significance. The p-value
of the severe crash comparison was 0.118, which was significant at the 12% confidence
level. Comparison of the distribution of penetration and rollover crashes was much more
significant, with a p-value of 0.002; this is very statistically significant. Likewise, if the
injury distributions were shifted, and A, B, and K injuries were compared, the
distributions were statistically different with p-value 0.020, and was statistically
significant at the 2% level. Therefore, it can be conclusively determined that the
distributions of crashes are not similar, and it is very likely that barriers placed in the
center of medians are associated with fewer severe crashes than installations on the
traffic- or opposite sides of the roadway. Although it was beyond the level of statistical
significance, the analysis also suggested a higher rate of severe crash outcomes with
installations placed near either shoulder.
5.3 Discussion
Results from this study were groundbreaking in several facets. To date, few
studies were available which have applied a broad cross-section evaluation of any barrier
type to determine weaknesses, barrier containment failures, and potential improvements
which could be made on the barrier systems. As such, there was little precedent on which
to build in this crash study, and many recommendations made previously were
determined to be less advantageous than originally believed.
With the lack of precedent, surveyed state DOTs could not supply all of the
information desired by researchers. No single state could supply a comprehensive data set
with crash reports filed by responding emergency personnel and DOT staff, photos of
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crash scenes, measurements from crash sites, vehicle information, and slope geometries.
Most states dedicated effort to assist with individual portions of the data requested even
at cost to the state DOTs. The information presented in this report represents the besteffort and broad cooperation of state DOTs pooling information together to solve
problems and improve cable barrier safety performance. As a result, some interpolation
and extrapolation was necessary, which introduced uncertainty in the analysis.
One element of cable barrier serious crash risk included risk due to motorcyclist
travel. Motorcyclist impacts with cable median barriers have historically caused concern.
A study completed in 2011 determined that although motorcyclist traffic accounted for
approximately 2% of all cable median barrier crashes, over 40% of those crashes were
severe [23]. Out of states with complete data sets in this study, 13 motorcyclists were
involved in crashes with cable median barriers, and 10 of those crashes were severe, with
4 fatalities. In Missouri, out of 127 severe crashes, motorcyclists accounted for 3 crashes,
or 2.4% of all serious and fatal crash events. Motorcyclist safety will continue to be a
concern for roadside safety engineers.
Lastly, it should be noted that high-severity crashes which occurred with barrier
systems installed on roadway shoulders were not caused by problems with construction.
No cable median barrier installation observed was found to be deficient with respect to
manufacturer’s installation recommendations. However, site-specific analysis was limited
to detailed narrative, site drawing, photographic, and scene diagram evidence. Future
improvements to cable median barrier designs must be accomplished to realize the
maximum safety improvement potential.
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY
One distinctive discrepancy in the data set in particular was centered around the
Trinity Cable Safety System (CASS) performance in Utah versus Washington. Both
states had a significant number of miles of CASS system installed yet the rates of
penetration on this system were markedly different between the states. In fact, the
average rate of penetration due to the combined effects of vehicle underride, override,
and rollover on CASS systems in Utah was only 6.1% on a per-crash basis. However, in
Washington, the rate of penetration was much higher, with a possible net frequency of
14.5%. Cross-median events in which the vehicle entered opposing lanes totaled 4.6% of
all cable median barrier crashes in Washington, and CMCs resulting from cable median
barrier penetrations occurred in 2.0% of all CMB crashes. Yet, based on images of barrier
installations along Washington and Utah roadways using Google Street View, there were
no apparent differences between the states with respect to barrier construction using the
C-channel post, and both states rigorously maintained recommended barrier placement
guidelines provided by FHWA and research reports. An analysis of the differences
between Utah and Washington results is provided below.
6.1 Weather Conditions
Along the I-15 corridor in Utah, annual snowfall totals can exceed 200 in. (5,080
mm) per year, more than 10 times greater than the state average. The precipitation totals
along I-15 are much higher than the remainder of the state, as shown in Figure 1. More
than 50% of all crashes reported in Utah involved snowfall. This was more than twice as
large as the snow representation in Washington. Although some locations in Washington
received high snow totals, particularly at higher-elevation locations near the mountains,
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the majority of the crashes into cable median barrier occurred in coastal regions where
snowfall was infrequent. Snowfall tended to decrease both penetration and rollover
propensity, whereas frequent rain near cable barrier locations could contribute to weak
post-soil interaction in Washington, increasing penetration propensity.
6.2 Traffic Volumes
Typical ADT counts in Washington on roadways with cable median barriers
varied between 20,000 vehicles per day to over 100,000 vehicles per day throughout the
state. In Utah, traffic volumes ranged from less than 10,000 vehicles per day to over
100,000 vehicles per day on similar roadways with cable median barrier. More crashes in
Utah occurred on roadways with lower traffic volumes than in Washington. The average
difference in traffic volumes between crashes in Utah and Washington was over 20%.
Furthermore, a larger percentage of heavy trucks were present in Washington relative to
Utah. Thus, cross-median and penetration crash events which were not within the design
limits of the barrier occurred. Although these crashes were not part of the failure analysis
study since these barriers were not designed to withstand impact from larger trucks, these
crashes nonetheless contributed to some severe injuries.
6.3 Avoidance Maneuvers
In Utah, most cable barrier crashes were caused by vehicles losing control due to
wet, snow-covered, or icy road conditions. Crashes in which the vehicle striking the cable
median barrier encountered dry roads and clear weather conditions in addition to being
involved in avoidance maneuvers, were relatively sparse. For example, the frequency of
avoidance-related crashes in Utah was approximately 9.0%, and at least one additional
vehicle contributed to the crash sequence in 19.8% of the cable barrier crashes. Although
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avoidance maneuver statistics could not be obtained for Washington crashes,
approximately 37.2% of crashes involved more than one vehicle, which was nearly twice
the rate of Utah. This suggests that due to large traffic volumes, avoidance maneuvers
occurred more frequently in Washington than in Utah, and fewer severe crashes occurred
in Utah as a result.
Avoidance maneuvers generally resulted in higher CG trajectory and orientation
angles because of highly-dynamic, large steering angle motions. These motions can alter
a vehicle’s travel path and cause a non-tracking skid engagement. As was observed in the
Missouri cable median barrier impact angle analysis, high CG trajectory and orientation
angles frequently led to severe penetration crash events. The lower number of avoidancerelated crashes in Utah indicated that many cable barrier crashes were likely low-angle
events caused by loss of control, not avoidance from an adjacent or encroaching vehicle.
6.4 Median Geometries
Medians on Washington roadways frequently ranged between 35 and 50 ft (10
and 15 m) wide. Over 63% of the crashes in Washington occurred with maximum median
widths less than 45 ft (13.7 m). In Utah, however, average median widths exceeded 50 ft
(15 m) in many sample sites measured from satellite images with map scaling using CAD
programs. Some median widths on roadways with cable median barrier installed
approached 80 ft (24.3 m).
Cross-median crashes occurred on roads with median widths exceeding 70 ft (21
m), as recorded in the California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri studies mentioned
previously [2,6,8,12]. By placing a barrier in the median, the barrier impact absorbs some
energy from a crash even if a penetration occurs. By decreasing vehicle energy and
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providing some lateral resistance during impact, the tendency for cross-median crashes to
occur on roads with wide medians drops significantly. With this reduction in CMCs,
severe crash risks are also reduced.
In Utah, with larger medians and relatively flat slopes (most slopes were between
6:1 and 10:1), a higher proportion of impacts occurred on the median slopes with lowest
risk of penetration than in Washington, based on the median slope results shown in
Figure 6. Site-specific estimates in Washington indicated that the roads with the highest
rates of penetration were sites with either fairly flat (i.e., flatter than 8:1) or steep (i.e.,
greater than 6:1) median slopes. The two roads with the lowest rates of penetration had
estimated slope rates of between 6:1 and 8:1 over much of the protected length, and much
of that roadway was at 8:1.
6.5 Barrier Placement
Cable median barriers were also frequently placed near the edge of median
shoulders in Washington, adjacent to the travel lanes. In Utah, many cable median barrier
installations were located in the median, either 1 ft (0.3 m) or 8 ft (2.4 m) from the ditch
centerline, or up to 16 ft (4.9 m) from the road. Barrier installations near the ditch center
can reduce the number of nuisance hits by allowing an opportunity for vehicles to correct
from errant maneuvers. When vehicles are engaged in avoidance maneuvers, CG
trajectory angles tend to increase relative to the barrier proportionately with the distance
between the travel lanes and the barrier installation. During loss of control, however,
vehicle speeds at impact were typically lower when barriers were far from the roadway
due to heavy braking and skidding.

67
Swerving, avoidance, or over-correcting maneuvers in Washington caused more
vehicles to strike the barrier at higher orientation angles and CG trajectory angles.
Barriers located on the shoulder permitted the vehicle striking the barrier from adjacent
travel lanes to pry under or override the cables, and vehicles impacting from the opposite
direction to pry underneath or launch over the barrier. Crash outcomes depended on the
impact angles, impact speeds, slope rates, and vehicle profiles.
6.6 Conclusions
As a result, it was reasonable to assume that average impact CG trajectory angles
and speeds during cable barrier impacts in Washington were higher than the average
impact CG trajectory angles and speeds in Utah. This determination was based on the
frequencies in snow-related crashes, as well as differences in median widths, traffic
volumes, and the number of lanes on each roadway where crashes occurred. Similar
arguments can also be provided for many of the states participating in this study.
However, Washington provided a tabulated list of only whether or not a rollover
occurred, as well as the maximum injury level sustained in a crash, in lieu of which
vehicle rolled and which vehicle had the highest severity. Rollovers occurred in 12% of
all crashes involving more than one vehicle in Washington, and data from other states
suggested that in at least 15% of multi-vehicle crashes involving cable median barrier,
and possibly up to 30%, the vehicle which does not strike the cable median barrier was
involved in the rollover. This could reduce the actual rate of rollover on Washington
systems by 1.8% to 3.6%. Similarly, multiple vehicles were involved in most of the
severe crashes in Washington. Approximately 1.5% of all Washington crashes were A+K
crashes not involving head-on collisions with vehicles in opposing travel lanes.
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Approximately 20% of the non-cross-median serious crashes in which multiple vehicles
were involved should not have been classified as serious crashes due to higher injury
severity to an occupant in the vehicle which did not strike the barrier than in the vehicle
which did. Accounting for this adjustment, the average rate of severe crashes caused by
the cable median barrier would be reduced to 2.1% in Washington, which compares
favorably with all other states in this study. Unfortunately, these adjustments cannot be
made on the individual case level, which could affect one installed system to a greater
degree than another.
However, none of the aforementioned factors should increase liability to any state
participating in this study. As stated, this study was both groundbreaking and unique, and
the recommendations provided in this research establish a precedent for future research
and consideration. Barrier installations already constructed or in construction prior to the
publication of this report cannot be treated with the same scrutiny as future barrier
installations. Benefit-to-cost analyses are required to provide improved guidance in the
future changes to policy and construction. Furthermore, all states participating in this
study indicated that the findings would be helpful to guide future policy and construction,
as part of a very active attempt to improve roadside safety. For this reason, states
participating in this study should be lauded for their enduring commitments to safety.
For example, expanding median widths and regrading medians of established
roadways can be often impossible due to constraints on the right-of-way, drainage, and
prohibitively large construction costs in these locations. The benefit-to-cost ratios of
many of these efforts are often much less than 1. Future construction projects may not
have a sufficient budget to address these needs as well. Furthermore, no median slope
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was “immune” to either penetration or rollover crashes; only a minimization was
observed. Instead, it is generally desirable that modifications can be made to existing
cable median barrier systems to improve performance regardless of placement or median
slope rate, since this generally has a lower net cost to the state and a higher propensity for
better overall barrier performance. However, such developments require extensive crashtesting, design and validation work, marketing, and production, and it will require time
for manufacturers to develop products to address these newly-identified needs.
In every state, significant effort was expended to adhere to the current state of
knowledge of cable median barrier construction and recommendations at the time of
barrier installation [24-26]. It has been frequently re-iterated in roadside safety
conversations that barrier installations at or near the shoulder should decrease impact
severity; the opposite effect was observed. Most cable median barrier placement
guidelines have been developed based on case studies and simulations of cable median
barrier impacts, and have led to some important and meaningful conclusions about
improper placement and practices. However, in nearly every design simulation utilized
by roadside safety research organizations, modeled cable properties were not reflective of
actual cable material and physical properties [27]. However, since replacing systems
installed on the shoulder could also be cost-prohibitive compared to the safety benefit
realized; a better solution would be to improve barrier design for systems installed on
shoulders.
Every cable median barrier system evaluated in this study has passed NCHRP
Report No. 350 crash test standards at the TL-3 impact conditions. Currently, there are no
standards or requirements for agencies or states to test barriers to non-standard impact
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conditions, and systems are currently in testing according to MASH standards. However,
impact conditions which led to an increased propensity for penetration through the barrier
or rollover were not consistent with NCHRP Report 350 or MASH crash-testing
standards. Oversteering crashes dominated the database, occurring more frequently than
even low-sideslip crashes. Since no cable median barrier has been tested with these
impact conditions to date, and these impact conditions are not required for a barrier
system to be installed in the median of a roadway in the National Highway System
(NHS), there is no meaningful argument that states or barrier manufacturers have acted
negligently with respect to any existing barrier installation or barriers currently under
construction.
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CHAPTER 7 VEHICLE ANALYSIS
7.1 Introduction
Vehicle profiles have often been cited as critical factors in the performance of
cable median barrier systems. Unfortunately, a comprehensive cross-sectional analysis of
cable median barrier crashes and vehicle profiles has not been available. It was frequently
cited in publications and re-iterated in conversations with DOT representatives that cable
median barriers are less capable of safely containing larger, taller vehicles such as trucks,
as well as to low-profile, narrow-front-end vehicles such as roadster or sport car vehicles.
Furthermore, many experts believed some vehicles were uniquely susceptible to
penetration or rollover compared to other vehicles, due to inertial, suspension, and front
profile differences [e.g. 10, 19, 25]. As a result, it was uncertain whether the roadside
safety community was conducting crash tests with representative practical worst-case
vehicles, or if more critical vehicles should be used.
Based on vehicle makes, models, and years involved in cable median barrier
crashes, a database was constructed relating vehicle dimensions and properties to crash
results. Data from states not providing vehicle year, make, and model were excluded
from the analysis.
Two different reference databases of vehicle dimensions were consulted to
identify critical features of vehicles involved in roadside safety crashes. The first
reference was the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA)
crash testing vehicle data spreadsheet, which tabulated vehicle dimensions and weights of
vehicles used in various crash testing programs including the New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP) [28]. The second resource consulted included dimensions of various
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vehicles tabulated by make, model, and year. The data were assembled by expert crash
reconstructionists into the program Expert AutoStats, produced by 4N6XPRT Systems.
Vehicle dimensions and inertial properties of both databases were compared. In
general, less information was available from the NHTSA dataset, since data tabulation in
the NHTSA set supported frontal crash testing programs. Discrepancies between the
databases were typically minimal, with the exception of weights. The differences are
believed to be the result of the inclusion of dummies in NCAP testing.
7.2 Vehicle Types
Vehicle types were classified using a simple heuristic combination of Highway
Loss Data Institute (HLDI) classifications of passenger cars, and segregation of utility
vehicles into van, SUV, and light truck profiles. HLDI classifications segregated
passenger cars by wheelbase and overall length. Small cars were defined to be cars with
total lengths less than 180 in. (4,572 mm) and wheelbases less than 105 in. (2,667 mm).
Mid-size cars were defined as vehicles with wheelbases between 105 and 110 in. (2,667
and 2,794 mm) and overall lengths between 180 and 195 in. (4,572 and 4,953 mm), and
large cars were taken to be the remainder of the passenger cars. Tractor-trailer, large
truck, and commercial or mass transit vehicles were categorized as “Large Vehicles,” but
due to the relatively low frequency of impacts at only 1.9% of all crashes, a detailed
analysis of tractor-trailer and large vehicle crashes was not conducted.
The impact distribution by vehicle type is shown in Figure 15. Each distribution
was plotted as a percentage with the type of crash noted. Small cars were involved in the
highest number of crashes and penetrations, but were involved in fewer rollovers than
SUVs. Likewise, mid-size cars were involved in the second highest number of crashes
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and penetrations, but were involved in fewer rollovers than small cars, SUVs, and
pickups, in terms of total crashes.
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Figure 15. Vehicle Types Involved in Cable Barrier Crashes
By comparison, rates of vehicle penetration and rollover on a per-crash basis are
shown in Figure 16. Large cars were involved in the highest frequency of penetration
crashes, followed by vans, mid-size cars, and small cars. Surprisingly, pickups had the
lowest rates of penetration of any vehicle type. Although some pickup models were
identified which had a higher susceptibility to penetration crashes, as discussed later,
generally pickups were not prone to penetrating through cable median barriers. Rollovers
were infrequent with all passenger car types, but were common for larger vehicles,
averaging more than 10% of all pickup, SUV, and van crashes combined.
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Figure 16. Frequency of Barrier Failure by Vehicle Type
Serious injury and fatal crashes were distributed between all vehicle classes, as
shown in Figures 17 and 18. Large car and SUV crashes were more severe in general
than small car, mid-size car, or pickups. Vans had the highest rate of severe crashes. A
high number of severe crashes occurred involving vans. Tractor-trailer crashes involved a
high number of cross-median crashes and rollovers which contributed to the increased
average crash severity.
SUVs and large cars were involved in a disproportionately high number of severe
crashes. The high rate of severe crashes with these vehicle classes correlated with the
high rollover and penetration rates. Likewise, despite a high rate of rollovers, pickup
trucks were involved in a significantly lower number of penetration crashes than other
vehicle types, which contributed to a comparable rate of severe crashes as small and midsize cars.
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Figure 17. Risk of A+K Crash by Vehicle Type
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An analysis of severe crashes based on barrier containment rates indicated that the
majority of severe crashes were associated with barrier containment failures, as shown in
Figure 19. The highest frequencies of severe crashes based on containment failures
occurred with large cars, SUVs, and pickups. Not surprisingly, vans had the lowest rate
of severe injuries related to barrier containment failures, since the penetration and
rollover rates for vans were not extremely high while the severe crash rate was
conversely very high. Also, mid-size cars were involved in more crashes in which the
vehicle became entrapped in the cables and cables crushed the hood, roof, or windshield,
or penetrated into the occupant compartment of convertibles. As a result, more noncontainment failure related crashes were severe involving mid-size cars than other
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7.3 Vehicle Factor Analysis
7.3.1 Summary of Important Findings
A summary of critical results pertaining to penetration and rollover crashes is
shown in Table 24. It was obvious that the distribution of vehicles involved in rollover
events were different than the composite distribution. The composite distribution was
defined as the database of all crashes. A scale was established to weight the results of the
Chi-squared tests. The scale is shown in Table 23.

Table 23. Scales Used to Evaluate Statistical Significance of Chi-Squared Tests
Lower Limit Upper Limit
p-value
p-value
0
0.15
0.25
0.4
0.6
0.75
0.85

0.15
0.25
0.4
0.6
0.75
0.85
1

Interpretation
Statistically Independent
Very High Probability
Moderate Probability
No Conclusion
Low Probability
Very Low Probability
Statistically Similar

As shown in Figure 16, SUVs were involved in rollovers in approximately 13% of
all crashes. Likewise, rollovers occurred in 9.4% and 9.3% of all pickup and van crashes,
respectively. With such a significant frequency of rollovers occurring with larger
vehicles, the combined distribution of vehicle dimensions, weights, and inertial properties
varied at a statistically significant level from the distribution of all crashes, which was
more heavily influenced by passenger cars.
By contrast the penetration subset was largely inconclusive with respect to the
composite dataset. The composite dataset was dominated by passenger cars. Likewise,
passenger cars were involved in many more penetration crashes than larger vehicles.
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Table 24. Chi-Squared Tests for Independence of Tested Vehicle Factors
Distributions Evaluated for
Independence using
Chi-Squared Tests

Penetration Subset Rollover Subset
p-value
p-value

Likelihood that Distribution is Independent
Penetration

Rollover

Weight

0.7972

< 0.001

Very Low Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0758
0.3252

0.2870
0.0461

Statistically Independent
Moderate Probability

Moderate Probability
Statistically Independent

Wheelbase

0.4496

< 0.001

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0582
0.2674

0.6882
0.8409

Statistically Independent
Moderate Probability

Low Probability
Very Low Probability

Track Width

0.5099

0.0187

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0320
0.3922

0.6503
0.3348

Statistically Independent
No Conclusion

Low Probability
Moderate Probability

Static Stability Factor (SSF)

0.8122

< 0.001

Very Low Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.1926
0.8342

0.0349
0.0040

Very High Probability
Very Low Probability

Statistically Independent
Statistically Independent

Bumper Height

0.5732

< 0.001

Low Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.8591
0.5924

0.4536
0.2010

Statistically Similar
Low Probability

No Conclusion
Very High Probability

Center of Headlight Height

0.2634

< 0.001

Moderate Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.5394
0.5454

0.7157
0.4408

No Conclusion
No Conclusion

Low Probability
No Conclusion

Front Hood Height

0.6267

< 0.001

Low Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0320
0.3922

0.6503
0.3348

Statistically Independent
No Conclusion

Low Probability
Moderate Probability

Rear Bumper Height

0.0615

0.0853

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.2890
0.3338

0.8065
0.3627

Moderate Probability
Moderate Probability

Very Low Probability
No Conclusion

Top of Trunk Height

0.4531

< 0.001

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.5263
0.7745

0.6545
0.9159

No Conclusion
Very Low Probability

Low Probability
Statistically Similar

CG Height

0.1691

< 0.001

Very High Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.2053
0.2089

0.1585
0.5335

Very High Probability
Very High Probability

Very High Probability
No Conclusion

CG from Front Axle

0.6634

< 0.001

Low Probability

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.9015
0.4500

0.1211
0.9136

Statistically Similar
No Conclusion

Statistically Independent
Statistically Similar

Turning Circle Diameter

0.1363

0.0340

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.1950
0.7420

0.8586
0.8660

Very High Probability
Low Probability

Statistically Similar
Statistically Similar

Max Turning Angle

0.3267

0.4031

Moderate Probability

No Conclusion

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.3354
0.7855

0.7174
0.5520

Moderate Probability
Very Low Probability

Low Probability
Low Probability

Roll Moment-of-Inertia

0.9626

< 0.001

Statistically Similar

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0497
0.4665

0.1406
0.2802

Statistically Independent
No Conclusion

Statistically Independent
Moderate Probability

Dimensionless Roll Moment-of-Inertia

0.1041

< 0.001

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.2319
0.6982

0.2693
0.8328

Very High Probability
Low Probability

Moderate Probability
Very Low Probability

Yaw Moment-of-Inertia

0.4904

< 0.001

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.6047
0.1170

0.1987
0.9384

Low Probability
Statistically Independent

Very High Probability
Statistically Similar

Statistically Independent Statistically Independent

Statistically Independent Statistically Independent

Statistically Independent Statistically Independent

However, the lack of significant distinction also suggests that vehicle types are
not solely responsible for penetration crash results. Although some features on impacting
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vehicles, such as sharp front nose profiles, rear bumper heights, turning circle diameters,
and CG heights, have significant effects on penetration rates, susceptibilities likely vary
between different systems, and definitely vary due to median geometries and impact CG
orientation and trajectory angles.
Containment failure causes were not known for many of the penetration and
rollover crashes in which vehicle year, make, and model were known. As a result,
penetration and rollover rates could not be segregated for every vehicle. If crashes
without containment failure causes were excluded, the dataset was too small to make
critical analysis of the features which contributed to penetration or rollover. Thus, all
containment failures were included and analyzed in this dataset. In addition, containment
failure data from Missouri and North Carolina, which oversampled severe and
penetration crashes, respectively, were included. Overall penetration, rollover, and severe
crash rates excluding data from these states were used to scale the resultant frequencies of
penetration and rollover to the calculated national average.
Vehicle dimensions tabulated from both the NHTSA database and 4N6XPRT
Expert AutoStats program were plotted and compared. Some discrepancies were
observed in the distributions of vehicle wheelbase, weight, and CG heights using both
methods, but most of the variations were within 5% difference. The only statistically
significant difference occurred with large vehicle wheelbases and weights. For example,
the Chi-squared error, calculated using the formula
=

(

)
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was 52.5 for wheelbases between 115 and 120 in. (2,921 and 3,048 mm), heavily
oversampling larger vehicles in the NHTSA database. As a result, overall p-values of the
distributions were less than 0.001.
7.3.2 Vehicle Curb Properties
Weight distributions varied widely between the NHTSA and AutoStats databases,
and are shown in Figure 20. The discrepancies in weights were likely attributable to the
added weights of dummies, ballast, and instrumentation used in NCAP testing.
Additionally, the Expert AutoStats program tabulated the vehicle curb weights, whereas
the NHTSA database tabulated gross weight prior to testing. The resultant difference in
weights was approximately 500 lb (227 kg) for the composite distributions.
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Figure 20. Distribution of Vehicle Weight in Severe CMB Impacts by Crash Result
Differences in the database were also related to the information constraints
available in the NHTSA database. When certain years or models of vehicle were not
available, the database was cross-referenced using knowledge of the structural frames
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used in each model year. For example, the Ford Taurus and the Mercury Sable were
geometrically similar and built on the same frames through 2006. When one vehicle type
was involved in a crash and information on that year or model could not be found, a
search was made for an analogous vehicle platform and shape from the same year. Also,
vehicles from the same production generation years were examined and occasionally data
from older or newer vehicles of the same model were used. As a result, dimensions and
properties obtained from the NHTSA database were extrapolated to the available
vehicles, and were therefore an approximation. This approximation was excellent for
small, mid-size, and full-size cars and SUVs, but was poor for pickups and vans.
Comparisons of the curb weights and exterior dimensions of vehicles in the
Expert AutoStats programs matched manufacturer-provided data in discrete tests. In light
of the unexpected differences between the databases, unrealistically high weights, the
need for approximations to associate dimensions in the NHSTA database, and the greater
volume of data available using the Autostats database, the Expert AutoStats data results
were concluded to be more accurate and thus are exclusively shown from this point
forward.
Cable barrier failure propensity based on wheelbase is shown in Figure 21. The
distribution of vehicles was plotted with the frequency of penetration or rollover in each
category. Rollovers were more frequent with increasing wheelbase. Recall that small car
classes according to HLDI classifications had wheelbases less than 105 in. (2,667 mm)
and total lengths less than 185 in. (4,699 mm), and mid-size cars had wheelbases between
105 and 110 in. (2,667 and 2,794 mm) and overall lengths between 180 and 195 in.
(4,572 and 4,953 mm). Because mid-size cars had such a low rate of rollovers, the
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rollover curve reached a minimum in the mid-size car wheelbase range of 4.7% of
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Figure 21. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase
Approximately 57% of all crashes into cable median barrier involved vehicles
with wheelbases ranging between 100 and 110 in. (8 ft-4 in. and 9 ft-2 in., or 2,540 and
2,794 mm). Of all vehicles with wheelbases exceeding 130 in. (3,302 mm), 106 vehicles
were pickup trucks, 6 were SUVs, and 16 were vans. The high contribution of pickups in
this large wheelbase category likely contributed to the increase in rollover frequency.
The wheelbase distribution was further segregated by vehicle type. Small car,
mid-size car, and full-size car classes were segregated into one group, and SUVs, vans,
and pickups were segregated into a second group. Plots of the two groupings are shown
in Figures 22 and 23. Rollover rates were relatively flat when segregated by vehicle type,
which indicated that wheelbase alone was not a causative factor in rollover crashes.
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Vehicle type was a controlling factor. Alternatively, mid-length SUVs, pickups, and vans
had high penetration rates, whereas mid-length cars had the lowest penetration rates.
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The distribution of wheelbase lengths is shown in Figure 24. The distribution was
stepped, because wheelbase numbers were tabulated by whole inches in the AutoStats
program. An attempt was made to smooth the distributions by capturing the median
percentile for each wheelbase increment. The smoothed plot of the distribution is shown
in Figure 25.
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Figure 24. Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase in Cable Median Barrier Crashes
100%
90%

Percent Greater Than

80%
70%
60%
All Crashes

50%

Penetrations

40%

Rollovers

30%
20%
10%
0%
90

100

110

120
Wheelbase (in.)

130

140

150

Figure 25. Smoothed Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase in Cable Median Barrier Crashes
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The distribution of wheelbase by crash result for all vehicles suggested that large
wheelbase vehicles were involved in more rollovers than small-wheelbase vehicles. This
was confirmed in Figure 21. There were no obvious differences between the penetration
and composite distributions.
Distributions based on vehicle segregations of passenger cars and SUVs, vans,
and pickups are shown in Figure 26. Unlike in the composite distributions, this subdivided distribution indicated a typically higher wheelbase involved in passenger car and
SUV, pickup, or van penetrations. Alternatively, the rollover distribution was virtually
indistinguishable from the composite distributions for both vehicle classes.
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Figure 26. Smoothed Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase by Vehicle Type and Crash
Result
Track widths were also plotted to identify potential relationships, as shown in
Figure 27. Generally, rollovers were more prevalent with larger track widths. This was
expected, because SUVs, pickups, and vans, which are involved in more rollovers than
cars, also typically have larger track widths.
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Figure 27. Crash Result Based on Track Width
Track widths were segregated by vehicle type as shown in Figures 28 and 29. The
distributions were compared by crash outcome. Segregation by vehicle type indicated a
strong relationship between track width and penetration rates for passenger cars, whereas
statistically significant differences in penetration rate were not observed for SUVs,
pickups, and vans. Penetrations were infrequent with small track with utility vehicles, but
remained relatively constant for vehicles with track widths greater than 60 in. (1,524
mm). Rollover rates were not strongly related to track width in either vehicle grouping.
Further analysis of track width with respect to CG height is discussed in Section 7.3.4.
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Figure 28. Crash Result Based on Track Width, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 29. Crash Result Based on Track Width, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
A smoothed distribution of crash result by track width is shown in Figure 30. The
penetration distribution favored larger-track width passenger cars. The 85th percentile
track width in all car crashes was 63.3 in. (1,608 mm), whereas the 85th percentile track
width for cars involved in penetration crashes was 63.8 in. (1,621 mm).

88
100%
90%
80%

% Greater Than

70%
60%

All Cars
Cars - Penetrations

50%

Cars - Rollovers
All Utility Vehicles

40%

Utility Vehicles - Penetrations

30%

Utility Vehicles - Rollovers

20%
10%
0%
50

52

54

56

58
60
62
Track Width (in.)

64

66

68

70

Figure 30. Smoothed Distribution of Track Width by Vehicle Type and Crash Result
7.3.3 Front and Rear Profile Dimensions
Crash results based on front bumper height were plotted and are shown in Figure
31. There was an unmistakable increasing trend toward higher rollover rates with
increasing bumper height. Surprisingly, this correlation appeared nearly linear with
bumper height. A similar relationship could not be determined for penetration crashes.
The overall distribution of vehicles involved in the crashes had no discernible trend in
penetration rates.

16%

35%

14%

30%

12%

25%

10%

20%

8%

15%

6%

10%

4%

5%

2%

0%

0%

Percent CMB Failure

Pecent of All Crashes

89
40%

% of All Crashes
% Penetrations
% Rollovers

> 30 in.

28-30 in.

26-28 in.

24-26 in.

22-24 in.

20-22 in.

< 20 in.

Front Bumper Height

Figure 31. Crash Result Based on Top of Front Bumper Height
As with wheelbase and track widths, the crash results were segregated by vehicle
type and plotted separately. The plots are shown in Figures 32 and 33. Although rollover
rates were very strongly related to front bumper heights when all vehicles were compared
together, comparisons by classes revealed mixed results. Passenger cars had no strong
correlation between rollover rates and front bumper heights. A strong correlation was
observed between SUV, pickup, and van rollover rates and front bumper heights.
The penetration distributions were not independent of bumper height in either
vehicle group subset; in fact, the passenger car penetration distribution was statistically
similar to the distribution of all passenger car crashes. This result was surprising, since it
is widely known that lower bumper heights can contribute to higher penetration rates for
low-profile cars.
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Figure 32. Crash Results by Front Bumper Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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A smoothed distribution of bumper heights by vehicle class and crash result is
shown in Figure 34. The distributions of bumper heights indicated significant differences
between car and utility vehicle bumper heights, but very little difference in car bumper
heights. It is likely that because the distribution of passenger car bumper heights
indicated that 85% of all passenger car bumper heights were between 19 and 23 in. (483
and 584 mm), the differences in suspension characteristics, such as stiffness and travel,
were more significant than differences in bumper heights for these cars. This also
indicated that impact conditions may be more important than bumper heights for
passenger car impacts, with respect to the propensity to penetrate through the barrier.
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Figure 34. Smoothed Distribution of Bumper Height by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
In addition to the top of the front bumper, crash results were analyzed by centerof-headlight heights, as shown in Figure 35. As before, a strong relationship between the
center-of-headlight height and rollover frequency was observed. Higher center-ofheadlight heights were associated with higher rates of rollover. However, this was
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expected because higher rollover rates were associated with pickups, vans, and SUVs, all
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of which had higher average center-of-headlight heights than passenger cars.
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Figure 35. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height
When compared by vehicle types, rates of penetration and rollover were less
significant as was observed in the composite distributions, as shown in Figures 36 and 37.
However, a generally decreasing trend in penetration rates was observed for passenger
cars, as shown in Figure 36. This was intuitive; very low front bumper height vehicles
were involved in more penetration crashes than other passenger cars due to an increased
propensity to underride. No significant correlations were observed with respect to SUVs,
pickups, and vans.
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Figure 36. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 37. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
The distribution of center-of-headlight heights was plotted and is shown in Figure
38. The deviation of the rollover dataset of SUVs, pickups, and vans was clearly visible.
A significantly reduced proportion of rollover crashes occurred when vehicles with
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center-of-headlight heights between 28 and 32 in. (711 and 813 mm) crashed into the
cable barriers. However, most differences were within the margin of error.
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Figure 38. Smoothed Distribution of Center-of-Headlight Heights by Crash Result and
Vehicle Type
The front-of-hood height was also plotted, and is shown in Figure 39. As with the
bumper and center-of-headlight heights, the rollover distribution was statistically
significantly different from the composite dataset. The increase in rollover rates occurred
at front hood heights exceeding 33 in. (838 mm). This is significant since the top cable
heights on most TL-3 high-tension and low-tension cable median barrier systems is 35 in.
(889 mm) or less. Virtually no fluctuation of the penetration dataset was observable based
on front hood height.
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Figure 39. Crash Result by Leading Edge of Hood Height
When compared by vehicle types, results were mixed. Comparisons of crash
results by vehicle type and hood heights are shown in Figures 40 and 41.The passenger
car distribution of front hood heights involved in penetrations was statistically
independent of the composite. Likewise, the distribution of front hood heights for SUVs,
pickups, and rollovers approached statistical independence. However, the relationships
were opposite. In general, cars had lower rollover rates with increasing hood heights,
except for hood heights in excess of 31 in. (787 mm). By contrast, SUVs, pickups, and
vans were involved in more rollovers with increasing hood height, with the exception of
vehicles with hood heights greater than 44 in. (1,118 mm).
In both classes, the middle front hood heights had the lowest rates of penetration.
Higher rates were observed at both lower and higher hood heights. Also, the highest front
hood heights for both cars and utility vehicles had the highest rates of rollover.
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Figure 41. Crash Result by Front Hood Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
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The smoothed distribution of front hood heights of all vehicles is shown in Figure
42. The difference between the composite and rollover datasets is clearly visible,
particularly with hood heights between 30 and 40 in. (762 and 1,016 mm). A surprising
trend was observed that very few rollover crashes involved vehicles with front hood
heights between 30 and 35 in. (762 and 889 mm). Over 65% of all cable median barrier
crashes occurred involving vehicles with front hood heights less than 32 in. (813 mm),
whereas 55% of all rollovers involved vehicles with front hood heights greater than 35 in.
(889 mm). The distribution of front hood height by crash result and vehicle group did not
generate meaningful identities, thus it was not shown here.
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Figure 42. Distribution of Front Hood Heights in CMB Crashes
The top of bumper to front of hood separation distances were plotted against crash
result, but results were not statistically significant when plotted by vehicle grouping.
Although statistical significance was observed with respect to the rollover database when
all vehicle types were plotted together, the differences were strongly related to the type of
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vehicle involved in rollovers, and was not caused by the bumper-to-hood separation
distance. Furthermore, statistical tests evaluating bumper-to-hood separation distances of
passenger cars indicated a very strong statistical similarity between bumper-to-hood
separation distances in rollovers and all crashes; alternatively, the two distributions were
virtually indistinguishable. If there is a relationship between bumper-to-hood separation
distance and penetration rates for passenger cars or utility vehicles, it was not obvious in
the available database of 3,804 crashes with known vehicle types and crash outcomes.
Rear bumper heights were compared to the composite and plotted, as shown in
Figure 43. The penetration frequencies peaked between 24 and 28 in. (610 and 711 mm),
and was reduced at both lower and higher rear bumper heights. Rollovers reached a
minimum between 22 and 24 in. (559 and 610 mm) rear bumper height. Both
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Rear bumper heights were plotted by crash result and vehicle class, and are shown
in Figures 44 and 45. Although results were not statistically independent for either
rollover or penetration crashes for either dataset, the penetration dataset for passenger
cars approached statistical independence from the composite distribution. The penetration
rates varied significantly between bumper heights of 25 and 27 in. (635 and 686 mm).
However, penetration rates for rear-tracking impacts, which were not distinguished in this
data analysis, were higher for both lower and higher bumper heights. Although evidence
of this claim is currently limited to anecdotal observations, the author is currently
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involved in a research venture to further validate this statement.
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Figure 44. Crash Result by Rear Bumper Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 45. Crash Result by Rear Bumper Height, SUVs, Vans, and Pickups
Top-of-trunk heights were related to both penetration and rollover rates. The topof-trunk height plots for all vehicles are shown in Figure 46. Penetration rates generally
declined with increasing rear trunk heights. This was intuitive: higher rear trunk heights
were associated with greater vertical capture area and higher energetic requirements to
underride the barrier. As the trunk or hatch height increased, underride penetrations were
virtually eliminated, which decreased the overall penetration rate. However, a competing
effect due to increased CG and bumper heights tended to increase the rate of override for
higher trunk or hatch heights as well, though this effect was less pronounced.
In addition, rollover rates increased with increasing trunk or hatch height, but this
was expected based on vehicle dimensions of the typical vehicles involved in rollover
crashes. Trunk or hatch heights were determined to not be causatively linked to rollover
frequency.
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Figure 46. Crash Result by Top of Trunk/Rear Hatch Height
A smoothed distribution of trunk and hatch heights based on crash results and
vehicle groups is shown in Figure 47. The distributions were each virtually identical to
the composite for each respective vehicle group.
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Figure 47. Smoothed Distribution of Top of Trunk/Rear Hatch Heights
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7.3.4 Center-of-Gravity Location
The position of the CG was a critical factor in the selection of crash testing
vehicles for standardized testing according to NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH [29,
30]. A comparison of CG heights by crash results was plotted and is shown in Figure 48.
The rollover rate was intuitively related to CG height. Higher CG heights were generally
associated with higher rollover rates. One unexpected relationship was that penetrations
generally decreased with increasing CG height, through 28 in. (711 mm), then increased
thereafter for passenger cars and utility vehicles.
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Figure 48. Crash Result by CG Heights
CG height distributions based on crash result and vehicle type indicated strong
correlations between penetration and rollover rates based on vehicle CG. Plots of CG
heights for passenger cars and SUVs, pickups, and vans are shown in Figures 49 and 50.

14%

60%

12%

50%

10%

40%

8%

30%

6%

20%

4%

10%

2%

0%

0%

Percent CMB Failure

Pecent of All Crashes

103
70%

All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers

> 23 in.

22.25-23 in.

21.75-22.25 in.

21.25-21.75 in.

20.75-21.25 in.

< 20.75 in.

CG Height (Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars)

40%

16%

35%

14%

30%

12%

25%

10%

20%

8%

15%

6%

10%

4%

5%

2%

0%

0%

> 29 in.

27-28 in.

26-27 in.

25-26 in.

< 25 in.

CG Height (SUVs, Pickups, and Vans)

Figure 50. Crash Result by CG Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

Percent CMB Failure

Pecent of All Crashes

Figure 49. Crash Result by CG Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars

All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers

104
CG heights were not strongly correlated with rollover rates for SUVs, pickups,
and vans. This result suggested that these types of vehicles were susceptible to rollover
independent of the CG heights. However, penetration rates were strongly correlated with
CG heights, as penetration rates increased with increasing CG height.
Passenger cars had a mixed rate of penetrations with CG height, with a maximum
between 20.75 and 21.25 in. (527 and 540 mm). The minimum occurred between 21.75
and 22.25 in. (552 and 565 mm). Rollover rates demonstrated a much more linear
relationship, generally declining with increasing CG height through 23 in. (584 mm).
Results of all these factors were on the bounds of statistical significance, but the small
differences between the passenger car CG height distribution would be erased if a vehicle
entered a sloped median and struck the cable median barrier at any height other than
nominal level. Thus, although CG height had an effect, particularly on stability, overall
CG height did not have a causative relationship in cable median barrier containment
performance within the indicated vehicle groupings.
The smoothed distribution of CG heights in cable barrier crashes is shown in
Figure 51. Over 60% of all crashes occurred with CG heights less than 23 in. (584 mm),
but approximately 9% of crashes and penetrations occurred with CG heights between 23
and 26 in. (584 and 660 mm). The 85th percentile CG heights for the composite,
penetration, and rollover data sets were 21.6, 20.7, and 25.8 in. (548, 525, and 654 mm),
respectively.
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Figure 51. Smoothed Distribution of CG Heights in Cable Barrier Crashes
A comparison of the longitudinal CG location relative to the front axle was
plotted and is shown in Figure 52. Penetration rates were relatively independent of the
longitudinal distance between the CG and the front axle, but rollover rates tended to
increase as the CG distance from the front axle increased. Historical tests with cable
median barriers has indicated a higher proportion of large yaw displacements using rear
engine mount cars with CGs located far from the front axle [31, 32]. The yaw
displacement following redirection may contribute to vehicle instability.
The distribution of longitudinal CG locations is shown in Figure 53. The
distribution of longitudinal CG location suggested that both penetration and rollover
crashes tended to occur more frequently with vehicles with CGs located further from the
front axle, but closely mimicked the distribution of all crashes for longitudinal distances
less than 40 in. (1,016 mm). The 85th percentile longitudinal CG locations for the
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composite, penetration, and rollover databases were 51.7 in., 52.5 in., and 54.5 in. (1,313
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Figure 52. Longitudinal CG Distance from Front Axle by Crash Result
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The static stability factor (SSF) [33], which is calculated using the formula
=

(

)

(1)

was used to segregate crash outcomes. Results are plotted in Figure 54. The SSF is a
statistical measure of the likelihood of rollover, based on the slope angle that would cause
a static vehicle to tip over. SSF star ratings and the probability function ranges of
estimated rollover rates is shown in Table 25.

Table 25. NHTSA SSF Star Ratings and Probability Function Values [33]
NHTSA Star Rating






SSF Range
< 1.04
1.04-1.12
1.12-1.24
1.24-1.45
> 1.45

Rollover Probability Function
Value Range
> 0.40
0.30-0.40
0.20-0.30
0.10-0.20
< 0.10

Although end effects were present at the 1- and 5-star ratings since less than 100 crashes
involved either 1-star or 5-star rated vehicles, generally rollovers decreased with higher
SSF ranking. These results are not surprising, but reinforce what is known about rollover
stability with relation to CG position and track width.
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Figure 54. Crash Result Based on Track Width and CG Height (SSF)
Whereas a very strong relationship between rollover and SSF was observed with
respect to all vehicles, when the data was segregated into subsets by vehicle types,
differences largely vanished. Distributions were statistically independent at the 5%
confidence level but functionally distributions were not unique. Penetrations and
rollovers were both more common with lower SSF values for SUVs, pickups, and vans,
but were more common at higher SSF values for much of the passenger car distribution.
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Figure 55. Distribution of Crash Result by SSF and Vehicle Type
7.3.5 Vehicle Cornering and Inertia
Crash results by minimum turning circle diameters were also plotted and
evaluated. The plot is shown in Figure 47. The minimum turning circle is a measure of
the maximum steering angle and reaction of the wheels and suspension to driver steering
input. As a result, it was expected that smaller turning circles, corresponding to higher
cornering rates and larger maximum steering angles, would be associated with more
rollovers and penetrations due to a more rapid increase in CG trajectory angle.
In general, larger turning circles corresponded to higher rates of rollover. This did
not match intuitive expectations. However, vehicle manufacturers have historically
utilized larger track widths, active suspensions, and lower maximum steering angles to
reduce rollover risk and improve stability. Vehicles which were more unstable were thus
designed with larger maximum turning circle diameters. This effect may have contributed
to the weak but increasing trend.
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Figure 56. Crash Result by Turning Circle Diameter
Penetration and rollover rates were not clearly related to turning circle diameter,
as shown in Figure 57. A large portion of car penetrations occurred with turning circle
diameters between 38 and 45 in. (96 and 1,143 mm). This class of passenger car
corresponded to sports-type cars, such as the Chevrolet Camaro, Dodge Charger, Pontiac
Firebird/Trans Am, and Dodge Viper, in addition to imported sports cars.
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Figure 57. Smoothed Distribution of Turning Circle Diameter by Crash Result and
Vehicle Type
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The distribution of roll moments of inertia of vehicles involved in cable median
barrier crashes is shown in Figure 58. For both passenger car and utility vehicles,
penetrations occurred at larger roll moments of inertia than the composite distribution.
However, rollover rates were mixed. For utility vehicles, higher roll moments
corresponded to higher rollover rates for roll moments of inertia less than 600 lb-ft-s2
(248 kg-m2), but for larger roll moments of inertia the rollover distribution matched the
composite. Alternatively, for the passenger car rollover distribution, rollovers generally
occurred with lower roll moments of inertia. The passenger car distribution matched the
intuitive expectation that lower roll moments of inertia were associated with higher rates
of rollover.
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Figure 58. Distribution of Roll Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
Roll moments of inertia were non-dimensionalized by dividing by the mass and
CG height. Results are plotted in . By non-dimensionalizing the rollover distribution of
SUVs, pickups, and vans, the rollover distribution was altered from boardering statistical
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independence to boardering statistical similarity, with a p-value of 0.83. None of the
other distributions had statistically significant differences to the composite.
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Figure 59. Distribution of Non-Dimensionalized Roll Moments of Inertia by Crash Result
and Vehicle Type
Likewise, the distribution of the yaw moments of inertia of vehicles involved in
cable barrier crashes is shown in Figure 60. As with roll moments of inertia, higher yaw
moments of inertia were associated with higher rates of penetration. Higher yaw
moments of inertia were correlated with higher rollover frequency for SUVs, pickups,
and vans through 2,500 lb-ft-s2 (1,033 kg-m2), but converged to the composite
distribution at higher yaw moments of inertia, similarly to the roll moments-of-inertia
distribution. Additionally, lower yaw moments of inertia were associated with higher
rollover rates for passenger cars.
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Figure 60. Distribution of Yaw Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
7.3.6 Conclusions
The vehicle dimension and performance analysis suggested that there is no “silver
bullet” vehicle profile or set of dimensions which will satisfy all the possible criteria for
full-scale testing of cable median barriers. Vehicles such as SUVs are involved in a
disproportionately large number of rollover crashes stemming from vehicle instability.
However, the high rate of rollovers was not indicative of a high rate of penetrations.
Furthermore, pickup trucks had the lowest overall rate of penetrations, which may be
related to years of cable median barrier full-scale testing with pickup trucks. Vehicles not
commonly used in cable median barrier testing, including large cars, SUVs, and vans
were involved in more penetrations than pickup trucks. Furthermore, vans were also
involved in more rollovers and severe crashes than pickup trucks in general.
It may be necessary to adjust the vehicles used in crash testing to be more
reflective of the actual fleet involved in penetration or rollover crashes. However, the
historical perspective on vehicle selection can be improved using these results, because
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vehicle types and selection can be catered directly to those vehicles which were involved
in containment failures or severe crashes.
7.4 Vehicle Make and Model Analysis
A summary of the vehicles most commonly involved in penetration and rollover
crashes with cable median barriers is shown in Tables 26 and 27. Recall that both
penetration and rollover rates for all vehicle types were scaled down to reflect calculated
national overall penetration and rollover rates. Vehicles included in Tables 26 and 27
were in a minimum of 10% penetration or rollover crashes, respectively, and were
typically involved in at least 15 crashes. Vehicles with the highest rates of penetration
were the 1996-2007 Ford Taurus, which spanned two generations of the Taurus model, as
well as the Subaru Impreza, Ford F250 and F350, and Chrysler PT Cruiser.
There has been a trend in recent years away from sharply-contoured front end
profiles. Many of the vehicles involved in high penetration crash frequencies are no
longer in production. This is an unfortunate consequence of having datasets which extend
more than 10 years from the present. However, Subaru Imprezas and Chrysler PT
Cruisers, for example, are relatively common, have models readily available, and had
penetration rates above 20%.
Vehicles involved in penetrations were either high-CG, stiff-body panel vehicles
or large cars with narrow, sharp front profiles. Likewise, rollovers were most frequent
with high-CG SUVs, pickups, and vans. However, in addition to notably high crash rates
it is also constructive to consider vehicles which were involved in relatively few rollover
or penetration crashes. A tabulated list of vehicles with relatively low risk of penetration
or rollover are shown in Tables 28 and 29.
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Table 26. Vehicles Involved in Penetration Crashes at High Frequencies
PENETRATIONS
Vehicle

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

Honda Civic
Honda Accord
Ford Explorer
Ford Taurus (1996-2007)
Saturn SL/SL1/SL2
Nissan Sentra
Chevrolet Blazer
Pontiac Grand Am
Ford Escort
Volkswagen Jetta
Pontiac Grand Prix
Chevrolet Trailblazer
Toyota 4 Runner
Ford F250
Acura Integra
Chevrolet Impala
Chrysler Sebring
Dodge Durango
Jeep Liberty
Dodge Intrepid
Toyota Tundra
Chevrolet Cobalt
Chevrolet Lumina
Ford F350
Chevrolet Astro
Chevrolet Camaro
Chevrolet S10
Ford Crown Victoria
Buick Regal
Chrysler PT Cruiser
Oldsmobile Alero
Subaru Impreza
Ford Escape
Toyota Celica
Chrysler Concorde
Lincoln Town Car
Mercury Tracer
Mitsubishi Mirage
Chrysler Cirrus
Toyota Matrix
Ford Aerostar
Mercury Grand Marquis
Oldsmobile 88
Volkswagen Golf

130
118
81
48
41
40
37
37
33
33
33
28
25
24
24
23
23
21
21
19
19
19
18
17
16
15
15
14
14
12
12
11
11
10
7
7
6
6
6
6
5
4
4
4

18
15
11
10
5
8
7
5
5
5
4
4
5
6
6
5
4
4
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
3
3
4
3
4
3
6
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

5
4
20
6
3
2
9
2
2
0
1
3
6
5
0
1
0
2
3
3
3
1
0
2
2
1
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
12%
11%
12%
18%
11%
17%
16%
12%
13%
13%
11%
12%
17%
22%
22%
19%
15%
17%
12%
18%
14%
14%
19%
20%
16%
17%
17%
25%
19%
29%
22%
47%
24%
26%
37%
37%
43%
29%
29%
29%
35%
43%
43%
43%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
3%
3%
21%
10%
6%
4%
20%
5%
5%
0%
3%
9%
20%
17%
0%
4%
0%
8%
12%
13%
13%
4%
0%
10%
10%
6%
0%
0%
6%
21%
0%
0%
0%
17%
24%
0%
0%
14%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
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Table 27. Vehicles Involved in Rollover Crashes at High Frequencies
ROLLOVERS
Vehicle

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

81
72
37
32
30
27
25
24
21
19
19
12
11
11
11
7
6
5

11
4
14
7
2
3
3
5
6
3
4
3
4
2
2
1
3
0

20
13
8
9
8
4
6
6
5
3
3
3
3
4
3
3
2
2

Ford Explorer
Ford Ranger
Chevrolet Blazer
Chevrolet C1500/2500/3500
Jeep Cherokee
Dodge Ram 1500
Toyota 4 Runner
Ford F250
Jeep Liberty
Dodge Intrepid
Toyota Tundra
Chrysler PT Cruiser
Isuzu Rodeo
Dodge Grand Caravan
Ford Econoline
Chrysler Concorde
Mazda Tribute
Mazda 323

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
12%
5%
16%
5%
9%
10%
17%
22%
12%
18%
14%
29%
16%
16%
8%
37%
0%
17%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
21%
15%
20%
21%
11%
19%
20%
17%
12%
13%
13%
21%
31%
23%
23%
24%
28%
34%

Table 28. Vehicles Involved in Penetration Crashes at Low Frequencies
PENETRATIONS
Vehicle
Ford Ranger
Ford Focus
Chevrolet Malibu
Dodge Dakota
Toyota Tacoma
Dodge Caravan
Hyundai Accent
Mitsubishi Eclipse
Dodge Stratus
Jeep Grand Cherokee
Honda CRV
Ford Expedition
Nissan Pathfinder
Geo Metro/Prizm
Chevrolet Suburban
Pontiac Sunfire
Nissan Maxima
Chevrolet K2500
Jeep Wrangler
Mazda Protégé
Ford Contour

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

72
61
32
33
24
23
22
21
21
20
19
19
18
17
16
16
15
15
14
14
13

4
4
2
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

13
5
1
0
1
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
2
2
1
0

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
5%
6%
5%
3%
0%
0%
4%
4%
4%
4%
0%
5%
0%
5%
5%
5%
0%
6%
0%
6%
0%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
15%
7%
3%
0%
3%
7%
0%
8%
4%
8%
9%
9%
9%
5%
5%
0%
0%
11%
12%
6%
0%
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Table 29. Vehicles Involved in Rollover Crashes at Low Frequencies
ROLLOVERS
Vehicle

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

Ford Mustang
Chevrolet Malibu
Chevrolet Silverado
Pontiac Grand Prix
Dodge Dakota
Volkswagen Jetta
Chevrolet Malibu (2004-2008)
Toyota Camry (2001-Present)
Toyota Tacoma
Acura Integra
Chevrolet Impala
Buick Lesabre
Chrysler Sebring
Hyundai Accent
Dodge Stratus
Hyundai Elantra
Subaru Legacy
Chevrolet Cobalt
Mercury Sable
Chevrolet Tahoe
Mitsubishi Galant
Chevrolet Lumina
Pontiac Sunfire
Chevrolet Camaro
Buick Century
Chevrolet S10
Mazda 3
Nissan Maxima

52
32
34
33
33
33
34
26
24
24
23
23
23
22
21
21
21
19
19
18
18
18
16
15
15
15
15
15

6
2
4
4
1
5
3
2
0
6
5
2
4
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
4
1
3
2
3
2
0

0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
10%
5%
10%
11%
3%
13%
8%
7%
0%
22%
19%
8%
15%
4%
4%
8%
8%
14%
9%
10%
10%
19%
5%
17%
12%
17%
12%
0%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
0%
3%
2%
3%
0%
0%
0%
3%
3%
0%
4%
0%
0%
0%
4%
4%
0%
4%
0%
5%
5%
0%
0%
6%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Current- and previously-used small cars were not well-represented in terms of
penetration crash frequency. The combined number of crashes involving Geo Metro/Geo
Prizm, Volkswagon Golf, Suzuki Swift, and Hyundai Accent was 47 crashes, but only 4
penetrations and 1 rollover were recorded on these small cars. These cars were frequently
used in NCHRP Report 350 crash testing. This is not surprising, since full-scale crash
testing with these small cars under NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH has only showed
critical behavior when tested in a V-ditch [34]. Few crashes were tabulated with vehicles
frequently used in MASH testing.
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Vehicles demonstrating more frequent barrier failures should be considered in
future crash testing efforts. Testing with vehicles which are susceptible to penetrations or
rollovers should be conducted in order to maximize the resultant safety of all impacting
vehicles. Results shown suggest that crash testing with new MASH trucks may not be
sufficient to capture the extent of the penetration and rollover crash types observed in this
study. Further analysis of the causes of penetration crashes is explored in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8 CAUSES OF CABLE MEDIAN BARRIER PENETRATIONS
Unlike rollovers, cable median barrier penetrations were heavily dependent on
which type of system was struck. Penetration mechanisms were heavily dependent on the
mechanics of barrier deformation and cable release. In order to describe the mechanisms
of penetration, system details for the Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3 3-Cable System, CShaped post and S-Shaped post Trinity Cable Safety System (CASS) TL-3 Systems,
Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF) TL-3 4-Cable System, and the TL-3, lowtension, 3-cable median barrier system are described below.
8.1 System Design Details
8.1.1 Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3 3-Cable System
The cable-to-post attachment used by Nucor was very strong compared to all
other barrier systems, and is shown in Figures 61 through 64. This cable-to-post
attachment is also used in the Trinity CASS barrier near end anchorages and
terminations.
The clips were fastened to the post by inserting the bent upper leg into the
appropriate hole on the flanged U-channel, and then were locked in place with a nut
threaded onto the bottom clip threads. Holes in the flanges were spaced approximately 1
in. (25 mm) on center vertically through the centerline of the flange. Many posts were 4
lb/ft (6 kg/m) flanged U-channel with Rib-Bak construction, though some installations
utilized the 5 lb/ft (7 kg/m) posts. The median barrier configuration for this post utilized
two short clips, shown in Figure 64, for the top and bottom cables, and one long clip,
shown in Figure 63, to support the middle cable.

Figure 61. Nuco
or Cable Barrierr Design Details [35]
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Figure 62. Nuco
or Cable Barrierr Design Details [35]
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Figure 63. Nuco
or Cable Barrierr Long Clip Design Details [36]]
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Figure 64. Nuco
or Cable Barrierr Short Clip Dessign Details [36]]
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Although the clip would perform adequately in horizontal pullout with stiff posts,
the flange-channel U-post does not have the rigidity necessary to resist bending and
buckling or fracture. During horizontal pullout loading, the post deflected with the cable
load, and the horizontal load applied transitioned to a mixed horizontal and vertical
loading. As the loading transitioned to vertical pullout, the posts were again pulled
upward and out of the ground or fractured in many crashes. Relatively few crashes were
observed in which the cable-to-post attachments released as intended.
8.1.2 Trinity Cable Safety System (CASS) 3-Cable Barrier
Like the Nucor TL-3 3-cable barrier on flange-channel posts, the Trinity CASS 3cable barrier installed on C-shaped posts had a large installed base in the United States.
CASS installations were present in such states as Iowa, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Washington, as well as many others. Details of the C-channel and S-post versions of the
TL-3 CASS system are shown in Figures 66 through 69.
Most of the Trinity CASS system installed in the participating states utilized the
TL-3 C-shape post sections. Installations of both the TL-4 and TL-3 S-shape post section
barrier designs were identified. However, relatively few crashes occurred on the TL-4
design.
The direction of the channel in the C-shaped posts was alternated, per
construction design. As a result, the radius of gyration to the weak axis was different
when the posts were struck on the channel or continuous sides. Alternatively, the S-shape
posts were comprised of S4x7.7 (S102x11.5) shape sections, with two 11/16-in. (17-mm)
holes in each flange. Researchers estimated that weakening holes decreased the strongaxis section modulus from 3.03 in.3 to 2.54 in.3 (49,652 mm3 to 41,623 mm3), and
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Figure 66. Triniity CASS C-Shaape Post System
m Details [37]
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Figure 67. Triniity CASS C-Shaaped Post System
m Details [37]
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Figure 68. Triniity CASS TL-3 S-Post System Details [38]
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Figure 69. Triniity CASS TL-3 S-Post System Details [38]

3

3

3
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decreased the weak-axis section modulus from 0.562 in. to 0.368 in. (9,210 mm to 6,030
mm3). By comparison, a standard S3x5.7 post has a strong-axis bending modulus of 1.67 in.3
(27,366 mm3), and a weak-axis bending modulus of 0.383 in.3 (6,276 mm3).
All of the cables in the Trinity CASS systems were located in a slot in the top of the post.
Cable spacers and retainers were used to prevent the cables from slipping out of the posts in
nuisance impacts. A sleeve tie was also used to retain the lower cable with a higher vertical
release load and to stiffen the flanges where the web was cut. Driven and socketed options were
available. The S-post TL-3 system had cables mounted at 29½, 253/16, and 20⅞ in. (749, 640, and
530 mm) and are shown in Figure 68. Cables in the TL-3 C-shape post system were 1/16 in. (2
mm) lower than in the S-post system. The TL-4 system had cables mounted at 38⅛, 29½, and
20⅞ in. (968, 749, and 530 mm).
A common cause of penetration in the CASS database occurred when the vehicle struck a
post before striking the cable barrier system. Since the vehicle applied no loads to the cable at the
time of impact, the only lateral load on the cables was caused by the posts; however, due to post
deflection, the cables were forced down in the slot and could not release from the post and
engage the vehicle, contributing to many override containment failures of even passenger cars.
This type of cable entrapment will always occur when cables are located within a post slot. This
form of cable entrapment was referred to as a “ramp formation” override penetration. As a result,
this system may be intrinsically susceptible to cable entrapment and ramp formation override
penetrations unless barrier modifications to prevent cable entrapment can be made.
8.1.3 Brifen TL-3 Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF)
The TL-3 Brifen WRSF is typically comprises proprietary Z-posts with rollers supporting
the cables vertically, as shown in Figures 70 through 72. Virtually all Brifen systems utilize
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Figure 70. Typiccal TL-3 Brifen
n WRSF Design Details [39]
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Figure 71. Typiccal TL-3 Brifen
n WRSF Design Details [39]
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Figure 72. Typiccal TL-3 Brifen
n WRSF Surfacee-Mounted Post Design Details [39]
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ground sockets for easy post replacement, though a post with soil plate option was also
available. Four cables are used in the system, with one cable woven around the posts and
mounted at 19 ½ in. (495 mm), two cables cross-woven and mounted at 26 in. (660 mm),
and an additional cable in a slot cut in the top of the post, mounted at 28 ⅜ in. (720 mm).
Typically, plastic retainer caps were used to retain the top cable in the Brifen
WRSF. Other cables were constrained by the interaction with adjacent posts. For each of
the middle and lower cables, vertical rise was only resisted by friction, whereas the lower
roller supported the cable from being pushed down by the impacting vehicle. Because of
the cable weave, the Brifen cables often sagged after a moderate-speed crash into the
system in which more than two posts were disengaged from the cables. The weave
significantly reduced average dynamic deflections and provided a smooth ridedown
deceleration, but the system was susceptible to both rollovers and underride penetrations.
Rollovers were frequently associated with wheel entrapment by the lower woven cable.
Underride penetrations were frequently caused by vehicles prying the bottom cable
upward, which had low vertical resistance. These factors will be discussed in greater
depth in Chapters 9 and 11.
8.1.4 Low-Tension, 3-Cable Median Barrier
Several low-tension, 3-cable median barrier designs have been tested and were
originally approved by FHWA according to TL-3 crash conditions in NCHRP Report
350. The low-tension cable median barriers involved in crashes in this study were similar.
The low-tension, non-proprietary 3-cable median barrier was developed through
testing and evaluation by several state DOTs, including New York and Washington [e.g.
40-41]. Several other states have installed many miles of low-tension cable median
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barrier, and in North Carolina and Missouri, the combined length of barrier exceeded
1,400 miles (2,253 km). It was estimated that the low-tension, non-proprietary 3-cable
median barrier currently accounts for more than 40% of the cable median barrier mileage
installed in the United States, though the exact percentage is unknown.
The low-tension, 3-cable median barriers installed in Missouri, Washington, and
North Carolina were very similar. Examples of the North Carolina’s low-tension, 3-cable
median barrier standard plans implemented in 2002 are shown in Figures 73 through 78.
In each of the low-tension, non-proprietary designs, tension spring compensators were
used to retain tension in the cables during very warm weather and to prevent excessive
tension increases during very cold weather. The cables were tensioned to between 900
and 950 lb (4.0 to 4.2 kN) at approximately 70º F (21º C), and frequently used wedge
splitter cable splice connections, as shown in Figure 76. End anchors for these designs
frequently used the end terminal developed by New York, which was approved under the
guidelines presented in NCHRP Report 350 [42]. North Carolina later modified the
standard cable median barrier plans in 2006 to address penetration concerns after
conducting some performance improvement studies [43].
8.2 Overview of Crash Data
Based on the statistical analysis presented, the crash data were categorized by
system type, though each crash was investigated independently. The types of containment
failures in each cable median barrier crash were determined using scene diagrams,
narratives, vehicle damages, and photographs when available. When the cause of the
penetration crash could not be identified, the case was excluded from further analysis.
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Figure 73. Low--Tension 3-Cablle Median Barriier Standard Plaans, North Carollina DOT, 2002
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Figure 74. Low--Tension 3-Cablle Median Barriier Standard Plaans, North Carollina DOT, 2002

Figure 75. Low--Tension 3-Cablle Median Barriier Standard Plaans, North Carollina DOT, 2002
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Figure 76. Low--Tension 3-Cablle Median Barriier Standard Plaans, North Carollina DOT, 2002
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Figure 77. Low--Tension 3-Cablle Median Barriier Standard Plaans, North Carollina DOT, 2002
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Figure 78. Low--Tension 3-Cablle Median Barriier Standard Plaans, North Carollina DOT, 2002
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A total of 213 crashes with determinable causes of penetration were identified.
Seven primary causes of vehicular penetrations were identified and tabulated, as shown
in Table 30. One of the categories, “Large Vehicle” incorporated medium to heavy
trucks, including double-rear axle single-unit trucks, buses, tractor-trailers, tank-trailers,
construction vehicles, and other similar vehicles which have dimensions and weights
beyond what has been typically tested on TL-3 cable median barrier systems. However,
because this type of failure was linked only to vehicle type, every penetration crash with
a vehicle conforming to this class was designated as a “Large Vehicle” penetration.
Because this failure type was linked only to vehicle type and the scene diagram,
narrative, and vehicle damage were not necessary, a disproportionate number of Large
Vehicle crashes were identifiable relative to the other penetration failure types.
The causes of penetration-related cable median barrier containment failures are
shown in Table 30. The failure causes shown in Table 30 were not intended to
demonstrate relative frequencies of penetration crash types between systems. Many of the
penetration crashes did not have determinable causes. The purpose was to demonstrate
the types of failures which were discernible per each system type to observe general
trends in the data. Unfortunately, systems such as Gibraltar and Brifen, despite having a
fair representation in the total database, had very few discernible causes of penetrations
due to the lack of available scene diagrams.
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Table 30. Causes of Penetrations
Penetration
Contributor

Description
Front end of vehicle protrudes beneath cables and lifts
cables up and over the hood. This condition is most
common with passenger cars.

Diving

Vehicle protrudes between or below cables and pries the
cables away from the system due to the slope of the vehicle
body, resulting in either underride or through-cable
penetration.
Wheels of vehicle pass over the top of the cables, forcing
them below the undercarriage. This category includes
launching but excludes rebound off of slopes which causes
override.

Prying

Override

Nucor

Number of Penetrations Recorded
CASS Brifen Gibraltar Generic

Total

10

2

1

1

22

36

20

26

5

1

30

82

27

26

1

-

8

62

Bounce-Over

Specific to rebounding off of slopes; vehicle strikes ditch
and rebounds up and over the barrier due to suspension
compression and unloading.

-

2

-

1

1

4

System Failure

Penetration caused by a breakdown of system components,
design, or installation, either releasing tension in the cables
or eliminating post contributions.

-

-

-

-

2

2

Large Vehicle

Tractor-trailers, buses, large trucks, camper vehicles, and
construction vehicles. No cable barrier is currently designed
for these types of impacts; however, these impacts are
frequently severe.

5

7

-

1

8

21

62

63

7

4

71

207

Total

Furthermore, many states had a significant number of miles of one particular
barrier type installed. This contributed to some additional uncertainty due to roadside
design practices utilized in each state. For example, median widths in Ohio routinely
exceeded 50 ft (15.2 m), and barriers on relatively shallow slopes were typically installed
either at or near the center of the ditch or near the shoulder slope break point. As a result,
very few crashes would result in a “bounce-over” type of failure, since “bounce-over”
crashes involve vehicles rebounding vertically after bouncing on changes in the median
slope.
Similar constraints affected the Brifen system overall. The only crashes applicable
in this study involved barriers located in wide medians or adjacent to shallow slopes,
effectively eliminating any opportunity for a “bounce-over” impact to occur. Although no
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“bounce-over” impacts were observed on the Brifen, Nucor, or Safence systems, there is
currently no proprietary or non-proprietary design which is not susceptible to “bounceover” failures.
Most of the impacts in the database occurred with 3-cable barrier variations of
each system type, with standard hardware and cable spacing. A total of 18 crashes
occurred in the state of Ohio with a 4-cable Nucor barrier, which was the only TL-4
system involved in crashes which had available scene diagrams and supporting
photographic evidence to determine the causes of failure. Two penetrations and two
rollovers occurred in two crashes on this system. In one crash, barrier penetration
contributed to a rollover. In a separate crash, the rollover caused the vehicle to override
the barrier.
Although the causes of barrier containment failures were mutually exclusive,
contributing factors to the failures were not. Three domains of cable barrier containment
failure factors were identified: system-dependent factors, installation-dependent factors,
and vehicle-dependent factors. Of these domains, the system-dependent and installationdependent failures will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9. A brief summary of typical
conditions associated with each type of penetration factor is provided below.
8.3 Types of Penetrations
8.3.1 Diving Penetrations
Diving-type penetrations were defined as crashes in which the median geometry
caused suspension compression, causing the leading edge of the vehicle bumper to dive
below the bottom cable and lift all of the cables above the bumper and onto the hood.
Diving penetrations were characterized by mechanical levers: once the impacting corner
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of the vehicle protruded under the cables, prying action through the longitudinal axis of
the vehicle lifted the cables up in the same manner as a long tree limb pulled at a
sufficient distance can lift or displace a boulder.
Diving failures were not restricted to particular vehicle classes. Examples of
vehicle makes involved in diving crashes included a Saturn Aura, Mitsubishi Galant,
Ford Fusion, and Ford Mustang. These vehicles did not conform to any identifiable frontend patterns except that the height of the leading edge of the hood was not “large,” or was
below approximately 27 in. (686 mm) in each case when the vehicle was at rest. Other
underride penetration types were heavily dependent on the geometry of the impacting
vehicle.
8.3.2 Prying Underride Failures
In prying-type underride penetrations, cables were pried up above the hood, thus
allowing the vehicle to pass under the cables. The prying differentiation was used to
separate crashes which did not heavily depend on median terrain; any underride
containment failure occurring on a flat shoulder adjacent to the travel lane was therefore a
prying-type penetration. As a result, crashes with prying underride penetrations had a
strong correlation with the vehicle impact orientation angle and vehicle shape.
Prying penetrations were analogous to mechanical wedges, which can split logs
when struck with enough force. Analogously, for low-angle prying events, the prying
action is similar to a “seesaw,” in which a small child located far from the fulcrum can
lift an adult, similar to the way that motion of the rear of the vehicle can cause prying on
the front corner or vice-versa. Both diving and prying penetrations shared similar failure
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mechanisms. However, median geometries and vehicle types varied widely between the
two containment failure datasets, prompting researchers to treat each type independently.
Non-tracking skid crashes, in which the entire side of the vehicle was engaged
with the cable barrier, frequently resulted in adequate vehicle capture and low risk of
rollover. Conversely, engagement along the front or rear planar surfaces of the vehicle
frequently resulted in penetrations.
During high-orientation angle impact conditions, the vehicle engaged the barrier
in a condition which may promote cable separation, lifting, or compression. The
increased risk to impacting vehicles was due to a combination of the following factors:
(1) vehicle stiffness prevented the cables from creating “furrows” or grooved contact
patches on the vehicle, which tended to retain the cables throughout impact; (2) the
“approximate equivalent” vehicle profile which came into direct contact with the barrier
system changed; and (3) vertical motions of the front or back of the vehicle were
exaggerated relative to cable motion at orientation angles approaching 90 or -90 degrees.
8.3.3 Bounce-Over Penetrations
A bounce-over penetration was a specialized crash event in which the impacting
vehicle rebounded off of a median slope and passed over the top of the barrier system.
This type of crash is more common with smaller passenger vehicles since large vehicles
more frequently “dig in” to the medians and either roll over or are captured by the barrier.
Bounce-over crashes occur most commonly on medians steeper than 8:1; most
bounce-over crashes occurred on medians between 6:1 and 4:1. Medians which are in this
steepness range are often used to facilitate large rain runoff from the road; as a result,
many medians have moist or wet soil through much of the year, even in drier climates.
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The softer median terrain does not facilitate bounce-over for larger vehicles since a large
amount of soil is typically displaced after engaging the slope, which dissipates much of
the energy contributed to “bouncing.” Smaller vehicles, which frequently have much
lower pitch and yaw inertias, bounce due to the impact without displacing much soil. This
is why only small to mid-size cars were engaged in bounce-over impacts in this crash
database.
8.3.4 Override Penetrations
Simply defined, override penetrations were those in which the vehicle drove over
the top of all of the cables before passing to the non-impact side of the cable median
barrier. Note that “bounce-over” crashes, in which the impacting vehicle rebounded off of
the median slope and passed over the barrier, were segregated from override penetrations
due to median slope contributions.
Override crashes could occur due to vehicle profile, vehicle orientation angle at
impact, cable entrapment in or on a post, ramp formation, or excessive cable sag. Of
these possibilities, cable entrapment, ramp formation, and vehicle orientation at impact
were the most common causes. Virtually every large ½-ton or ¾-ton pickup truck class
has a rear end bumper height which is approximately 3 to 5 in. (76 to 127 mm) higher
than in the front. Since many cable median barrier systems have a top cable mounting
height less than 35 in. (889 mm), many rear-leading pickup and large SUV crashes
resulted in penetration that likely would have been adequately captured if cable barrier
systems were taller. MASH crash testing with the 2270P vehicle could demonstrate this
type of behavior.
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8.3.5 Low CG Trajectory Angle Penetrations
A broad class of penetrations that spanned multiple penetration mechanisms
consisted of low-CG trajectory angle crashes which resulted in penetration. Low-angle
impacts leading to barrier penetration occurred on every barrier make. According to the
results of NCHRP Report No. 665 [21], approximately 55% of all run-off-road crashes
occurred with CG trajectory angles less than or equal to 15 degrees. Due to the difficulty
in determining when a penetration crash occurred, it is likely that the number of lowangle penetrations is underrepresented in the penetration crash database.
Low-CG trajectory angle penetration crashes had contributions from post impacts
and cable entrapment on posts, high-susceptibility vehicle front-end profiles and bumper
heights, and low energy available for stable crush to occur, in addition to barrier-specific
mechanisms. As a result, both override and prying underride penetrations occurred.
The risk of severe crash result associated with this containment failure was
dependent on multiple factors. If the low-CG trajectory angle crash resulted in
penetration when the barrier was installed on the traffic-side shoulder or approach slope,
the vehicle entered the median. Then, the vehicle either increased CG trajectory angle
due to median slopes and driver reaction, or came to rest in the median. Crashes in which
the vehicle came to rest were not severe in general, whereas moderately low-angle crossmedian trajectories were frequently severe. When the barrier was installed near the center
of the V-ditch, the vehicle always came to a stop in the median. While this generally
resulted in a low-severity crash, underride of the Nucor system caused several severe
injuries due to occupant compartment deformation from roof crush. Low-CG trajectory
angle penetrations did not occur on systems located on the back side of median slopes,
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but did occur when the barrier was installed on the opposite-side shoulder. Penetrations
on the barrier when it was located on the opposite side of the V-ditch frequently resulted
in severe crash outcomes.
8.4 Approximate Equivalent Vehicle Profile
High orientation angle crashes which resulted in penetrations were found to share
many common features between all proprietary high-tension barriers. Narrow-profile
vehicles or vehicles with smooth front ends alter the expected interaction between the
vehicle’s front end and the cable barrier during high-orientation angle crashes. As the
orientation angle approached either 90 or 270 degrees to the barrier system, differences
arose as the vehicle engaged the cable barrier system with the entire front or back surface
instead of a concentrated impact at a corner. Impacts occurring along vehicle corners
could be approximately equivalently simulated as a wireframe object with corresponding
roll, pitch, and yaw moments of inertia impacting the cable barrier. Front- or rear-leading
impacts instead engaged the cable barrier with an entire surface, which had a contour
corresponding to a cross-section of the vehicle at a given time. This concept is illustrated
in Figure 79.
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smooth vehicle front-end surfaces caused separation or lift when impact occurred near the
midspan. This susceptibility was amplified with aerodynamic, pointed vehicle front ends.
Large vehicles were also sometimes able to push the cables down and override the barrier
if bending waves propagating through the cables caused the cables to disengage from the
front bumper.
The major difference associated with the performance in high orientation angle
crashes was that with non-localized contact along the entire front of the vehicle’s profile,
contact pressure was distributed over a wide area such that local contact forces were low.
Although net forces were equal for distributed or concentrated impacts, the distributed
forces did not surpass the elastic limit of the front-end components on the vehicle. Elastic
deformations were very small in comparison with cable barrier deflections. Thus, vehicle
reacted similarly to a rigid body, and lifted cables above the bumper and hood, separated
the cables and allow the vehicle to penetrate through the barrier, or overrode the cables,
depending on the shape of the vehicle’s front end.
8.5 Cable Tension and Dynamic Deflection
As discussed in Chapter 5, there was an increased risk to occupants of errant
vehicles in any high-tension cable median barrier crash that appeared to be associated
with the higher tension in the cables. Although higher cable tensions do tend to reduce
dynamic deflections, the effect was not as pronounced as many engineers have assumed
previously. Dynamic deflections in tests conducted on cable barrier systems, including
roadside systems, were plotted by impact severity. Impact severities were derived from
crash test results submitted to FHWA for eligibility status for use on the NHS, as well as
testing agency reports. Results were included through 2010 and are shown in Figure 80.
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Figure 80. Dynamic Deflection Comparison, Low- and High-Tension Cable Barriers
As shown in Figure 80, at low IS-values below 40 kip-ft (54 kJ), high-tension
barriers exhibit up to a 33% reduction in dynamic deflection compared to low-tension
cable barriers. However, the difference in dynamic deflection between low- and hightension cable barrier systems was approximately 15% with an IS value of 102 kip-ft (138
kJ). This IS value is typical of the standard impact condition for TL-3 impacts using a
2000P test vehicle according to NCHRP Report 350. Reported rates of dynamic
deflections were always higher than the 15% average determined from full-scale crash
testing. It should be noted that the high-IS value crashes with high-tension cable median
barriers very closely corresponded to, and occasionally intersected, the approximate
deflection curve from low-tension crashes; the primary “benefit” of high-tension dynamic
deflection reduction occurs at low IS-value crashes. This low-IS value benefit is likely
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the result of decreased post spacing in many of the high-tension cable median barrier
systems. However, the low-IS value crashes would likely experience a greater reduction
in severity if higher dynamic deflections and lower accelerations occurred. This may
contribute to the lower severe injury rate in low-tension cable median barrier crashes than
occurred with higher-tension cable median barrier crashes.
Reasons that higher cable tensions do not produce a substantially lower dynamic
deflection at high IS values include the following: (1) most high-tension cable barrier
systems used weak, proprietary posts which were not as strong in strong-axis bending as
S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) posts used in low-tension cable barrier systems; (2) higher tension on
the cables produced a lateral redirective force with an approximate correlation to the sine
of the angle formed between the deflected cable and adjacent supports, meaning weaker
adjacent posts cannot sustain as much load as stronger posts used in low-tension 3-cable
median barrier systems could and the cable deflection angle between adjacent posts was
frequently less than in low-tension systems; and (3) higher-tension systems frequently
redirected vehicles with fewer numbers of cables since the higher restorative forces in the
cables tended to allow vehicles to override lower cables or slip under higher cables.
While there was a tangible benefit to using higher-tension systems, the associated cost
must also be weighed in accordance with that decision.
8.6 Energetic Capture Concept
The increased risk of penetration due to high orientation angle had roots in
classical physics and mechanics. The cable capture phenomenon was strongly related to
energetic constraints during redirection. When vehicles engaged cable barrier systems
with standard crash testing conditions, with both CG trajectory and orientation angles of
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25 degrees, the front bumper corner absorbed the initial impact through headlight fracture
and crushing of the front fender panels. As the fenders collapsed around the cables, local
energetic minima were generated according to cable positions. Additional force and
energy contributions to the cable were required in order to disengage the cables from the
cavities formed by the fender crush and headlight fracture. Higher energy input to cause
cable disengagement limited the frequency of penetrations occurring after the capture
sequence was initiated.
When vehicles impacted cable barrier systems with orientation angles
approaching 90 or 270 degrees with respect to the barrier system, energetic constraints
were altered. Until the front fenders, headlight, or grill were crushed and energetically
favorable crush zones were generated, the entire stiffnesses of the vehicle ends were
engaged. If a sufficiently large local stress threshold was not exceeded to cause plastic
deformation of the front or rear ends, the tensioned and deflected cables applied force to a
vehicle end in unstable equilibrium and the vehicle interacted with the cable barrier as if
it was a rigid body.
According to the principles of minimization of potential energy, cables followed
the energetic path which tended to minimize internal strain energy. If capture did not
initially occur, this path frequently caused cables to rise above the hood and roof or shift
below the vehicle, unless intermittent locations of energetic minima were created (i.e.,
crush zones, such as the windshield or crown of the hood). The large stiffness of the most
vehicle front and back planes could prevent localized contact stresses from exceeding the
elastic limit of the impacting components and prevent the initial capture engagement in
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some crashes. Without sufficient plastic deformation necessary to create energetically
favorable crush zones, cables were shed from the front or back of the vehicle.
Higher cable tensions further decreased cable response times and increased
sensitivity to transverse wave motions. High-tension cables closely follow classical wave
propagation equations for tensioned strings since the bending contributions become
negligible at high cable tensions. As a result, wave speeds were functionally dependent
on cable tension. Bending waves caused cables to disengage from the impacting vehicle
in some crashes. Higher CG trajectory angle crashes were also susceptible to these types
of prying underride or cable-slip override phenomena.
8.7 Overall Discussion and Recommendations
As stated previously, low-tension, 3-cable median barriers had the lowest average
rate of severe crashes and severe outcomes of all of the barrier types. Researchers
postulated that this result was actually the culmination of multiple effects.
First, low-tension cable median barriers are frequently historical systems. Most
low-tension cable median barrier currently installed in the United States were installed
before high-tension cable median barrier systems became prevalent. Working knowledge
of the barrier and the difficulties associated with mowing and ditch erosion around posts
were also expressed in research reports and DOT experience as the prominence of hightension cable median barriers increased. As a result, many state DOTs began to place
high-tension cable median barrier adjacent to the travel lanes on the shoulders in the hope
that the problems experienced by roadside maintenance crews could be mitigated.
Additionally, barrier placement on shoulders frequently improved ease of repair by
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maintenance crews since the workers were able to park vehicles in the median and repair
the system at a safe distance from adjacent traffic.
However, crash severity is strongly correlated with the associated IS value at
impact. Although systems in median centers experienced a higher frequency of crashes
with high CG trajectory angles, the speeds of the crashes were almost always lower than
when barrier systems were located on the shoulders adjacent to the roadways. This fact
was particularly evident when comparing crash results of states with widely-varying
median configurations. In Utah, median barriers were commonly installed at 1 ft (0.3 m)
or 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the V-ditch, per Utah installation standards. Utah’s large
separation distance between the cable barrier and the travel way contributed to the lowest
rates of A+K crashes compared to other aggregate severities of high-tension cable barrier
installations in other states. Conversely, in both Wisconsin and Washington, similar
systems were frequently installed on barrier shoulders since medians were steeper and
narrower to accommodate increased drainage and narrower right-of-ways. In both of
these states, the crash severity on the same barrier type was considerably higher than in
Utah. These effects had never been previously documented, and all three states were
acting in compliance with the state-of-the-art in cable barrier installation practices and
recommendations made by transportation safety agencies.
An analysis of the median data in Ohio indicated that, although penetration
propensity increased to more than 17% when barriers were located within 4 ft (1.2 m) of
the center of the V-ditch, crash severities were lowest when barriers were placed near the
center of the ditch verses on traffic-side shoulder, opposite-side shoulder, approach slope,
or back slope. In fact, penetration propensity was nearly twice as large when barriers
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were installed near the center of the ditch compared to anywhere else in the median. One
exception was the traffic-side shoulder, which had a penetration rate nearly equal to the
penetration rate of the barriers installed near the center of the median. Yet the percentage
of serious injury and fatality crashes for barriers in median centers was less than half as
large as when the barrier was installed anywhere else in the ditch.
In addition, nearly all severe crashes near the center of the median were caused by
penetrations, occasionally resulting in cross-median crashes or rollovers. If penetration
crashes can be prevented when cable median barriers are placed in ditch centers, the
potential to reduce severe crash risk is very high. The results of the Ohio evaluation are
shown in Table 31.
A chi-squared test was conducted on the severe crash, penetration, and rollover
data, and the results were significant at the 10% confidence level; given the size of the
data set at 857 crashes, the result should be interpreted as very significant since the data
set is small with respect to A+K crashes.

Table 31. Ohio Cable Median Barrier Location Severity and Crash Result

Barrier Location
Center
Traffic-Side
Opposite-Side

K+A
1.6%
2.8%
8.3%

% Penetration
17.0%
8.7%
10.0%

% Rollover
3.8%
4.3%
5.1%

Penetration and rollover crashes increased risk to occupants of errant vehicles
compared to low-tension systems. However, penetration and rollover crashes typically
constituted less than 55% of all severe cable median barrier crashes. Based on this
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finding, if penetration and rollover crash risks could be completely mitigated, many other
severe crashes would still occur.
The highest combined PSCC and RSCC occurred with low-tension, 3-cable
median barriers. Penetration and rollover crashes were less frequent on higher-tension
systems despite an increased net occupant risk. This result suggests that high-tension
cable barrier systems actually placed occupants at greater additional risk than low-tension
systems due to the increased cable tension. The greatest advantages to high-tension
systems included the ease of maintenance, ease of installation and repair, and versatility
of the systems. Many posts can be placed in ground sleeves for rapid replacement, and
the posts are small and lightweight, enabling easy transportation. Most attachments are
small and quick to repair. High-tension systems also retained tension after impact,
reducing cable sag and reducing the requirement for immediate repair, a concern often
cited with low-tension cable median barrier systems.
Ultimately, cable median barrier penetrations were caused by varied factors and
were heavily dependent on barrier design. Therefore, changes in barrier design can lead
to immediate reductions in the risk of penetration, as well as the rates of severe injury or
fatality crashes. Based on the results of this study and the types of containment failures
identified, improved barrier designs may be drafted, tested, and implemented. This could
lead to the reduction of hundreds or thousands of severe injuries and fatalities.
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CHAPTER 9 PENETRATION CRASH ANALYSIS
9.1 Nucor TL-3 System on Flange Channel Posts
The Nucor NU-CABLE system was installed in many of the surveyed states,
although the greatest quantity was in the state of Ohio. The most predominant causes of
penetrations on the Nucor system were override events and prying crashes in which the
vehicle pried cables upward and lifted them over the hood and bumper. Several crashes in
which the strong cable-to-post attachments contributed to penetration containment failure
occurred at CG trajectory angles much lower than are designated for full-scale crash
testing in NCHRP Report 350 or MASH.
9.1.1 Override Penetrations
A total of 22 override penetrations were identified on the database of Nucor
penetration crashes. Of these override crashes, 16 were linked to the strong cable-to-post
attachment, 4 were due to vehicle launching over the barrier due to installation on a
slope, and 2 penetrations were due specifically to the weak post-to-ground interaction.
Photographs of the crashes were used to document failure types when available.
An example of a crash in which the strong cable-to-post attachments contributed
to vehicular penetration through the barrier is shown in Figures 81 and 82. In this crash,
an impacting pickup lost control due to slick roadways and departed the roadway into the
median. The CG trajectory angle was approximately 24 degrees, and the orientation angle
of the vehicle at impact was approximately 110 deg. The vehicle impacted the cables and
began to redirect. The first few impacted posts were pulled out of the ground as the
pickup was redirecting, and the strength of the cable-to-post attachments retained the
posts on the cables. Due to the high orientation angle at impact, the cables did not locally
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crush the fender at the front of the vehicle. This crush typically fostered proper cablevehicle interaction and was commonly associated with acceptable barrier behavior. Posts
downstream from impact bent backward as the pickup progressed into the system,
lowering the cable heights. Eventually, the vehicle overrode the cables and struck the
round wood posts on the back side of a W-beam guardrail system. Due to the high
orientation angle of the truck, the posts acted as a tripping mechanism and the pickup
rolled five quarter-turns.
Although the weak post strength and high vehicle orientation contributed to the
penetration, the primary cause of the failure was due to the cable-to-post attachments
which failed to release the cables. By preventing cable release, the posts were pulled out
of the ground or fractured, which deposited the posts on the ground and lowered the cable
heights in front of the bumper. This type of override penetration was therefore referred to
as a “ramp formation” failure. If the cables had been released from the posts, cables
would have remained engaged with the front of the vehicle.
The incident slope at the POI was 10.4:1, which was generally considered “flat”
median terrain. Construction of the system was within recommended tolerance, and the
vehicle bears a strong resemblance to the Dodge Ram pickup trucks frequently used in
MASH crash testing programs. Other additional crashes occurred in which the strong
cable-to-post attachments caused override, but photographic evidence from those crashes
was sparse.
A second example of the strong cable-to-post connection consisted of a
combination of several component failures which culminated in the override penetration.
Vehicle no. 1 hydroplaned on the roadway and struck an adjacent vehicle. The second
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vehicle swerved to avoid Vehicle no. 1 but was unsuccessful. After colliding with
Vehicle no. 1, Vehicle no. 2 skidded into the median and struck a cable barrier, coming to
rest on the opposite side of the system. Impact CG trajectory and orientation angles of
Vehicle no. 2 were in the range of 10 to 15 degrees and 20 to 30 degrees, respectively.
Unfortunately, a lack of vehicle trajectory photographs prevented more accurate
photogrammetric techniques from being used to calculate the encroachment angles. Final
vehicle orientation was approximately 205 degrees, relative to the vehicle’s original
travel direction. Crash photographs are shown in Figures 83 and 84.
The penetration event occurred due to a combination of the following three
factors: (1) sequential impacts with posts in the system caused post fracture in the
socketed foundations with virtually no plastic deformation of the post; (2) the cable-topost attachments remained firmly attached to the cables, causing the fractured posts to
accumulate in front of the vehicle, while downstream posts fractured and were displaced
back with the impacting vehicle; and (3) a long, unsupported length of cable combined
with the weight of displaced posts tended to pull the cable downward, causing separation
of the bumper cover of the vehicle and marginalizing the “capture zone.” In this
reference, capture zone (CZ) refers to the front area of the vehicle between the upper
bumper surface and the lower edge of the hood. This area frequently corresponds to a
blunt surface concealing cavities in the vehicle made for headlights, the radiator, and the
engine compartment. The CZ concept has frequently been invoked when discussing cable
barrier placement in V-ditches and explaining both failures and successes of certain cable
barrier systems, though a formal characterization has never been given to this region of
the vehicle.
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The bumper cover separation occurred moments before the vehicle overrode the
cable barrier system. The bumper cover was displaced downward, allowing the top cable
to engage the expanding gap at the top corner of the bumper cover. The large frictional
force generated by the accumulated posts in front of the vehicle pushed the cable
downward, slowing the vehicle rapidly. The vehicle overrode the accumulated posts
which abruptly stopped the posts from sliding along the cables, and rapidly pulled the
cables downward. As the cables dropped, they tore the bumper cover from the vehicle.
The vehicle then possibly overran the bumper cover. The large forces contributing to the
bumper cover removal also caused the vehicle to yaw, and it came to rest with an
orientation angle exceeding 180 degrees.
Although the removal of the bumper cover in cable median barrier crashes is
relatively infrequent in full-scale crash tests and from real-world crash photographs, the
bumper cover failure was not likely the primary case of barrier penetration. Failure in this
crash was likely caused by the accumulation of fractured posts in front of the vehicle,
combined with displaced posts upstream and downstream from impact. Although the
removal of the bumper cover did reduce the tendency of the cables to accumulate around
the bumper area, sufficient area was present beneath the bumper cover to allow a
satisfactory redirection, as shown in Figure 84. The bumper cover was removed during an
excessive downward force from the cables, which suggests that regardless of the type,
make, or model of the vehicle in this impact condition, the vehicle may have had an
increased risk of penetration or rollover.
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9.1.2 Prying Underride Penetrations
The high strength of the Nucor cable-to-post attachments relative to post strength
prevented through-cable prying events from occurring on the TL-3 Nucor NU-CABLE,
flanged U-channel post cable median barrier system. All prying penetrations were caused
by vehicle underride. Every Nucor prying failure occurred with one of the following
impact conditions: (1) a low CG trajectory angle and high orientation angle (typically a
large oversteering angle) contributed to prying penetration at first contact with the
system; (2) a low CG trajectory angle and low orientation angle caused prying failure
during initial contact with the system; or (3) after a moderately-high CG trajectory angle
impact, vehicle redirected at a low angle and made secondary low-angle contact with the
damaged system, which then pried cables up before penetrating through the barrier.
Vehicles involved in prying failures were either narrow-profile, sharp-nosed
vehicles, such as the early 2000s-model Ford Taurus, or vehicles which had stiff, rounded
back ends such as the Pontiac Grand Am and Grand Prix models. As a result, prying
failures were sensitive to combinations of initial orientation angle and vehicle front-end
or rear-end geometries.
Several examples of prying failures are discussed here in greater detail. In one
prying-type crash, a 1999 Ford Taurus struck the Nucor 3-cable median barrier with CG
trajectory and orientation angles of less than 10 degrees when the barrier was located at
the edge of the shoulder. The vehicle remained in contact with the barrier for
approximately 60 ft (18.3 m) before prying the cables above the hood and coming to rest
in the median. No photographs were available for this crash.

168
In a second prying case, a 1994 Chevrolet Camaro impacted the Nucor system
with a sideslip angle of approximately 90 degrees. The vehicle entered a broad-side skid
in an overcorrecting condition, striking a TL-3 3-cable Nucor barrier system with 20 ft
(6.1 m) post spacing. The CG trajectory angle at impact was approximately 32 degrees,
and the heading angle was approximately 118 degrees. Photos of the impact are shown in
Figures 85 and 86.
In this crash, the vehicle oversteered into the median to avoid contact with another
vehicle on the road. The high orientation angle of the vehicle did not provide a good
engagement of the cables with the vehicle impacting its right-front corner, and the cables
slipped over the bumper and leading hood corner. The pointed front end of the vehicle
accentuated vertical prying. The gradual slope of the vehicle permitted the cables to slide
up and over the hood and roof, crushing and tearing both the front and rear windshields.
The driver was able to regain control of the vehicle path briefly, but overcorrected
in the median and slid to a stop with an orientation angle of approximately 245 degrees.
The vehicle engaged one post along the right side, and pushed the post downstream. The
post remained attached to the cables after the vehicle passed underneath.
Partial penetration crashes, in which the propensity for complete penetration was
demonstrated, were classified with other penetration crashes. Partial penetration crashes
consisted of override penetrations in which two wheels of the impacting vehicle came to
rest on both sides of the barrier or prying penetrations in which the vehicle came to rest
beneath the cables.
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171
One such potential penetration crash occurred with a 2003 Pontiac Grand Am,
which struck the barrier with a low but unknown CG trajectory angle and an orientation
angle greater than 100 degrees. The vehicle made an acceptable first contact with the
barrier, as the lower cables crushed the right-front fender panel inward and fractured the
headlight housing. However, due to the slope of the leading right-front corner of the
vehicle and the strength of the cable-to-post attachments, the upper cable was forced up
the vehicle’s A-pillar, lifting the lower cables and tearing the hood supports. The hood
was removed from the vehicle and came to rest at an unknown location in the median.
The force required to remove the hood caused the vehicle to yaw around with the back
leading. The second and third posts downstream from impact were struck by the rear of
the vehicle and lifted out of the ground due to the prying action of the cables above the
vehicle, but remained attached to the cables due to the strong cable-to-post attachments.
The posts became wedged in the rear windshield, shattering the rear glass and crushing
the roof inward. Photographs of the crash are shown in Figure 87.
Although the vehicle was brought to a stop in the median, the strong cable-to-post
attachment could have seriously injured or killed an occupant in the back seat of the
vehicle in this crash because of the retention of the post. Fortunately, no occupants were
present in high-risk seat locations, and this crash resulted in only property damage. This
crash result further served to illustrate that lower cable release loads and better post-soil
and post-socket engagement is necessary to improve barrier performance. By improving
these features of Nucor’s barrier design, performance in prying situations would be
expected to improve.
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9.1.3 Diving Underride Penetrations
A total of 11 diving penetration crashes were identified in the Nucor penetration
crash database. Of the 11 documentable diving penetration crashes on the Nucor barrier,
8 crashes occurred in medians with approach slopes steeper than 7:1 and when the barrier
was installed close to the ditch center. In each crash, the CG trajectory angle was
sufficient to cause suspension compression on the impacting corner, and the vehicle
orientation angle was between 10 and 80 degrees to the barrier. No rear-leading or overcorrecting diving crashes were documented, leading researchers to conclude that failures
due to vehicular diving were sensitive to the impacting orientation angle.
One such diving crash that resulted in a penetration involved a 2009 Ford Fusion.
Photographs of the crash are shown in Figure 88. A collision occurred with a second
vehicle in adjacent travel lanes, causing the Fusion to veer off of the roadway into the
median. The vehicle was oversteering as it entered the median, but the vehicle’s front
suspension compressed as it interacted with the 5.2:1 approach slope, and the vehicle
dove beneath the lower cables. Suspension rebound lifted the cables up, crushing and
folding the hood and crushing the windshield. Many posts upstream and downstream
from impact were pulled out of the ground due to the underride collision, rendering the
system inoperable for subsequent impacts.
A second example of a diving collision involved a 2003 Ford Taurus.
Photographs from the impact are shown in Figure 89. The vehicle entered the median
with an orientation angle greater than 60 degrees and a moderately-high CG trajectory
angle of approximately 21 degrees. The vehicle had lost control due to snow and slush on
the road.
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Figure 88. Diiving Underrride Penetrattion Crash onn Nucor NU
U-CABLE Baarrier
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Figure 89. Diiving Potentiial Underride Penetrationn Crash on Nucor NU-C
CABLE Barrrier
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The front suspension was compressed near the center of the V-ditch and began to
rebound upward when the vehicle struck the cable barrier system. The suspension
compression lifted the cables above the hood and onto the windshield. The suspension
rebound caused the cables to engage and crush the A-pillars and windshield, which
captured the vehicle. However, significant occupant compartment deformation occurred,
and the vehicle demonstrated a clear propensity for penetration since no cables were in
optimum position to capture the vehicle after the vehicle came to rest.
As an additional source of occupant risk in this crash, a post was lifted out of the
ground due to the rebounding vertical force, and the post crushed and pierced the
windshield. Post removal and subsequent interaction with the vehicle places occupants at
higher risk of injury, since occupant interaction with the displaced posts are a more direct
source of injury than ancillary injury mechanisms such as a secondary collision in
opposing travel lanes.
9.1.4 Nucor NU-CABLE Penetrations Discussion
The Nucor NU-CABLE barrier had the largest volume of photographs available.
It also had the highest average severity for all of the high-tension barrier types. The
penetration severity increase factor (PSIF) of the barrier was not very high, as shown in
Table 21. Based on the overall A+K rate near 4%, this indicates that non-penetration
crashes tend to be more severe on average than occurred with other systems.
Strong cable-to-post attachments were disadvantageous in two ways: (1) the
strong attachments tended to promote system override by forcing the cables to deflect
downward with the posts on impact and (2) to the inherently weak post-soil interaction
and analogous low embedment of the post in socketed foundations increased
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susceptibility to post pullout from the ground or sockets. Although both conditions
increased risk to impacting occupants by enabling penetration crash conditions to occur,
the weak post-soil or post-socket interaction increased occupant risk more than override
conditions because displaced posts which remain attached to the cables became spearing
risks to small cars.
9.2 Trinity CASS Cable Barrier
Most of the Trinity CASS crashes in the available crash database occurred with
the Trinity CASS system with C-section posts. As a result, analysis efforts were focused
on this system. However, penetration frequencies for all systems were virtually identical,
and all mechanisms of vehicle penetration were present in each of the designs. Despite a
large uncertainty associated with a relatively small dataset, the highest penetration crash
frequency occurred with the TL-4 CASS system, which was susceptible to “throughcable” penetrations by mid-size to small cars. As a result, all of the non-through-cable
penetrations of the three CASS systems were treated concurrently.
9.2.1 Ramp Formation Override Penetrations
A common penetration failure mechanism in CASS system crashes was vehicular
override over the barrier. From the 26 penetration override events with distinguishable
causes on the CASS barriers, 23 of the penetration crashes were caused by the vehicle
striking a post before contacting the cables. Because the cables in the CASS system were
integrated into a slot in the top of the post, failure of the post to release the cables
inevitably led to the formation of a ramp for the vehicle to climb and override the barrier
system. Furthermore, evidence of this type of impact can be provided simply by
examining the vehicles involved in override penetrations. Except for conditions of
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“bounce-over” in which the impacting vehicle rebounded off of the median slope and
penetrated over the top of the barrier, small to mid-size cars were rarely involved in
override penetrations on any cable barrier system. However, small and mid-size cars
comprised 31% of all override penetration failures on the CASS system.
Because post impacts contributed to cable entrapment in the slot and a reduction
in system height, this type of failure was referred to as a “ramp formation” failure, with
similar crash circumstances and outcomes as were observed with Nucor ramp formation
override failures. Typical impact conditions contributing to ramp formation were low to
moderate CG trajectory angles, typically less than 20 degrees relative to the roadway, and
oversteering conditions in which vehicle orientation was a rotation toward the median.
Overcorrecting and fully tracking crashes only constituted 3 ramp formation override
crashes. Demonstrable crashes illustrating this failure mechanism could not be provided
because reproduction of unauthorized scene diagrams or photographs would constitute a
violation of non-disclosure agreements.
An additional override crash involved a vehicle towing a trailer. Most of the
crashes involving a vehicle towing a trailer resulted in unfavorable cable barrier
performance, by causing trailer “tip-over.” trailer penetration, vehicle rollover, or vehicle
penetration. Frequently, these crashes were caused by oversteering gradients in the
median. Trailers with high CG locations, higher bumper heights, flatter, stiffer body
panels, and high rigidity, failed to engage cable barriers and increased penetration
propensity. However, crashes involving passenger vehicles towing trailers were also
infrequent. Thus, these crashes were not considered to be “failures” of the barrier, nor the
fault of the DOT, construction or maintenance crews, or barrier designers.
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9.2.2 Prying Underride Penetrations
A total of 26 prying underride crashes were recorded in the CASS penetration
crash database with sufficient information to determine cause of penetration events. Of
the 26 recorded vehicular prying penetrations, high orientation angle crashes accounted
for 17 penetrations and low CG trajectory angle, low orientation angle crashes accounted
for 9 penetrations. Low-angle crashes were treated separately because they displayed
similar failure mechanisms as low-angle penetration crashes.
Most light to mid-size SUVs and some full-size cars were not typically involved
in penetration crashes, since the broad front end combined with large bumper protrusions
typically resulted in capture or rollover. One vehicle which was involved in 21 cable
median barrier crashes, but only one penetration crash, was a Dodge Stratus. The scene
diagram from the penetration crash involving the 2002 Dodge Stratus is shown in Figure
90. Photographs of a 2002 Dodge Stratus, which was similar to the vehicle involved in
the impact, are shown in Figure 91.
The Dodge Stratus was not typically involved in penetration crashes due to some
unique features. The front of the vehicle was both broad and blunt, and the sides of the
vehicle were relatively flat. Typical sill heights of the windows exceed 35 in. (890 mm),
whereas the ground clearance averages approximately 16 in. (406 mm). Total vehicle
height averages were approximately 55 in. (1,397 mm). This height provided a large
surface over which vehicle capture was possible, which also required cables to rise
substantially to pass over the top of the vehicle. Furthermore, depressions around
headlights and taillights improved capture tendency.
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9.2.3 Low CG Trajectory Angle Penetrations
With respect to the CASS system, two override and nine prying underride
penetrations resulted from low-angle impacts that were easily identifiable. Up to four
additional cable barrier crashes may have also been low-angle penetrations.
The susceptibility of CASS systems to low-angle impacts was largely derived
from how the cables interacted with the vehicle. Since the cables were initially engaged
with the post in a center top slot in every CASS system type, low CG trajectory and low
orientation angle impacts deformed posts downward in a mostly downstream direction or
in the weak-axis direction post bending. However, the low angle of engagement also
typically corresponded to lower levels of cable damage on the vehicle. The cables were
not entrapped on the vehicle body and were free to oscillate or shift along the body
panels.
In several crashes where a vehicle struck the barrier with moderate CG trajectory
angles, as the vehicle began to redirect away from the first contact site, sequential
impacts with downstream posts caused the vehicle’s front end to yaw toward the barrier.
The secondary impacts frequently occurred with low CG trajectory angles and higher
orientation angles than were observed at the initial impact. Since posts upstream from the
second impact were damaged, the secondary impact permitted greater rates of
penetration.
Another frequent problem was observed during low-angle barrier impacts with
narrow-profile vehicles or vehicles with smooth front ends. With vehicle protrusion under
the bottom cable, the vehicle was able to pry upper cables out of the slot and away from
the post. High cable tension versus low cable tension frequently resulted in larger
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redirecting forces at similar angles of deflection. However, this was not always
advantageous.
Higher vertical loading at the same deflection caused two problems. Vertical force
was related to the angle formed between adjacent constraints. Cables displaced vertically
sometimes caused longer sections of cable to be perturbed and lift out of the post slots
once threshold vertical forces were exceeded. Downstream and upstream cable
disengagement contributed to penetration propensity.
Alternatively, if the cables remained engaged with the slots and attachments
downstream and upstream from the vehicle, the vertical load increased as the cable was
lifted up over the hood. This resulted in large compressive forces on the suspension. As a
result, the vehicle was pressed down and scraped against the ground or “bottomed out”
on the springs, forcing the high-tension cables above the engine hood and potentially onto
the windshield or roof. The vehicle could then either penetrate through the barrier or the
cables could crush or cut into the occupant compartment. In either scenario, the risk of
severe occupant injury was increased.
9.2.4 Diving Underride Penetrations
Only two diving underride penetrations were observed in the CASS database.
Both occurred on the Trinity CASS system with C-channel posts and occurred in Vditches with slopes between 4:1 and 6:1. Not all “diving” crashes resulted in penetrations
or partial penetrations. Diving crashes typically resulted in higher severity on CASS
systems than other cable median barrier systems due to the potential for roof crush by the
bottom or middle cables. If the bottom cable remained adequately engaged with the
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vehicle and the upper cables disengaged from the slot, the upper cables occasionally
caused occupant compartment crush.
The cable release load of the bottom cable in the CASS system was not available
in published research studies. However, a brief mechanical analysis indicated that the
weight of the cable, the cable tension, and friction with the retainer clip likely could
develop a net vertical release load per post of approximately 900 lb (4.0 kN). However,
due to the vertical resistance of the upper two cables, the vertical release of the lower
cable could rise by a factor of as much as 2.5, to approximately 2200 lb (9.8 kN). For
posts deflecting during impact, the vertical release load can be even larger. During a
diving or prying underride crash, the propensity for the lower cable to crush the hood or
windshield could be very large if the low vertical release load of the bottom cable was
increased.
Scene diagrams were not available for several non-rollover, non-cross-median,
severe CASS crashes with passenger cars. It was believed that partial or complete
underride was likely responsible for the severe outcomes. However, this estimate could
not be proven with the currently available dataset. Care should be taken to determine the
cause of any serious crash involving the Trinity CASS barrier to ensure that the lower
cables did not crush the occupant compartments of impacting vehicles.
9.2.5 Trinity CASS Penetrations Discussion
The TL-4 CASS system has very large cable spacing, which makes the system
more susceptible to through-cable penetrations. If a vehicle protruded between the cables
and lifted the upper cables above the hood, the bottom cable could remain tightly
constrained and form either a trip point or pry point to permit larger rates of vehicle
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penetration through the system. Similar questions have been raised regarding the 3-cable
Gibraltar TL-4 cable barrier, since it too has a large cable spacing in excess of 8 in. (203
mm). Unfortunately, insufficient information was available in this database to evaluate
and compare the safety performance of the TL-4 CASS and TL-4 Gibraltar systems with
large cable spacings.
In general, placement of the cables in the post slot resulted in less desirable cable
interaction with the vehicle. Although many crashes resulted in adequate containment
with relatively low damage to impacting vehicles, and dynamic deflections were
relatively low in most crashes because good cable engagement occurred, many crashes
resulted in undesirable outcomes. By placing the cables within the center slot and
constraining them, the cables are subject to the reaction of the posts and may not release
properly, which increases penetration risk due to override and increased occupant risk
due to underride. Barrier design improvements must be made to prevent these types of
high-risk containment failures from occurring.
9.3 Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF)
The total number of Brifen cable barrier crashes exceeded 1,500, and crossmedian crash rates of the Brifen system in Oklahoma were comparable with other
systems used in the state. However, documentable cable barrier crashes, in which scene
diagrams, photographs, and narratives were available, numbered approximately 120. Of
this set, only 7 documentable cable barrier crashes resulted in penetrations. Thus, the
penetrations were examined in great detail, but the relative frequency of each type of
penetration event could not be determined.
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9.3.1 Prying Underride Penetrations
Of the 7 penetration crashes available for further analysis, 5 were prying
underride crashes in which the impacting vehicle struck and penetrated below the Brifen
WRSF with little to no contribution from median slopes. The surprisingly high rate of
prying penetrations, given the small data set, further illustrates the risk associated with
low vertical release loads for the bottom cable. Vehicles diving under the barrier, or those
which engaged the barrier such that the cables slipped over the bumper and were pried
upward, experienced significantly increased risk of penetration, since the bottom cable
could not resist vertical uplift prying forces.
An example of a Brifen crash which resulted in a prying penetration is shown in
Figure 92. With sufficient details to complete a full crash reconstruction, it was
determined that the 2000 Toyota Avalon impacted the barrier at approximately 50.7 mph
(81.6 km/h) with a 16 degree CG trajectory angle and a 152 degree orientation angle,
with respect to the barrier. The vehicle contacted the wire rope with the leading rightfront corner, caused by the high orientation angle.
Immediately after impact, the force of the redirection caused the vehicle to yaw
with the right-rear corner turning into the barrier. These forces were eccentric to the
vehicle’s CG and thus were relatively low to cause yawing. As a result, the forces never
exceeded the breaking strength of the front headlight glass casing and the cables did not
crease into and engage the vehicle. As the vehicle’s back end rotated into the barrier, the
cables slipped over the front bumper and hood corner due to the prying force and the
vehicle penetrated under the barrier. The sunroof was shattered due to contact with the
cables.
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The vehicle struck and bent four posts. One impact occurred at the front bumper,
two occurred with the right-side body panels, and one occurred at the right-rear wheel, as
shown in Figure 92. The vehicle occupants were not injured in this crash. Approach
slopes leading up to the barrier were 9:1, and soil foundation tubes were in excellent
condition.
Other prying penetration crashes were typical of this crash event. Vehicles
impacted the barrier with large orientation angles, frequently with the right-side of the
vehicle leading, and slipped under the wire ropes. These types of failures were
predominantly due to the configuration of this barrier type. The lower cables on the TL-3
Brifen barrier were located at a height of 19½ in. (495 mm), but no vertical constraints
were used to retain the bottom cable, due to the required weave in the lower and middle
cables. Vertical release of the cables is largely resisted by gravity and friction with the
post; however, this causes the dynamic release loads to be low.
9.3.1.1 Other Penetration Types
One override penetration and one diving penetration were recorded. The diving
penetration crash occurred in an approved 6:1 V-ditch, in which the Brifen barrier was
installed on the traffic-side approach slope. The vehicle exited the roadway at a relatively
low angle, projected over the slope break point, then contacted the slope and began to
rebound. During rebound, the vehicle partially redirected and yawed into and beneath the
barrier.
The override penetration observed in the database was somewhat anomalous. In
this crash, a heavy snowfall occurred prior to and during the crash. Control of the vehicle
was lost, and the vehicle entered the median and struck the Brifen WRSF. However, the
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snow depth was so high that the barrier deflection was restricted, and the snow in front of
the barrier contributed to ramping over the barrier. Such a penetration event is not
expected in most impact conditions. Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
prevent such a penetration from occurring on other barrier systems; due to the snow and
low travel speeds, this crash has low likelihood of cross-median crash result.
9.3.1.2 Brifen WRSF Penetration Discussion
The Brifen penetration database was limited, but some clear tendencies were
observed. First, due to the low vertical release load of the cable, the Brifen TL-3 WRSF
was susceptible to underride from prying and diving failure types. Prying failures were
the most common type of failure and the most common type of impact condition in
general, especially when barriers were located at or near the shoulder. Thus, special care
should be taken to improve the vertical release resistance of the lower cable and ensure
adequate vertical resistance can be achieved. Though further analysis is necessary, it may
be appropriate for barrier manufacturers to evaluate the effectiveness of installing vertical
retainers on the lower cables that prevent the cables from rising with low vertical release
forces in order to reduce trip propensity.
9.3.2 Low-Tension Non-Proprietary 3-Cable Median Barrier
Approximately 128 severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri, 795 crashes
in Washington, and 22 penetration crashes in North Carolina between 2001 and 2004
were examined in detail to determine causes of penetration or rollover occurrence on
low-tension, 3-cable median barrier systems. Results of the analysis are provided below.
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9.3.2.1 Override Penetration Crashes
Override penetration crashes on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier were
much less frequent than override penetration crashes on high-tension cable median
barriers. Out of 71 cable median barrier crashes with determinable failure causation, only
8 crashes involved passenger vehicles overriding the barrier.
Out of the 8 override crashes, 5 involved vehicles striking the cable median
barrier at large CG trajectory angles approaching 90 degrees. Although the override
occurrence was usually associated with only larger passenger vehicles such as pickups,
SUVs, and vans, a Hyundai Tiburon (Tuscani) was also involved in an override crash.
The vehicle swerved off of the road to the right, overcorrected, and redirected into the
median at approximately 86 degrees before it vaulted off of the slope break point of the
4:1 median approach slope and overrode the barrier. The cable barrier was installed on
the traffic-side approach slope. The other four high-angle override crashes involved a
large van and three pickup trucks. A sample scene diagram of a pickup high-angle
override crash is shown in Figure 93.
The 3 other override penetration crashes consisted of very low CG trajectory
angle, low orientation angle crashes. In two crashes, the impacting vehicles were pickup
trucks, and in one crash, the vehicle was a passenger car. The vehicles impacted the
barrier on relatively steep approach slopes, with unmeasured slopes likely between 4:1
and 6:1 based on visual estimation. The vehicles impacted the cable median barrier,
sequentially bending the S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) support posts downstream, then overrode the
cables. The override was likely due to the following two factors: (1) the low tension in
the cables was insufficient to prevent sagging when multiple support posts were
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[e.g. 25, 26, 43]. Underride failures with contribution from V-ditches steeper than 6:1
have often been cited as the most common failure of low-tension cable median barriers.
Of the 71 low-tension, 3-cable median barrier penetration crashes with
determinable causes, 23 were due to diving penetrations. The low-tension, 3-cable
median barrier utilized a 5/16-in. (8-mm) J-bolt. A study conducted at the Midwest
Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) on the strength of the J-bolts, commonly referred to
as hook bolts, determined that the peak horizontal pullout load of the 5/16-in. (8-mm) Jbolt was approximately 719 lb (3.20 kN), and the peak vertical pullout load was
approximately 636 lb (2.83 kN) [45].
Most underride crashes occurred when the bottom cable was on the opposite side
of the post relative to the impacting vehicle travel direction. Although not recorded,
several estimates of frequency were made regarding back-side penetrations, and suggest
that at least 60% of all underride penetrations occurred at locations where the lower cable
was on the opposite side of the post relative to the impacting vehicle.
The North Carolina penetration database supported this finding even though it
was not a true “random sampling” of penetration crashes. However, causes of the
penetrations and the associated crash circumstances in North Carolina were unknown to
the researchers at the time of the crash investigations. It was observed that 15 of the 22
North Carolina penetration crashes, or approximately 68%, were back-side crashes. Of
these, it was determined that 8 of the back-side crashes resulted in the vehicles diving
under the cables.
Although median slope rates did have an effect on diving penetration rates,
median slopes alone did not completely describe the risk of diving underride
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penetrations. Many of the sloped medians were shallower than 6:1. One diving
penetration occurred on a median slope of approximately 10:1. In that crash, the vehicle
was traveling at a high rate of speed, launched off of the shallow approach slope and
struck the median approximately 4 ft (1.2 m) in front of the barrier, then dove under the
cables. Photographs from the crash site are shown in Figure 94.
In general, slopes steeper than 8:1 were most susceptible to cable median barrier
diving penetrations. Diving penetrations occurred less frequently if the impacting vehicle
made contact with the barrier on the approach slope. The critical location to cause diving
penetrations was approximately 3 to 6 ft (0.9 to 1.8 m) from the center of the V-ditch,
based on analyses of ruts made in the soil in the crashes in North Carolina. This
determination was supported by literature [26].
Although photographs were not available for crashes in the state of Missouri, and
thus no rutting analyses were possible, median profiles were estimated based on sitespecific analysis and limited photogrammetric reconstruction. In each Missouri diving
underride crash, the median slope was steeper than or equal to 6:1, and the back-side
slopes were also steeper than or equal to 6:1. In every diving underride crash in the
database, back-side slopes were as steep as or steeper than the approach slopes into the
median. This suggested that the approach slope steepness has a significant effect on the
propensity to compress the suspension. However, the back side slopes had the
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Figure 94. Diiving Underrride Penetrattion Crash inn North Caroolina
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strongest correlation with diving propensity when cable barriers were located near the
center of the ditch. Steep back-side slopes caused more frequent penetrations than steep
front-side slopes, and no diving crashes were observed when the cable median barrier
was installed on a shallower slope. However, this type of installation may be subject to
penetration, rollover, or other types of failures.
Despite the effect of suspension compression on the propensity for vehicle
penetration through the barrier, the weak lower cable-to-post attachments strongly
increased penetration propensity. The attachments disengaged from the posts at low loads
and allowed the cables to slip above or below the vehicle. It was believed that in every
recorded diving cable median barrier crash in this database, the diving tendency would be
significantly reduced or eliminated if the bottom cable-to-post attachment strength was
increased. This could have reduced diving penetrations by as much as 50%. Increasing
the release load of the bottom cable would likely increase contact forces between the
impacting vehicle and bottom cable, which could result in better engagement and
formation of the familiar cable crease observed on vehicles involved in successful
redirections. Additional examples of diving underride crashes are shown in Figures 95
and 96.
9.3.2.3 Prying Underride Penetrations
Unlike most high-tension cable median barrier systems, low-tension, 3-cable
median barriers were the most susceptible to through-cable barrier penetration. This type
of penetration was restricted to prying type, although median slope and vehicle geometry
also contributed to the penetration in some crashes.
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Since prying penetrations were necessarily restricted to crashes in which vehicle
diving under the barrier was not the primary cause of the penetration, the median profiles
of typical prying crashes varied dramatically from the diving penetration crashes. Out of
the 22 penetration crashes in North Carolina, all penetrations occurring on the median
approach slopes were prying penetrations, and 5 of the 15 crashes where the cable
median barrier was installed on the back slope were prying penetration crashes.
Additionally in Missouri, only 1 of the 18 prying crashes occurred on the median back
slope, while 2 prying penetration crashes occurred when the barrier was impacted on the
opposite-side shoulder. Conversely, 13 prying penetrations occurred on either the
approach slope or ditch center, and an additional prying crash occurred when the barrier
was installed on the adjacent shoulder of the divided roadway.
Frequently, at least two prying risk factors were present in prying penetration
crashes. Prying penetrations occurred when cables were lifted or separated and failed to
engage the vehicle. As with the high-tension cable median barrier systems, prying
penetrations were sensitive to impacting vehicle orientation angles. These angles were
cross-plotted against all severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri, as shown in
Figure 97. No clear distinction could be made between the two crash distribution data
sets. Oversteering impacts, in which the vehicle orientation angle was greater than the
CG trajectory angle, were 5 times more common for prying penetration crashes.
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Figure 97. Comparison of Prying Penetration CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles
Prying penetration crashes typically occurred via a combination of the following
factors: (1) cables located on the back side of the post released from many posts because
lateral forces exceeded cable-to-post attachment strengths; (2) large orientation angles
promoted bumper protrusion between or below the cables contributing to underride or
through-cable penetration; and (3) low contact forces prevented beneficial body panel
crushing or headlight fracture, causing poor cable-vehicle engagement. Back-side cable
release most commonly occurred when other cables failed to adequately engage the
vehicle, so the entire redirection load was applied by one back side cable. Examples of
penetration crashes in which the impacted back-side cable was removed from more than
10 posts downstream from impact are shown in Figures 98 and 99.
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Figure 98. Baack Side (Miiddle) Cable Release from Many Doownstream Posts Resultinng in
Penetrration
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Figure 99. Baack Side (Miiddle) Cable Release from 11 Downstream Postss Resulting iin
Penetrration
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One unique penetration crash involved a Mitsubishi Montero equipped with a
brush guard mounted on the front bumper. Crash photographs are shown in Figures 100
and 101. The vehicle struck the cable barrier system, and the angled surface of the brush
guard forced two of the cables below the front bumper and one above the hood. The cable
that was lifted onto the vehicle caused minor windshield damage and scratching on the
vehicle’s A-pillar. However, most of the vehicle damage was due to an unrelated rollover
which occurred on the roadside of the opposite travel lanes long after the barrier
penetration.
Such an event was anomalous because very few impacting vehicles were
equipped with these guards. However, the effect of the brush guard in this crash was a
microcosmic representation of the effect of weak cable-to-post attachments on strong
posts. Even large vehicles, which were typically excellent candidates for redirection on
cable median barriers, were at increased risk of prying penetration crashes at high
orientation angles. This further supports the conclusion that orientation angles can alter
the energetically preferential interaction of vehicles with cable median barriers. If a
sufficient contact groove was not made before the impacted cables began to slip on the
vehicle, the likelihood of redirection was very low.
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V Caused by Brush Guardd
Figure 100. Prying Penetrration Failurre with SUV
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Figure 101. Brush Guard Prying Peneetration withh Cable Conttact Striationns on A-Pillaar
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9.3.2.4 System Failures
Two cases of system failures were noted in the low-tension cable median barrier
penetration database. In both crashes, the vehicle adequately engaged the tensioned
cables and at least one cable formed a contact groove, fracturing the impacting corner
headlight casing and collapsing the grill and fender around the cable. However, in both
crashes, the low-tension cable splice failed, allowing the tensioned cable to rebound away
from the vehicle. In one crash, the back-side bottom cable engaged the grill and
headlight. As the cable was deflected with the vehicle, large tensions were developed in
the cable and exceeded the strength of the cable splice. Similarly, in the other crash, the
back-side middle cable engaged the bumper and grill of the impacting vehicle, crushing
the fender and grill, characteristic of good capture behavior. As the cable was deflected
with the vehicle into opposing travel lanes, high tension was developed in the cable and
exceeded the splice limits. In both crashes, weak cable-to-post attachments contributed to
splice failure. Photographs of the first crash are shown in Figures 102 and 103.
Since this crash result was only recorded on low-tension cable median barrier
systems, better splices may be necessary for future low-tension cable barrier systems. A
study of cable median barrier hardware identified several other splices which could be
used or adapted for low-tension cable barrier use [46].
9.3.2.1 Other Penetration Causes
Other penetration causes were identified that led to penetrations on low-tension
cable median barrier systems, including impacts with large vehicles (i.e., tractor trailersor single-unit trucks), and bouncing override penetrations due to median slopes.
However, as with the high-tension cable median barrier counterparts, bouncing override
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Figure 102. High-Tension
n Splice Teaarout Penetraation
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Figure 103. High-Tension
n Splice Teaarout Penetraation

208
penetrations were impact condition dependent, and no cable barrier system manufactured
had been tested and approved to redirect large vehicles (i.e., tractor-trailers).
Causes for bounce-over of low-tension systems were virtually identical to other
systems. Since the arguments and outcomes were similar, the causes are not discussed
here. Out of a recorded 70 cable median barrier penetrations on low-tension cable median
barriers, only 2 resulted in a bounce-over. This could be the result of barrier placement,
which was frequently near the center of the median or on the shoulder instead of up the
median slope where vertical vehicle rebound was highest. Bounce-over penetrations may
also be reduced by easy release of the top cable. Without sufficient additional crash
information, the low frequency of bounce-over penetration crashes cannot be explained.
9.3.2.2 Discussion
Low-tension, 3-cable median barriers were the most susceptible barrier type to
prying and diving underride penetrations on a fixed median terrain and with a fixed
barrier placement, and the least susceptible to override penetration based on crash results
obtained in this research effort. Strong cable-to-post attachments are essential for bottom
and middle cables in low-tension cable median barrier systems. Reducing the vertical
upward compliance of the lower cable upward could reduce the number of diving
penetrations. However, care must be taken to prevent excessive stiffening of the cable
against downward vertical motion on the post, or the lower cable will become a trip point
for rollovers.
The advantage of the weak top cable-to-post connection is that with a low vertical
release load, underriding vehicles did not experience occupant compartment crush due to
the top cable, and overrides were very infrequent when the cables quickly released from
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the post but remained engaged with the vehicle. This stratification of cable-to-post
attachment strengths has not been optimized by any cable median barrier system in use to
date and could be necessary to further improve cable median barrier design.
There is no evidence yet that many (if any) penetration crashes were caused due
to cables which drooped in one location due to a previous crash. This may be due to
excellent DOT response of rapid barrier repair at crash sites, which prevented these
conditions from occurring. However, crashes in which two or more vehicles struck the
cable median barrier only resulted in penetration if one of the vehicles was either a
tractor-trailer or was towing a trailer, based on the available database. In both of these
crash types, the vehicles which struck the barrier were not within the designed
performance limits of the barriers. Further, crashes in which multiple vehicles struck the
cable median barrier constituted only approximately 3% of all crashes in the database. If
such a correlation existed and penetration propensity was higher when vehicles struck
near previous crash locations, insufficient data were present in the database to indicate
this increase. Nonetheless, states with low-tension cable median barrier systems often
mandate barrier maintenance and repair within 48 hours of the crash notification. Even
when repairs happen up to two weeks after a crash, the repair timeframe appears to be
adequate to prevent penetration events caused by previous cable barrier crashes from
occurring. Shorter repair windows may be required during winter months when icy road
conditions increase crash frequency.
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CHAPTER 10 PENETRATION CRASH SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
10.1 Introduction
Cable median barrier penetration propensity is affected by many independent
factors. These factors include vehicle geometry, stiffness, and suspension properties,
system stiffness, post strength, cable tension, cable-to-post attachments, cable heights,
median slopes, cable barrier offset from roadway, CG trajectory angle, and CG
orientation angle at impact. Identifying what combination of these factors, or additional
unlisted factors, contributed to a penetration crash can be daunting.
A series of simulations were created to identify the causes of cable median barrier
penetrations in three separate crashes with photographic evidence. Factors which
culminated in the penetration of the vehicle over, under, or through the cable barrier
system were identified and illustrated explicitly. It was determined that in each of the
simulated crashes, the system was in an acceptable location, system construction was
acceptable, and impact conditions deviated from the typical impact conditions which
accentuated penetration risk.
All median measurements were made with respect to the point of departure.
Angles were always referenced from a tangent line to the road drawn at the location
where the vehicle CG departed the lane edgeline, and were positive when the vehicle
rotated counterclockwise as viewed from above. As a result, any median crash had a
positive CG trajectory angle by definition. Orientation angles varied from -180 to 180
degrees, with positive angles occurring when the centerline of the vehicle was oriented
toward the median and negative when the vehicle centerline oriented at the CG was
oriented away from the median.
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10.2 Simulation 1: TL-3 Nucor Cable Barrier System
The first simulation considered an impact of a 2009 Mitsubishi Galant into a TL-3
Nucor NU-CABLE cable barrier system. The median was comprised of five discrete
segments, relative to vehicle initial direction of travel: a 12.5-ft (3.8-m) wide flat,
asphalt-paved shoulder; a 15.5-ft (4.7-m) wide 6:1 approach slope, a 3.0-ft (0.9-m) wide
flat grassy ditch bottom, a 19.0-ft (5.8-m) wide 7:1 back slope, and a 13.5-ft (4.1-m) flat
opposite-side shoulder. The system was installed 13.5 ft (4.1 m) from the approach slope
break point. Since the system was installed on a 6:1 approach slope, the system location
was acceptable according to FHWA approval letters b96, b96a, b167, b183, b184, b184a,
and b193.
The crash sequence was initiated when the impacting vehicle lost control,
swerving off of the road into the median. The vehicle departed the road with a CG
trajectory angle of 32 degrees and an orientation angle of 62 degrees relative to the
roadway. Based on a rudimentary crash reconstruction, the speed of the vehicle at the
point of departure from the lane was determined to be approximately 58.1 mph (25.6
m/s), based on skid marks on the road and shoulder, tire marks in grass, post
deformations, and vehicle damage energy estimates. Photographs of the crash site are
shown in Figures 104 and 105.
10.2.1 Component Models
The posts in the system were 4 lb/ft Rib-Bak ® posts manufactured from ASTM
A499 steel with a yield stress of approximately 80 ksi (552 MPa) and a tensile strength of
approximately 100 ksi (689 MPa). Post models were comprised of four separate parts:
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Figure 104. Crash Scene Photographss, Simulationn No. 1
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Figure 105. Post-Crash Vehicle Photo
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base flanges measuring 0.272 in. (6.9 mm) thick, a 0.143-in. (3.6-mm ) thick, dual-leg
web, 0.227-in. (5.8-mm) thick ribs, and a 0.196-in. (5.0-mm) thick short flange.
All post parts were modeled using type 2, Belytschko-Tsay shell elements in LSDYNA v. 971 R5.1 [47]. All above-ground post deformation was attributable to rupture
of the smaller, outer flange, and crack propagation through the dual-leg webs, folding the
flanges backward at ground level. To simulate this effect, rigid tubes closely matching
the dimensions of the post were created. The posts were put in the soil tubes to a distance
of 1 in. (25 mm) below the ground at the center of the web. Since the posts were
embedded in soil, the clearance of the soil tube around the post was approximately 0.12
in. (3 mm) around the entire post.
The ground slopes were modeled with rigid walls intersecting at sharp angles.
This was an approximation, since slope rounding was present at every slope transition.
Although slope rounding does minimize the sharp transition and reduces the abrupt
reactions with the suspension, the radius and position of the slope rounding was not
known and could not be measured from photographs or satellite photography. However,
the difference between a rounded slope and the sharp slope transition would likely not
exceed 1 in. (25 mm) based on dimensions which could be measured from photographs.
During the crash event, two posts were completely fractured and retained by the
high-tension cables. To simulate post contact with the ground, each post web and flange
section was partitioned into upper and lower parts. The lower parts were used in contact
definitions with the rigid soil tube, and the upper part was included in the part set that
could contact the ground.
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Cables were attached to the posts with curved cable clips. The clips measured
0.2725 in. ± 0.0010 in. (6.92 mm ± 0.025 mm). Curved legs on the clips were used to
retain the clips, and nuts on the tops of the clips were used to fasten the tops of the clips
in place. The clips were made of steel with 60 ksi (414 MPa) tensile strength. An
approximate tensile load to cause rupture of one leg would therefore be 3.5 kips (15.6
kN).
The clips were modeled using a process described in reference [49]. Solid element
models of a rod of equivalent diameter to the cable clips were created and simulated in
tension, bending, and torsion using material properties consistent with available material
properties found from Nucor clip specifications. The resulting tension-strain, bending
moment-curvature, and torque-rate of twist curves were inserted into beam element
models of the clips using the *MAT_MOMENT_CURVATURE_BEAM material model
with a type 2 Belytschko-Schwer beam element section. The nut on the end of the cable
clip was modeled using solids and made rigid. A rigid nut approximation was reasonable
because nuts typically experience minimal damage during impact, and the solid elements
dominated the timestep.
Because contact between beam elements and shell element edges can result in
node snagging, beam elements with null material properties (i.e., zero-stress) were used
in a ring around each hole in the smaller flange. The holes in the post were oversized by
0.020 in. (0.5 mm), and the diameter of the null beam elements was 0.020 in. (0.5 mm).
The cables were modeled with beam elements according to the process described in
reference [27]. The cables were tensioned over 400 ms prior to impact using discrete
beam elements, which were switched from deformable to rigid just before impact.
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The cables in the system comprised of models recommended in literature [27].
Cables were tensioned to 5.0 kips (22.2 kN) over 350 ms prior to impact using discrete
beams and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a ramp loading curve to
apply a controlled ramp load. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was
switched from deformable to rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between
the cables and the posts and vehicle were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and
contact between cables and beam element cable-to-post attachments utilized an automatic
general contact type, which more accurately treated beam-to-beam contact.
10.2.2 Vehicle Model
A Dodge Neon model created and maintained by the National Crash Analysis
Center (NCAC) at George Washington University (GWU) was selected for similarity
with the Mitsubishi Galant. Unfortunately, some major differences between the
Mitsubishi Galant and Dodge Neon vehicle model were observed.
First, the suspension properties of the Dodge Neon model were not reflective of
high-impulsive loads which occurred when the vehicle contacted the back slope. As a
result, the simulation was not considered accurate following impact with the modeled
back slope.
Second, the front bumper of the Mitsubishi Galant was composed of a smoothfaced aluminum bumper cover with a crushable plastic cartridge for energy dissipation.
The Dodge Neon model incorporated a thin plastic bumper cover and polystyrene bumper
for energy dissipation. To improve cable-to-bumper interaction, the front bumper of the
Neon was smoothed with a layer of shell elements over the front of the opening of the
bumper and included in the contact definitions. Additionally, the Neon bumper cover was
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large, measuring 13.4 in. (340 mm) tall, whereas the Galant bumper cover was only
approximately 9 in. (229 mm) tall, and the Galant bumper cover was attached with screwon tabs.
Finally, the weight, height, length, wheelbase, track width, and roll and yaw
moments of inertia of the vehicles were markedly different. Using data from the Expert
AutoStats program, the wheelbase of the Neon was 20 in. (508 mm) less than the Galant,
the weight was nearly 900 lb (408 kg) less, and the track width of the Neon was 4 in.
(102 mm) less than the Galant. Despite these shortcomings, the simulation was able to
replicate the crash results.
10.2.3 Results of the Simulation
Sequential photographs of simulation no. 1 are shown in Figures 106 through 109.
The vehicle projected over the top of the slope break point and struck the cable median
barrier while airborne. The top cable of the Nucor system contacted the vehicle’s bumper
and was forced below the bumper. The high tension in the cable pulled the bumper cover
downward and pulled against the attachments supporting the bumper cover. As the cable
deflected, lateral force from the cables caused the second cable to rebound, followed by
the first. The vehicle then contacted the back slope and rebounded upward, and the
steering linkage was torqued, causing the vehicle to redirect downstream. The rear tires
contacted the cables and fractured posts and continued to deform the cables downward.
Most events in the simulation matched physical evidence on the scene. The
vehicle projected over the slope and overrode the cable; however, in the crash, the
downward pull of the cables deformed the bumper cover attachments, and ultimately tore
the bumper cover off of the vehicle. The bumper cover deformed and the rebounding
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cables and additional contact from the back tires folded the bumper cover over the cables,
where it remained after the crash. These results were anomalous, but without more
accurate vehicle, tire, and slope rounding models, such an event could not be replicated.
Nonetheless, the override tendency was clearly obvious based on the sequential
photographs.
Two root causes of this penetration were identified. First, the high CG trajectory
angle of the vehicle into the barrier resulted in higher CG height at impact than was
suggested by Mongiardini et al. for sedan or small car vehicles [19]. As a result, the
vehicle struck the barrier at a much higher energy level and CG height relative to similar
vehicles in nominal TL-3 impact conditions.
Although the placement of the cable median barrier anywhere on a 6:1 slope is
permitted by FHWA and most state DOTs, agencies such as NCAC have recommended
that low-tension cable median barriers not be placed between 1 ft (0.3 m) and 8 ft (2.4 m)
from the center of the V-ditch [26]. Some state DOTs have mandated this practice for all
cable median barriers. However, some high-tension systems have been tested and
approved for use anywhere in 6:1 V-ditches, based on the expectation that a vehicle
departing the road with a CG trajectory angle of 25 degrees and a speed of 62.1 mph (100
km/h) will not override most cable median barrier systems based on nominal bumper
trajectories. Following several cable median barrier placement studies, FHWA issued a
memo revising acceptable barrier placement locations. Detailed studies analyzing vehicle
trajectories in V-ditches have recently generated concern that MASH vehicles can display
sensitivities not witnessed in testing conducted according to NCHRP Report 350 [19].
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Unfortunately, high-angle departures from the road generate very difficult
scenarios for capturing errant vehicles. This problem will be present for all sloped
medians to some degree; for 6:1 V-ditches, significant deviations of the CG height
relative to the ground are observable at 28 degrees, and for 4:1 slopes, significant
differences between CG heights can be observed even at 20 degrees. In a limiting case,
the angle of departure which generates a “free fall” condition will result in bouncing as
well as potential for override. An optimum solution to prevent these types of override or
underride crashes in V-ditches with slopes of 6:1 or steeper is to use taller, more robust
cable median barrier systems, such as TL-4 cable median barriers. States should consider
adopting TL-4 cable median barriers as a standard to prevent these overrides and
underrides.
The second cause of this penetration was that the cable-to-post attachments for the
Nucor system were too strong, as detailed in Chapters 8 and 9. The high cable-to-post
attachments prevented the top cable from releasing from the posts, and dragged the top
cables downward beneath the vehicle. This was particularly evident from the post-crash
photographs, which showed two fractured posts displaced downstream of impact, still
attached to the cables. The cable-to-post attachment strengths should be striated to
prevent the top cable-to-post attachments from becoming overly strong and dragging the
cables downward. There are additional benefits to low top cable attachment strengths,
including low risk of vehicle occupant compartment crush during underrides, higher rates
of cable entrapment preventing rebound into adjacent travel lanes, and better reaction on
sloped medians. An ongoing study has attempted to identify the critical performance
metrics for top and mid-post cable-to-post attachment heights [48].
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10.3 Simulation 2: TL-3 Brifen Cable Barrier
The second simulated cable median barrier penetration crash considered a Brifen
4-rope, TL-3 cable median barrier. The median profile at the point of departure consisted
of five segments: an 8-ft (2.4-m) wide flat shoulder, a 22.7-ft (6.92-m) wide, 9:1
approach slope, a 4.6-ft (1.40-m) wide flat ditch center, a 22.4-ft (6.83-m) 8:1 back slope,
and a 10.6-ft (3.23-m) wide opposite-side shoulder. The cable median barrier was
installed at the center of the 9:1 approach slope.
The Brifen system, as previously detailed, involved 0.24-in. (6-mm) thick S-posts.
roller cable supports locked on the sides of the posts, woven cables between posts, and
posts placed in sleeves. The cable heights were at 19.7, 26.0, and 28.3 in. (500, 660, and
720 mm), with two cables woven on opposite sides of the post at 26.0 in. (660 mm).
The vehicle, a 2000 Toyota Avalon, struck the cable median barrier with CG trajectory
and orientation angles of 16 and 152 degrees. Photographs of the crash scene are shown
in Figures 110 through 112. This vehicle never departed the ground during impact, and
the low CG trajectory angle and relatively flat approach slope enabled a straightforward
crash reconstruction. Based on frictional values and post deformation energies,
researchers estimated that the impact speed was approximately 50.7 mph (81.6 km/h).
10.3.1 Component Models
The vehicle model used in simulation no. 1 was also used in Simulation No. 2, but
oriented at a 152-degree orientation angle and a 15.9-degree CG trajectory angle. Also,
the front bumper cover slat was removed, since that portion of the bumper did not contact
the cable barrier. The ground slopes were also created using rigid walls, similar to those
used in Simulation No. 1.
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Figure 110. Crash Scene Photographss, Simulationn No. 2
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Figure 111. Crash Scene Photographss, Simulationn No. 2
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The posts were modeled with type 2 Belytshcko-Tsay shell elements, with an
element length of approximately 0.39 in. (10 mm). The posts were modeled as two parts:
one part below ground was used in contact definitions with the foundation tube, and one
part above ground used in the contacts with the rigid walls representing the ground.
The cable supports, which were effectively rollers pinned to the sides of the posts,
were modeled using a thin, rigid, shell element casing. Shell elements were used in lieu
of solid elements since the cables, composed of beam elements, are better suited for
contact with shell elements than solid elements. This effect was described in reference
[49]. Rigid cable supports on each post were tied to nodes on the posts to model the clip
engagement.
The cable on the top of the post was placed in a U-shaped slot. However, as
mentioned, shell element edge contact with the beam elements can result in node
snagging and instability. Thus, the U-channel slot was expanded by 0.039 in. (1.0 mm)
and beam elements with a 0.039 in. (1.0 mm) diameter were lined around the U-channel
slot, and assigned null material properties.
The cables in the system comprised models recommended in literature [27].
Cables were tensioned to approximately 5.0 kips (22.2 kN) over 500 ms prior to impact
using discrete beams and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a ramp
loading curve to apply a controlled ramp load. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the
cable was switched from deformable to rigid approximately 50 ms before impact.
Contacts between the cables and the posts, cable-to-post attachments, and vehicle were of
the automatic node-to-surface type, and contact between cables utilized an automatic
general contact type, which more accurately treated beam-to-beam contact.
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Initial simulation results showed vehicle capture instead of penetration. The
vehicle struck the cable median barrier and the cables deformed the right-front fender
inward toward the headlight housing. The low vehicle mass and yaw moment of inertia
caused the vehicle to rotate around the right-front corner, enabling the back of the vehicle
to strike the system. The vehicle was redirected and did not rebound into adjacent travel
lanes. Sequential photographs of the vehicle redirection event are shown in Figures 113
and 114.
It was determined that the failure type in this penetration crash was an underride,
likely caused by the lower cable sliding up and over the headlight and hood before the
vehicle was redirected. The basic model of the Neon did not incorporate headlight glass
into the model, and the fender terminated adjacent to a hole where the headlight would
normally be located.
A headlight assembly was modeled by creating a tangent surface to the hood and
fender that filled the hole above the bumper. The headlight was assigned glass material
properties and given a thickness of 3.5 mm. The mesh was smoothed using the mesh
smoother tool available in LS-Pre-Post to distribute the mesh and maximize the tangent
smoothness.
10.3.2 Simulation Results
The updated simulation results are shown in Figures 115 through 117. The Neon
projected over the 9:1 slope and into the cable median barrier. The vehicle struck the
barrier with the right-front corner. The front headlight struck the bottom cable first,
lifting the cable over the top of the right-front headlight, and over the right-front corner of
the hood. The remaining three cables struck the right-front fender and hood and were also
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Figure 113. Downstream Sequentials of Redirectiion Simulatiion, Simulation No. 2
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Figure 116. Behind-Barriier Sequentiaals of Penetrration Simulaation, Simullation No. 2
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lifted above the hood. As the vehicle progressed into the system, it struck four posts, and
all four cables were forced above the hood and roof. The struck posts dented the fender,
door panel, and rear bumper, and struck the right-rear tire, just as occurred during the
crash sequence.
Unfortunately, the differences between the Dodge Neon and the Toyota Avalon
also contributed to differences between the simulation and penetration crash. The curb
weight of the Avalon was 700 lb (318 kg) greater than the curb weight of the Neon
model, the wheelbase was 2 in. (51 mm) larger, and the top bumper height of the Avalon
was higher than in the Neon model, but the center-of-headlight height was nominally the
same. This led to a sharper front-end profile of the Avalon than was present in the Neon
model. However, results were still indicative of the physical crash.
Two major contributors to this penetration crash result were identified. First, the
low strength of the bottom cable-to-post attachment permitted the cable to rise up, over
the headlight and hood without damaging the vehicle. By simply supporting the bottom
cable with no vertical resistance load to lifting, the vehicle was able to pry the bottom
cable up, and no other cable was in an optimum position to prevent penetration. This
problem could be rectified by adding vertical resistance to the bottom cable on the post.
Such a mechanism could be as simple as another snap-on roller attachment placed above
the bottom cable to retain it on the post.
When a vehicle struck a cable median barrier system such that the headlight made
tangential contact with the cables, a higher propensity for penetration always occurred.
Side panels, including fenders, are nearly always more stiff than the front ends of most
vehicles. This is by design; because there is frequently crush room in front of the vehicle
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due to the bumper cover offset from the crushable bumper, glass headlights which can
fracture, and plastic components such as frontal grills or air dams, the compliance of the
front of the vehicle tends to promote good cable engagement with the vehicle. When the
vehicle struck the barrier with an orientation angle between 90 and 180 degrees; however,
the stiffer side panels and higher headlight strength when struck from the side provided.
This prevented formation of the characteristic cable contact grooves present on many
redirection or capture crashes. This factor is largely responsible for the high rate of
penetration crashes for very high orientation angles.
Unfortunately, high cable tension has both benefits and detriments in these types
of high-orientation angle crashes. In some crashes, the high tension and sufficient cableto-post attachment strengths combined to overcome the crush strength of the side panel,
contributing to redirection or capture. The resistance to vertical cable separation can also
be higher if cable-to-post attachments on adjacent posts offer some resistance to vertical
cable motion. However, the high tension in the cable also occasionally promoted vertical
cable separation due to the natural minimization of potential energy. Small vertical
deflections in bottom cables which occurred during crashes with low-tension systems
propagated a low-speed wave from the disturbance, but the cable was frequently
constrained by adjacent cable-to-post attachments. However, on high-tension systems,
small vertical deflections of the bottom cable could exceed the adjacent cable-to-post
attachment strengths, which expanded the unsupported cable length in front of and
behind the vehicle.
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10.4 Simulation No. 3: Generic Low-Tension Cable Median Barrier
The final crash simulated involved a low-tension, 3-cable median barrier
constructed similarly to the system drawings shown in Figures 73 through 78. Posts used
in the system were 6 ft-3 in. (1,600-mm) long, S3x5.7 posts with holes drilled in the
flanges to accommodate 5/16-in. (8-mm) diameter J-bolts which supported the cables.
Nominal cable mounting heights were at 21, 27, and 33 in. (533, 686, and 838 mm).
The median profile at the crash site consisted of four discrete slopes: a 4-ft (1.2m) wide concrete shoulder, a 19-ft 10-in. (6.0-m) wide, 11.4:1 approach slope, a 19-ft 10in. (6.0-m) wide, 11.4:1 back slope, and a 4-ft (1.2-m) wide concrete shoulder adjacent to
the opposite-side travel lanes. The system was installed 5 ft (1.5 m) up the backslope
from the median center.
Post-crash photographs are shown in Figures 118 through 120. Based on scene
diagram and trajectory information, it appeared that the driver either became
incapacitated or fell asleep. The vehicle, a 2000 Mercury Grand Marquis, drifted off of
the roadway with a CG trajectory and orientation angle of 7 degrees. There were no
visible signs of braking or steering throughout the departure event. The vehicle passed
through the bottom of the ditch, gradually increasing the CG trajectory angle to 11 deg
prior to impact due to some left steering input. The vehicle remained engaged with the
bottom cable for a sufficient amount of time to remove the bottom cable from more than
15 posts downstream of impact with a small steering angle to the left, before the vehicle
redirected up the back slope and collided head-on with a different vehicle in the opposite
travel lanes.
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Figure 118. Crash Scene Photographss, Simulationn No. 3
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Figure 119. Crash Scene Photographss, Simulationn No. 3
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Figure 120. Crash Scene Photographss, Simulationn No. 3
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10.4.1 Component Models
Similar to the Brifen and Nucor simulations, post models in Simulation No. 3
consisted of shell element flange and web parts. Since the flanges of S3x5.7 posts were
sloped, the thickness of the flanges was tailored to approximate the bending section of the
real flange using a flat, constant-thickness flange approximation. The thickness of the
shell flange was set to 0.26 in. (6.6 mm), and was positioned such that the distance
between the outer contact surfaces of the front and rear flanges of the post were 3 in. (76
mm) apart, equal to the depth of a real post.
Because there was some surface soil displacement, the soil tubes were terminated
approximately 2.5 in. (64 mm) below the surface of the ground. This permitted the posts
to “rotate” through the upper effective 2 in. (51 mm) of soil. Some differences between
the deformed post energy of the crash and model were expected because the soil was not
modeled explicitly; however, the overall difference in energy for two posts bent to the
ground was not expected to exceed 20% of the energy of the post damage, which was less
than 5% of the initial energy of the vehicle. As a result, this assumption was believed to
be acceptable.
The 5/16-in. (8-mm) diameter J-bolt cable-to-post attachments were modeled
using beam elements, similarly to the cable-to-post attachments used in the Nucor cable
barrier system. Tension-strain, moment bending-curvature, and torque-rate of twist
curves were inserted into a *MAT_MOMENT_CURVATURE_BEAM material model
for the J-bolts, and the bolts were connected directly to the mesh of the post since none of
the bolts fractured in this simulation. A comparison between the beam element models of
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the J-bolts and the documented tests on J-bolts indicated a difference of less than 5% of
the nominal vertical and horizontal pullout strengths of the models and real bolts [45].
As with the other simulations, the cables in the system comprised models
recommended in literature [27]. Cables were tensioned to 950 lb (4.2 kN) over 400 ms
prior to impact using discrete beams and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model
with a controlled ramp loading curve. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable
was switched from deformable to rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts
between the cables and the posts and vehicle were of the automatic node-to-surface type,
and contact between cables and beam element J-bolts utilized an automatic general
contact type, which more accurately treated beam-to-beam contact.
A Ford Taurus model developed by NCAC was initially included in the model as
a close match to the Mercury Grand Marquis. However, simulations frequently resulted
in instabilities and early terminations, which could not be traced back to system or
vehicle properties. Because the source of the instabilities could not be determined, the
Neon model used in simulation nos. 1 and 2 was substituted into this model.
Unfortunately, despite similarity in front-end profile dimensions, considerable differences
between the neon and Taurus were identified. The Taurus weighed more than 1,350 lb
(612 kg) more than the Neon, was 40 in. (1,016 mm) longer with a 10-in. (254-mm)
longer wheelbase, and had a 4-in. (102-mm) wider track width. Despite these differences,
it was determined that if the Neon model could illustrate the penetration mechanisms in
this crash, the results would be applicable to crashes involving vehicles with similar
front-end profile dimensions which impacted the barriers with similar impact conditions.

248
10.4.2 Simulation Results
Sequential photographs of simulation no. 3 are shown in Figures 121 through 124.
After initial simulations in which the vehicle was captured by the barrier, the simulated
vehicle mass was increased such that the weight of the vehicle in the model was equal to
the curb weight of the vehicle, as reported by Expert AutoStats. The vehicle followed a
similar trajectory as the vehicle involved in the penetration crash. Upon impact, the
middle and upper cable were pried upward and over the hood, as the bottom cable
engaged the vehicle at the headlight location. The bottom cable crushed into the front
fender less than 1 in. (25 mm) as it was displaced laterally by the vehicle. The cable was
removed from 10 posts downstream of impact before the vehicle redirected parallel with
the system, and the bottom cable slipped down the vehicle bumper and fender, and was
eventually run over by the tires.
Differences between the crash test and the simulation caused some variation in the
end result of the simulation. The primary difference was that no steering input was
applied to the simulated vehicle as was observed in the crash, which was evident in the
increasing CG trajectory angle of the errant vehicle on the traffic-side approach slope.
Additionally, there were differences between the wheelbase and overall vehicle weight,
in addition to suspension spring stiffness and vehicle crush stiffness. Despite these
differences, the model closely replicated the failure mechanism observed in the crash.
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Figure 122. Downstream Sequentials, Simulationn No. 3
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Despite these differences, critical features of the simulation and crash test were
similar. The vehicle passed through the ditch bottom with some suspension displacement
not exceeding 2 in. (51 mm) at the point of contact with the cable median barrier. The
middle and upper cables slipped over the hood due to similar bumper-to-hood separation
distances, and the bottom cable engaged the vehicle at the left-front fender corner. The
bottom cable was removed from enough posts downstream of impact to allow the cable to
droop when the vehicle trajectory became parallel with the system. The vehicle overrode
the bottom cable, resulting in penetration, and became free-wheeling.
This simulation illustrated two major problems with the low-tension cable median
barrier system. First, the bottom cable-to-post attachment is too weak to prevent these
types of impacts from penetrating through the barrier system. When the system was
struck with the bottom cable on the opposite side of impact, crashes in which the middle
and upper cables did not successfully engage the vehicle resulted in a high rate of
penetrations. In the simulation, this was further accentuated by the low but increasing CG
trajectory angle, causing the middle and upper cables to make first contact with the leftside fender instead of the front of the vehicle, enforcing the same fender stiffness
problems observed in simulation no. 2.
Secondly, the bottom cable height was too high to prevent underrides from
occurring in even flat medians. The bottom cable height of 22 in. (559 mm) was higher
than the hood height of 1% of vehicles involved in cable median barrier crashes. A 3-in.
(76-mm) deflection of the front end of the vehicle, which can occur due to suspension
compression near the center of the V-ditch and can even occur due to bouncing on the
approach slope, would then increase susceptibility to more than 5% of all vehicles
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involved in cable median barrier crashes. If the high rate of penetrations which occur
when the bottom cable struck the vehicle above the center height of the headlight is taken
into account, the risk increase for flat and sloped terrain in front of the barrier increases to
1.5% and 21% of crashes, respectively.
Excessive deflection of the back-side cable and bottom cable underride together
accounted for over 70% of all low-tension cable median barrier penetrations based on
data collected in this study, though the precise rate is unknown. To alleviate these
problems, the bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments must be strengthened, and
attachments with greater energy absorption on cable release from the posts are strongly
recommended. Currently, the bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments for lowtension cable median barrier systems have horizontal and vertical release loads of
approximately 850 lb and 750 lb (3.3 kN and 3.8 kN), respectively. An increase in the
diameter of the J-bolt shanks, from 5/16-in. (8-mm) to 3/8-in. (10-mm), would result in
an approximately 75% increase in pullout strength from the post. Such a modification
would likely reduce backside-cable release-related penetration frequency by 50% or
more, based on the results of this simulation and the distribution of vehicle masses
involved in cable median barrier crashes shown in Figure 20.
In addition, a fourth cable may be necessary for low-tension cable median
barriers, located between 15 and 18 in. (381 and 457 mm) from the ground. This
additional cable could be added to existing low-tension cable median barrier systems with
one of two methods: an additional hole could be drilled in the flange for an additional
cable-to-post attachment, or a hanging bracket could be attached to the bottom cable
location to support the lowest cable. In order to retain a 1,000-lb (4.4 kN) release force,
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the bracket could be strengthened with a cable tie near the cable location. Both methods
would require simulation for concept development and full-scale crash testing to verify
the crashworthiness of the design.
A reduction of 50% or more of cable median barrier penetrations and associated
fatalities due to cross-median collisions would likely cost $6,250 per mile (per 1.6 km) of
barrier, based on a two-worker mobilization each paid at $30 per hour, applying retrofits
at a rate of one post per 10 minutes in addition to a $5 per post material cost. This
roughly equates to spending 5 minutes per post. A $1,300 per mile (per 1.6 km) flat
mobilization fee was added for materials, signage, traffic control, and transportation to
the site.
Fatalities are estimated to occur at a minimum of once per 40 miles (64 km) of
barrier per every 3 years with the current system construction. A non-fatal to fatal crash
ratio of 199:1 is expected in a given mile stretch, based on low-tension cable median
barrier A+K rates of approximately 0.5% K crashes. Maintenance cost increases of $100
per crash were expected, due to the increased repair time and additional cable hardware.
Additional costs per 40-mile (64-km) stretch of road would then increase $20,000 per
fatal crash in a 3-year period. By using this method, ADTs, crash rates, and ROR
departure frequencies are not necessary to complete this analysis. Thus, a maximum cost
estimate for one fatal crash would reasonably be $270,000 per 40 miles (64 km) of barrier
per three years.
Considering that 50% of fatalities are caused by underride or low cable-to-post
attachment strength and expecting a 50% reduction in such penetrations due to these
simple modifications, a resultant reduction of 35% of fatalities is expected over this same
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stretch of barrier. Using the FHWA fatal crash costs of $4,008,900 per fatal crash, a 35%
reduction in fatal crashes over this expanse of road over a 3-year period would result in a
cost reduction of $1,403,115. The benefit-to-cost ratio of this modification to low-tension
cable median barriers would then be 5.2.
Since the cost per unit of roadway defined in this benefit-to-cost analysis is much
higher than is expected for state DOTs per fatality, and actual penetration rates for the
barrier could decrease by more than 70% based on the penetration analysis, the actual
B/C ratio based solely on fatality reduction should exceed 5.2. However, it should be
emphasized that the current bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments must be
strengthened at the same time as an additional cable should be added to the system. No
top cable-to-post attachment changes are currently recommended. Otherwise, the benefit
estimated in this analysis will not be realized to the maximum extent possible.
10.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Difficulties associated with simulating real-world cable median barrier crashes
arise from significant differences in vehicle front-end geometries, stiffnesses, material
properties, weights, and vehicle shapes and inertial properties. The purpose of the
simulations was not to replicate the actual crash results, but to replicate the mechanisms
responsible for the penetration crash events. Because of this, variations between the
simulation results and the crash results were tolerated, and mechanisms contributing to
the penetration mechanisms were the central focus of this chapter.
In the first two penetration crashes, problems with the cable barrier system and
general problems affecting all cable median barrier systems were both identified. Highangle crashes on slopes alter the intended interaction of the vehicle with the barrier
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system. If the CG velocity vector significantly exceeds the nominal value of 25 degrees
used in full-scale crash testing, previous studies evaluating the testing and design limits
of barriers in 6:1 slopes are no longer valid [e.g., 19]. In simulation no. 1, the high
strength of the cable-to-post attachments also prevented the cables from cleanly releasing
from the posts. Thus, the cables were overridden and the vehicle vaulted over the system.
Likewise, high orientation angle crashes can alter the dynamic of impact, as
shown in Simulation 2. Instead of contributing to beneficial headlight fracture and the
formation of a contact groove, very high orientation angle crashes can engage the higher
crush stiffness of vehicle body side panels and the stronger crush axis strength of the
headlight, which may foster a prying-type impact. In addition, in the second simulation,
the low vertical release force of the bottom cable permitted the cables to slide up the post
before impact instead of interlocking with the vehicle.
In the third simulation, the penetration mechanism was relatively unique to lowtension cable median barrier systems. The vehicle adequately engaged the bottom cable
while the top two cables slid over the hood and roof. The low cable-to-post attachment
strength of the bottom cable-to-post attachment was insufficient to retain the cable on
downstream and upstream posts from impact. Following cable release from posts
downstream of the vehicle, the cable had insufficient tension to remain at the contact
height and drooped, permitting the vehicle to pass over the bottom cable and redirect
toward the opposing lanes.
Simulations of cable median barrier crashes are typically very challenging and
require careful examination of all the components in the system. For cable models, use of
the model developed by Stolle and Reid is recommended [27]. Tensioning was efficiently
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and quickly produced in the cables using short sections of
*MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM parts with ramped load curves, tensioning the
cables over the first 50 ms of impact. Researchers determined that for every 2 kip tension
and 100 m length of cable simulated, one 6-in. (152-mm) length of tension was required.
Four tensioners were used in simulations 1 and 2, whereas only one tensioner was used in
simulation 3.
Cable to post attachments were also difficult to simulate. Each cable-to-post
attachment was independently simulated and evaluated to determine if minimum
manufacturer-reported maximum strengths and deformations were observed. Since beam
elements have the best contact definitions with other beam elements, beam-to-beam
contact should be used whenever practical, and beam-to-shell-edge contacts should
always be avoided.
In each of the simulations noted, failure mechanisms observed using photos and
scene diagrams were replicated, though actual crash results varied from the simulations.
But in each one of the crashes, initial simulations indicated that redirection was possible.
In the first simulation, the vehicle model incorporated a lower open section of the bumper
cover at the air dam. The opening in the bumper cover permitted adequate cable
engagement and the vehicle was redirected. This illustrated the effect that vehicle profile
can have on vehicle redirection. Likewise, in the second simulation, the simulated vehicle
was both lighter than the actual vehicle, and had no glass headlight. The vehicle was
redirected in many variations of impact location along the barrier, cable tension, and even
inclusion of a headlight model. It was determined that both increased weight and the
impact orientation combined to initiate the prying-type failure.
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In the third simulation, weight was the most significant differences between the
simulated and physical vehicles. When the vehicle was simulated at the nominal weight
of the model, the vehicle was redirected and did not override the cable. However, when
additional weight added to the model to bring the equal to the curb weight of the real
vehicle, the vehicle did not redirect nearly as quickly with a higher dynamic deflection,
and the vehicle ultimately overrode the cable. The increased energy at impact ultimately
determined whether the vehicle was captured or penetrated through the system.
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CHAPTER 11 CAUSES OF CABLE MEDIAN BARRIER ROLLOVERS
11.1 Overview of Crash Data
Unlike cable median barrier penetrations, rollovers caused by cable median
barriers have not been well studied. Manufacturers have noted cable barrier rollovers, but
findings from these studies have not generally been made public. Frequently when
rollovers were observed during full-scale tests on cable median barriers, results were
largely dismissed as specific to an impact configuration or design concept failure [e.g. 50,
51]. Nonetheless, rollovers are real concerns for impacts with cable median barriers. In
most states, rollover crashes were more severe but occurred less often than penetrations.
Rollovers typically occurred in 3% to 8% of all cable median barrier crashes.
Rollover events were particularly cumbersome to reconstruct; since, rollover
causes were subject to many more factors than were penetration crashes. An accurate
determination for the causes of the rollover was extremely difficult to obtain as median
profile and smoothness, vehicle roof stiffness, angle of roll eccentricity, vehicle weight,
and trip speed all affect the path of a rolling vehicle and the predominant locations of
vehicle damage. Further, scene diagrams represent estimates of responding officers
regarding scene diagrams and are frequently inexact. One trait of all rollover crashes on
cable median barriers is that, at the time of rollover, all vehicles were non-tracking.
Vehicles involved in rollovers which initially contacted the barrier with tracking impact
conditions all yawed to non-tracking conditions before tripping.
Despite the difficulty in gauging trip causation, common factors were identifiable
through narrative, scene diagram, photographic, and median slope evidence. Common
factors associated with rollovers enable researchers and manufacturers to recommend
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improvements addressing general classes of problems instead of addressing individual
crashes. Rollover causes were largely independent of which system was installed,
although rollover frequencies varied between systems. This finding was reasonable as all
systems rely on three basic components: support posts to maintain cables at desired
heights; cable-to-post attachments to maintain cable heights and transmit lateral and
vertical load from cables to posts; and multiple tensioned cables. Similar to the
determination of the causes of penetrations, a detailed investigation and analysis was
conducted to determine the causes of rollovers on cable median barriers. A summary
table of rollover causes is shown in Table 32.

Table 32. Causes of Rollovers with Cable Median Barriers
Rollover
Contributor

Description

Vehicle either impacts barrier installed on roadside shoulder
Steep Median and protrudes over median slope before a tire becomes
Slopes
snagged on the approach slope, or trips due to changes in
the median terrain when barrier is located within ditch.
Vehicle contacts barrier with large oversteering orientation
Broadside Skid angle. Frequently, sideslip angles in these crashes are
approximately 90 degrees.
Vehicle struck cable median barrier and initially began to
redirect. During redirection, vehicle tire snags on post or
Contact with
becomes entrapped by cable(s). Can occur when
Post
orientation angle approaches +/-90 degrees during
redirection.

Nucor

Number of Rollovers Recorded
CASS Brifen Gibraltar Generic

Total

Passenger
Cars

3

6

-

-

7

16

13%

8

20

2

-

7

37

37%

12

24

1

1

19

57

42%

Other Effects

Rollover caused by other effects, such as end terminals,
tow-behind trailer attachments, or large exit angles
following redirection. Relatively infrequent events.

1

2

-

-

2

5

25%

Large Vehicle

Tractor-trailers, buses, large trucks, camper vehicles, and
construction vehicles. No cable barrier is currently designed
for these types of impacts. Rollover crashes with these
large vehicles are tolerated and better than penetrations.

1

4

-

-

2

7

-

25

56

3

1

37

122

36%

Total
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11.2 Rollover Analysis
11.2.1 Steep Median Slope Rollovers
When vehicles encountered steep median slopes (i.e., steeper than 6:1), rollover
frequency increased, as was discussed in Chapter 5. These types of rollovers may be
difficult to mitigate because the slope contributes to vehicle instability, thus new cable
barrier designs alone may not be sufficient to prevent these types of containment failures.
The cable barriers frequently captured the impacting vehicle during these crashes, but the
vehicle tripped and rolled before it was fully redirected.
There were three types of median slope-caused rollover failures. The first type
was caused by entrapment, in which an impacting vehicle struck the barrier and the front
(or rear) tires extended over the median slopes before the vehicle was redirected.
Extension of the vehicle’s wheels over the slope lowered the impacting end of the
vehicle. Then, the subsequent redirective forces resisting the vehicle pressed the wheels
of the impacting end against the roadside slope, potentially causing digging in on the
slope or generating large frictional resistive forces as the suspension compressed. These
compressive forces contributed to wheel entrapment on the median slopes and culminated
in a frictional roll moment which caused rollover. This type of rollover almost
exclusively occurred in impacts in which the CG trajectory angle was greater than 15
degrees and the vehicle encroached on the slope with orientation angles approaching
either 90 or 270 degrees. An additional scene diagram of a rearward vehicle rollover
crash occurring at a break point of a 6:1 approach slope is shown in Figure 125. The
scene diagram was highlighted to indicate the locations of the median slopes.
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The third type of median slope rollover was caused when vehicles struck a cable
median barrier installed on a V-ditch back slope. After redirection, some vehicles skidded
laterally into the median and tripped due to the slope transition in the center of the
median. An example of this crash type is shown in Figures 126 and 127. In this crash, a
Dodge Caliber struck the cable median barrier with an orientation angle of approximately
110 degrees and a CG trajectory angle of approximately 21 degrees. The vehicle
displaced one post and yawed to nearly 180 degrees before being redirected, then
rebounded down the back slope and tripped. It is believed that the vehicle made two and
a half complete revolutions. Because the vehicle rolled through the center of the V-ditch
and back up the approach slope, vehicle damage was extensive.
Pickup trucks, vans, and SUVs were found to be the most susceptible to the
median slope-related crashes in which the wheelbase and suspension stroke were large.
Passenger cars were involved in only 4 out of the 25 potential median slope-related
rollovers. Of these, two were full-size cars, one was a mid-size “crossover” class vehicle,
and one was a compact car. Also, it should be noted that a large oversteering angle was
present in most of these crashes. A distinction was made between steep median slope
rollovers and oversteering rollovers based on the largest contributing circumstance. Steep
median slope rollovers were identified as crashes in which the vehicle “bounced” or
compressed on the suspension due to the median slope, and the suspension compression
and possible wheel entrapment on the slope were the largest contributors to rollover.
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Figure 126. Example Rolllover Crash Caused by High Redireection on Bacck Slope
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Figure 127. Example Rolllover Crash Caused by Redirection on Back Sloope (continueed)
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11.2.2 Broadside Skid Rollovers
Rollovers which occurred when vehicles struck cable median barriers with
broadside skid conditions were much more common than steep median slope-related
rollovers. Vehicles involved in these crashes either impacted the cable median barriers
with sideslip angles very close to 90 degrees, or yawed to 90 degrees after impact before
rolling over. Broadside skid rollovers were distinct from both contact with post and
median slope rollovers because the cables were the primary contributor to rollover.
Passenger vehicles were involved in 35% of these types of rollovers, whereas SUVs,
pickup trucks, and vans accounted for 65%. For those larger vehicles which rolled due to
large oversteering angles, SUVs alone accounted for 29% of all rollover crashes.
Vehicle impacts at high orientation angles contributed to vehicle instability by
increasing the overturning moment applied to the vehicle frame. A model and schematic
diagram of the force interaction in a high-orientation angle crash is shown in Figure 128.
During rollover crashes, new, energetically-favorable roll axes were generated through
which the applied moments to the vehicle were maximized. The new roll axis was rotated
with respect to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle to incorporate the contribution of a
small pitch moment at the cable impact location.
Because of this shift in the vehicle’s trip axis, the leading back corner of the
vehicle was typically the first location to contact the ground. Frequently, first contact of
the vehicle’s upper body with the ground resulted in displacement of the upper frame
rails, crushing near the rear-top corner of the vehicle, roof slant, and often an
accumulation of dirt, grass, or median materials at the initial contact site. In addition to
the increased pitch moment, vehicle-to-cable friction interaction caused yaw moments,
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which tended to increase the orientation angle. Thus, if the vehicle struck the barrier at a
relative sideslip angle of 60 degrees, the frictional interaction with the barrier tended to
accentuate vehicle yaw toward a 90 degree sideslip angle, increasing rollover propensity.
Examples of oversteering rollover crashes are shown in Figures 129 through 131. In each
of the crashes shown, the vehicle struck the cable barrier with the front end at a high
orientation angle then tripped and rolled. None of the crashes were caused by an impact
with a single post or series of posts. Median slopes contributed to some crashes, but
wheels were not entrapped on a slope in any of the crashes. Further, no trailer
attachments or towed units were present.
One crash involving a Jeep Grand Cherokee is shown in Figure 129. During this
crash, the vehicle struck the cable barrier with the left-front corner in an oversteering
configuration, yawed around the front end, and tripped as the vehicle approached a 90degree orientation angle. The right-rear corner made first contact with the ground,
shattering the rear windshield and right-rear window. As the vehicle rolled, the roof was
crushed, but most of the remaining damage to the vehicle only occurred to the exterior
body panels. A similar crash involving a Suzuki Grand Vitara which also yawed around
the front end before tripping is shown in Figure 130.
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Figure 129. Example Rolllover Crash Caused by High Orientaation Angle at Impact
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A second high-orientation angle rollover crash occurred involving an Isuzu
Rodeo, as shown in Figure 131. During this crash, as the vehicle descended into the Vditch, the right-front bumper corner engaged the cables. Combined with the large
frictional moment from the tires, the vehicle tripped with the right-rear corner leading,
and made one complete revolution, coming to rest on its tires. Most of the damage was
concentrated on the right side.
11.2.3 Contact with Post Rollovers
The most obvious cause of rollover crashes was attributable to vehicles contacting
and snagging on posts, which can form trip points. Unlike other types of rollover crashes,
vehicle contact with posts can accentuate rollover risk for all impacting vehicles,
including small cars. When comparing vehicle data within each barrier make, lighter
vehicles were found to be more susceptible to tripping, as shown in Table 32. Mid-size
and small passenger cars comprised 24 out of the 55 rollover crashes caused by post
snagging, or 44% of all rollovers involving vehicle contact with posts. Furthermore, no
large cars were documented with this type of crash result, and only six out of the 29
SUV, pickup truck, and van rollovers related to vehicle contact with posts had weights
over 4,400 lb (1,996 kg).
Rollovers caused by contact with posts were unique because the rollover initiator
was wheel snag on a flange or web of the post. Although multiple compounding factors
including friction contributed to most rollovers, contact with post rollovers also occurred
in wet and snowy weather when roadside friction was reduced. The occurrence of these
types of rollovers in low-friction conditions indicates that even weak posts can contribute
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to vehicle instability, which was noted historically [52]. Examples of post snag rollover
crashes are shown in Figures 132 and 133.
Contact with post rollovers were the most sensitive to the make of cable barrier
struck, since post strengths were critical to facilitating rollover. Post shapes and cable
tensions are shown in Tables 33 and 34, and the several post section shapes are shown in
Figure 134.
The cumulative rate of vehicle rollover on each system was plotted against
calculated yield moments about the X and Y axes shown in Figure 134. Bending
moments were calculated based on the assumption that no torsional warping occurred and
that all loading occurred through each post section shear center. Scatter in the weak-axis
bending moment direction appeared to be randomly distributed, as shown in Figure 135.
However, a possible correlation was observed when rollover frequency was plotted
against yield moments about the X direction, as shown in Figure 136.
Considering the large number of factors contributing to rollover events, these
results suggested that there may be a strong relationship between post strength in bending
along an axis parallel with the roadway and the frequency of rollover crashes. These
results also indicate that post bending strengths along axes perpendicular to the roadway
(i.e., the Y-axes) do not have a strong correlation with rollover frequency. Some
subjective estimates for causes of rollovers estimated that weak-axis post bending
strength would be more strongly related to rollover than strong-axis bending strength.
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Table 33. Summary of Post Characteristics in High-Tension Cable Guardrail Systems
Cable Barrier System

FHWA
Post Installation Option
Approval Letter

Post
Shape

Post Size

Post Material Galvanization

Yield Stress
ksi (MPa)

B-96
B-96A
(TL-3) Driven Post with
Nucor Steel Marion Inc.
B-167
Trapezoidal Soil Plate
B-183
Socked Post in Concrete
NU-CABLE
B-184
Base
B-184A
B-193 Revised

Trinity Highway Safety
Products, Inc
CASS

Hill & Smith Limited
Brifen Limited
WRSF

B-119
B-119A
B-119B
B-141
B-141A
B-141B
B-141C
B-141D
B-141E
B-157

In Concrete
Driven
Base-Plated
Driven Sleeve with Notch
Driven Sleeve with
Soil Plate

B-82
B-82B
B-82B1
B-82C
B-82C1

Driven Post
Post in Concrete Footer

B-137
B-137A
B-137A1
Gibraltar
B-137B
B-137C (HSA)
Gibraltar Cable Barrier
B-137C (HSSD)
B-137D
B-147A
B-88
B-88
B-88A
Safence, Incorporated
B-88B
B-88C
Safence Cable Barrier
B-88D
B-88E
B-88F
Low-Tension, 3-Cable
Median Barrier

B-64
B-64 Sup
B-147

Driven Post
Socked Post-Rebar Tube
Socked Post withTube
in Concrete

U

6 kg/m (4 lb/ft) UChannel with
3/8 in. (10 mm) hole

U

7.5 kg/m (5 lb/ft) UChannel with
3/8 in. (10 mm) hole

C

3.96 in. x 1.97 in. x
0.1575 in. (100 mm x 50
mmx 4 mm)

S

S4x7.7 (S101x11.5)
with 11/16 in. (17 mm)
holes at groundline

S/Z

C

I
Plastic Sleeve in Concrete
Footer
Driven Post

Driven Post

3.93 in. x 1.26 in. x
0.236 in. (100 mm x 32 ASTM A36
mm x 6 mm)
3.93 in. x 2.17 in. x
ASTM A709
0.179 in. (100 mm x 55
Grade 36
mm x 4.55 mm)

A 36 Hot
Rolled

4

4

4

Critical Moment of
Inertia
Sx
Sy
4

3

3

3

Plastic Section Modulus
Zx
3

3

Zy
3

3

3

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

Strong Axis
Bending
Moment

Weak Axis
Bending
Moment

Rollover Rate

80
(552)

51.6
(229)

1.176
(717)

0.606
(224800)

1.125
(477500)

0.496
(8121)

0.656
(10742)

0.519
(11782)

0.779
(17160)

39.6 kip-in.
(4483 kN-mm)

52.4 kip-in.
(5930 kN-mm)

3.2%
(~5.6% TL-4
System)

NA

80
(552)

66.1
(293)

1.423
(917)

0.641
(266671)

1.433
(596622)

0.605
(9913)

0.802
(13141)

0.862
(14129)

1.338
(21931)

48.4 kip-in.
(5472 kN-mm)

64.2 kip-in.
(7254 kN-mm)

N/A

36
(250)

26.5
(117)

1.259
(812)

2.907
(1209901)

0.615
(288554)

1.477
(24198)

0.704
(11542)

1.858
(30447)

1.858
(30447)

53.2 kip-in.
(6050 kN-mm)

25.4 kip-in.
(2886 kN-mm)

5.6%

36
(250)

27.0
(120)

1.285
(828)

2.781
(1157512)

0.188
(78364)

1.39
(22785)

0.131
(2148)

1.718
(28157)

0.263
(4301)

50.1 kip-in.
(5696 kN-mm)

4.7 kip-in.
(537 kN-mm)

A123

36
(250)

29.0
(128)

1.378
(888)

2.629
(1094355)

0.142
(59271)

1.336
(21887)

0.226
(3704)

1.702
(27889)

0.382
(6251)

48.1 kip-in.
(5472 kN-mm)

8.1 kip-in.
(926 kN-mm)

3.2%

Galvanized

36
(250)

31.1
(138)

1.481
(955)

3.359
(1398162)

0.562
(234088)

1.706
(27963)

0.519
(8512)

2.034
(33334)

0.791
(12965)

61.4 kip-in.
(6991 kN-mm)

18.7 kip-in.
(2128 kN-mm)

N/A

60
(410)

53.8
(239)

1.560
(1006)

2.232
(929049)

1.595
(663706)

1.373
(22506)

1.276
(20904)

1.688
(27654)

1.491
(24436)

82.4 kip-in.
(9227 kN-mm)

76.5 kip-in.
(8571 kN-mm)

N/A

36
(250)

11.1
(49)

0.529
(341)

1.869
(778000)

0.151
(62900)

1.187
(19450)

0.183
(2995)

1.421
(23285)

0.320
(5239)
42.7 kip-in.
(4863 kN-mm)

6.6 kip-in.
(749 kN-mm)

ASTM A 123

3.25 in. x 2.5 in. x 0.15
in. (83 mm x 63 mm x ASTM A570
ASTM F1043A
(A1011) Gr 60
3.4 mm)
slotted tube

INP 80

Critical Moment of
Inertia
Ixx
Iyy

NA
Nucor Steel
Marion Inc
Grade SP-80

ASTM A 36

Maximum
Critical Cross
Post Shear
Section Area
Capacity
2
2
kip (kN)
in. (mm )

NA

C

0.1575-in. (4-mm) thick
C-post

Cold Rolled
from A36

A 123

80
(550)

38.9
(172)

0.840
(541)

1.034
(430199)

0.100
(41589)

0.646
(10593)

0.134
(2201)

0.827
(13544)

0.273
(4467)

S

S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) 72-in.
(1,829-mm) Long

A 36 Hot
Rolled

Galvanized

36
(250)

35.1
(156)

1.670
(1077)

2.520
(1048903)

0.455
(189385)

1.680
(27530)

0.391
(6400)

1.940
(31790)

0.656
(10749)

~3.7%
Predominantly
TL-3

N/A

4.9%

60.5 kip-in.
(6883 kN-mm)

14.1 kip-in.
(1600 kN-mm)

7.8%
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Table 34. Standard Cable Heights and Tensions

System
TL-3

Nucor Steel Marion Inc.
NU-CABLE

TL-4
6:1 Slope or
Flatter
TL-4
4:1 Slope

Trinity Highway Safety
Products, Inc

TL-3

CASS

TL-4

Hill & Smith Limited
Brifen Limited
WRSF

TL-3

TL-4

TL-3
Gibraltar

TL-4
3-Cable

Gibraltar Cable Barrier
TL-4
4-Cable
TL-3
Side-Mounted on
O-posts
TL-4
I-post
Safence, Incorporated
Safence Cable Barrier

Cable Design Tension
at 70ºF (21ºC)

Cable Heights

Cable Barrier System

TL-4
C-post
TL-4
C-post
MASH on 4:1
Slope

(in.)
15*
21 1/2
25 1/2
29 1/2
15
27
31
35
19
31
38
42
20 13/16
25 1/8
29 7/16
20 7/8
29 1/2
38 1/8
19 1/2
26
26
28 3/8
18 1/2
24 1/2
30 1/2
36 1/2
20
25
30
20
30
39
20
25
30
39
18.9
24.8
30.7
36.6
18.9
22
25.2
28.3
18.9
22*
25.2
28.3
19 5/16
30 15/16
34 11/16*
38 7/16
20 13/16
25 1/8
29 7/16

Low-Tension,
TL-3
3-Cable,
Non-Proprietary
*Optional cable shown
** 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cables are interwoven between posts
*** Posts are installed on alternating sides of system

(mm)
381*
546
648
749
381
686
787
889
483
787
965
1067
529
638
748
530
749
968
495
660
660
721
470
622
775
927
508
635
762
508
762
991
508
635
762
991
480
630
780
930
480
559
640
719
480
559*
640
719
491
786
881*
976
529
638
748

lb

kN

5600

24.9

4600

20.5

4250

18.9

4800

21.4

3020

13.4

950

4.2
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Figure 134. High-Tension
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Figure 136. X-Axis Yield Moment Relationship with Rollover Frequency
Note also that many rollovers occurring due to impacts with Nucor systems were
caused as posts accumulated in front of the vehicle after being lifted out of the ground or
sockets, or fracturing at the ground line. As the posts accumulated, the effective strongaxis strength of the next downstream post increased. This effect, unique to Nucor
systems, may have increased the average rate of rollover if the cable-to-post attachment
was weaker and if the posts-soil interaction was stronger. If the Nucor result followed the
trend of the other high-tension cable median barrier systems, the expected rollover rate
would be between 1.9% and 2.7%.
11.2.4 Other Rollover Causes
Several other rollover causes were identified in the research study, although each
cause was relatively unique. For these remaining rollover crashes, the most frequent
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rollovers involved large vehicles, such as tractor-trailers, buses, or single-unit trucks, as
well as vehicles with tow-behind trailers. The increased rollover frequency for towbehind units was likely the result of a high trailer center-of-gravity with respect to the
towing vehicle. For example, the vertical CG height of many ½-ton to ¾-ton pickup
trucks ranged between 25 and 30 in. (635 to 732 mm), but the storage floor height on
most tow-behind units was at least the center axle height of the vehicle, typically 16 to 18
in. (406 to 457 mm). As a result, tow-behind trailers dramatically increased the effective
CG height of the towing vehicle.
In particular, tow-behind camping units were particularly sensitive to rollovers.
Over 60% of all vehicles with tow-behind campers were at least partially involved in a
rollover event in the database, although trailer-related crashes were infrequent.
11.3 Discussion
In general, rollovers occurred less frequently than penetrations. However, this was
not indicative of the difference in crash severities.
Rollover crashes increase risk of injury or fatality for the occupants of impacting
vehicles. Occupants utilizing safety belts experience risk due to large accelerations,
occupant compartment deformation or intrusion, or an appendage being pinned under the
vehicle after flailing. Unbelted occupants are at higher risk of fatality due to bouncing
and tumbling within the interior occupant compartment, as well as during ejection, in
addition to the factors affecting belted occupants.
Rollover crashes contributed to more A+K fatalities than penetration crashes.
After a vehicle penetrates a cable median barrier and the barrier does not crush the
occupant compartment or contribute to rollover, then the vehicle can come to a stop in the
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median without causing occupant injury. Penetration crashes resulted in property damage
only (PDO) in 73% of the crashes, and on average, 7.9% of penetration crashes were
severe. Using data only from states with complete data sets, rollover crashes resulted in
only 35% PDO damage, compared to 17.3% A+K injuries. This indicates that, in the
event of a rollover, severe crash outcomes are almost twice as likely as if the vehicle had
penetrated through the barrier. Although prevention of cable median barrier penetrations
is necessary to reducing the risk of severe crashes with cable median barriers, rollover
crashes have higher associated severities in general and every effort should be made to
mitigate these types of crashes.
High orientation angle crashes tended to promote a chaotic rollover path with
combined roll and pitch motions. At high speeds, these types of rollovers were more
severe on average than the other rollover types observed in this database. At lower
speeds, more energy was transferred to the more energetic roll and pitch motions along
the eccentric roll axis, as shown in Figure 128. These crashes had lower average
severities than for other rollover types. As a result, little variation was observed between
fatal and severe injury rollover crash frequencies, compared to other rollover crash types.
High-orientation angle crash fatality risk was 50% greater than median slope fatality risk
and nearly 100% greater than the risk due to contact with posts.
One way to reduce rollover propensity is to place the cable median barrier near
the center of the V-ditch, within 4 ft (1.2 m) of the centerline. Whereas penetrations
occurred more frequently in ditch centers, particularly in narrow V-ditches, rollovers
occurred approximately 20% less often in ditch centers than anywhere else in the median.
Despite these competing factors, median centers were associated with the lowest rates of
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severe and fatal injuries. Moreover, penetration crashes are easier to prevent than rollover
crashes in general, so factors which reduce rollover frequency may still have high
benefit-to-cost ratios by reducing overall average crash severity even if the
countermeasures increase penetration frequency.
A different method of reducing rollover frequency is to alter cable barrier post
design. The frequency of rollover events with CASS C-post systems was nominally
higher than other high-tension barrier systems at 5.6%, but rollover events on CASS
systems with weakened S4x7.7 posts only resulted in a rollover rate of 3.7%, as shown in
Table 33 and Figures 135 and 136. Strong-axis post strength appeared to be closely
related to rollover propensity. Unfortunately, this presents a difficult design problem for
engineers: strong posts, with high strong-axis bending strengths, had higher rollover
frequencies than weak posts with low weak-axis bending strengths. However, strong
posts were able to exert more lateral force on the vehicle during redirection, reducing the
number of posts damaged in a crash and potentially reducing dynamic deflection. This
results in a trade-off between rollover mitigation and design deflection.
Since the Gibraltar data set was extremely small, no statistics for the Gibraltar
system were considered explicitly. However, Gibraltar utilized the strongest posts in
bending about the X-axis. There is cause for concern that crashes with Gibraltar systems
may be at elevated risk of rollover. Additional investigation with a broader accident
database may be necessary.
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CHAPTER 12 DISCUSSION
12.1 Penetration Crashes
A maximum reduction in penetration crash frequency of 92% could be realized if
all passenger vehicle penetrations were prevented. Practically, this is impossible due to
the wide range of possible impact conditions and vehicle profiles the barriers would be
subjected to. Penetration events can even occur on concrete median barriers, which are
frequently cited as a replacement for cable median barriers with a history of penetrations
leading to cross-median crashes. However, many of these penetration crashes can be
prevented through improvements in barrier design, updated barrier placement guidelines,
and by varying cable mounting heights on the posts.
There is a major advantage of high-tension cable median barrier systems over
low-tension systems. Following most impacts on high-tension systems, the cables retain
sufficient tension to minimize cable drop in the impact region where posts were
disengaged from the cables. Crashes into low-tension cable median barriers frequently
resulted in cable drop after impact. Some crashes involved two or more vehicles striking
the low-tension cable median barrier in succession in Washington, Missouri, and in some
non-penetration crashes in North Carolina. In many of these crashes, all errant vehicles
were captured and redirected. However, state DOTs reported that crash sites were
unsightly and suggested that any additional crashes at the same location could result in
increased risk of penetration [22]. Higher-tension systems provided some sense of
confidence that additional impact events would not result in penetrations.
The Gibraltar cable barrier system, with wide post spacings up to 30 ft (9.1 m)
and installed on alternating sides of the cables, may exhibit a higher susceptibility to
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underride penetration crashes. Vehicles impacting at the location of a post on the opposite
side of the cables can cause complete post disengagement. Although the hairpin cable-topost attachment was relatively strong, as shown in Figure 137, upward vertical bracket
release could occur during impacts with low-height, sharp-nosed and narrow front-profile
vehicles, as shown in Figure 133.
For posts installed at the approved 20- to 30-ft (6.1- to 9.1-m) spacing, any cableto-post disengagement of a given post would result in a 40- to 60-ft (12.2- to 18.3-m)
unsupported cable length upstream or downstream of the vehicle. With such large
unsupported lengths, the barrier may experience an increased penetration frequency due
to median slopes, low-profile vehicles, or vehicle crashes under non-tracking and highorientation angle impact conditions.
Whereas the Gibraltar cable barrier system may be more prone to underride in
some crash configurations, the vertical release load of the cable-to-post attachment may
be sufficiently small to prevent override penetrations. Based on a preliminary analysis,
the hairpin bracket should vertically release away from the posts when posts deflect
laterally, and impacts at posts will less frequently cause the cables to be pulled down by
the deflected posts. More analysis will be necessary to conclusively determine the
accuracy of this estimate.
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Figure 137. Gibraltar System Details, TL-3 Sysstem [53]
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12.2 Rollover Crashes
Despite gaps in the available data sets, rollover crashes were more severe than
penetration crashes on average; since, most penetration crashes involved vehicles coming
to rest in the median with only property damage. Severe penetration events were limited
to crashes in which the occupant compartment was deformed, barrier elements protruded
into the compartment, or cross-median crashes occurred. Rollover crashes much less
frequently resulted in property damage only. Low-speed, short-distance rollover events
could also be severe if an occupant was ejected from the vehicle.
The cable entrapment within the vertical slots of the CASS barrier was found to
contribute to penetration propensity when impacts at posts forced the cables to drop
within the post slot. This effectively created a ramp to allow the impacting vehicle to pass
over the top of the barrier, which also was associated with a high rollover frequency.
However, the weakened S-posts utilized in the CASS TL-3 and CASS TL-4 systems
appeared to result in significant reductions in rollover propensity. Penetration frequency
was unchanged for these posts.
The major difference in the performance of the CASS S4x7.7 (S102x11.5) posts
was a significant reduction in strong-axis post strength. Since the weakened/modified
posts were nominally more flexible at the ground line and yielded more quickly under the
same impact conditions, vehicular capture occurred more frequently and more vehicles
were brought to controlled stops. This proprietary design was reflective of the
improvement that can be obtained by weakening a nominally strong post section in terms
of its strong-axis bending capacity. Note that the Nucor flanged U-channel posts are not
installed with the strong axis parallel with the roadway, and thus strong-axis weakening is
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not expected to have a significant effect on rollover propensity. Although this
improvement would likely assist other cable median barrier systems, untested post
modifications are not recommended for use in any barrier system.
12.3 Barrier Placement and Median Grading
As stated in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4, barriers placed in medians wider than 40 ft
(12 m) had optimal performance when installed near the center of 6:1 or 8:1 V-ditches.
Penetration crashes were reduced from over 10% on slopes flatter than 10:1 or steeper
than 5:1 to less than 8% on slopes ranging between 9:1 and 6:1. Likewise, rollover
frequency decreased from over 5% for slopes flatter than 8:1 and steeper than 4:1 to
approximately 1% on slopes ranging between 7:1 and 5:1. However, barriers placed in
narrow medians may not experience the same safety benefits observed in wide medians.
Current standards are under development to establish meaningful crash testing procedures
for evaluating barriers installed within relatively narrow, sloped median ditches [19].
However, crashes into systems installed in narrow, flat medians are expected to have very
similar outcomes to crashes into systems with wide, flat shoulders.
Many studies have been performed to determine optimum barrier placement
within medians located between divided highways [e.g. 24-26]. From these studies, the
optimum location for placing a cable median barrier is at or near the center of the V-ditch
in order to prevent the maximum number of nuisance impacts. Unfortunately, this barrier
placement poses problems for state DOTs in terms of erosion control and mowing
concerns, as cited by most of the states surveyed in this study. Most states prohibited the
installation of cable median barrier within 1 to 8 ft (0.3 to 2.4 m) of the center of the
ditch, which was consistent with placement guidance provided by FHWA. Barriers
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located near the center of depressed medians can cause increased difficulty with the
maintenance and repair work of damaged cable barriers. In addition, post socketed and
end anchor foundations may require greater depths, diameters, and/or reinforcement as
the ditch bottom generally has a higher moisture content than the adjacent median slopes.
In response to these concerns, state design practice has historically tended toward
installing cable median barrier close to one or both of the two shoulders, or on an
approach slope or back slope as far away as possible from the travel lanes. Barrier
placement alternatives were determined from full-scale crash testing results. In addition,
state DOTs have historically installed cable median barriers near shoulders and on 6:1 or
flatter slopes based on successful crash testing of barriers installed on level terrain.
Unfortunately, systems installed near shoulders were more likely to be associated
with a severe crash than installations near the center of the median, as discussed in
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.7. Approximately 15% of the crashes occurring with cable median
barriers located on shoulders near the travel way were severe, based on a limited sample.
The severe crash rate was 4.4% for all crashes occurring further than 4 ft (1.2 m) from the
center of the median. In contrast, the severe crash rate for barriers installed near the
center of the median was 1.6%. Penetration frequency was 5.6% higher for barriers
installed near the center of the median than on approach or back slopes, but rollover
frequency was 1.2% lower for this same comparison. However, these conclusions applied
to medians wider than 40 ft (12.2 m). Narrower medians may experience a difference in
crash rate distributions [19].
Flat medians as compared to steep medians enabled errant vehicles to oversteer
and increase CG trajectory angles before crashing into the barrier. As the CG trajectory
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and orientation angles at impact increased, the likelihood of penetration or rollover
increased as well. These roadside/median encroachments were usually caused by
avoidance maneuvers or panic reactions to on-road conditions and/or situations.
Steeper median slopes can allow errant vehicles to launch into the air beyond the
slope break point and potentially vault over a barrier. As a result, it would seem
reasonable that the distributions of CG trajectory impact angles and impact speeds for
barriers installed near shoulders as well as near V-ditch centers would be similar,
although bumper and hood heights with respect to the barrier may not be similar. Higherspeed impact events were found to increase the severity of those crashes. Crash severity
was also increased when vehicles were redirected back into adjacent travel lanes. In
addition, vehicle redirection into adjacent travel lanes was more common when barriers
were installed near median shoulders as compared to median centers.
Barriers installed near median centers significantly reduced the risk of re-entering
adjacent travel lanes and potentially striking adjacent vehicles. Vehicles, which departed
the road at low angles and were able to regain control, were also less likely to crash into
the barrier, thus decreasing both nuisance hits and severe crash frequency. If barrier
placement is not feasible near the center of divided highways, it is recommended that
barrier placement occur as far as reasonably possible away from travel lanes using taller,
more robust barrier systems.
The symmetric 6:1 V-ditch configuration also reduced the risk of override relative
to steeper median slopes due to reduced propensity for “bounce-over”. As a vehicle was
projected over the SBP and onto the front slope of a median, there was a physical
separation which occurred between the nominal and actual bumper height positions
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above the ground [25-26]. The difference between actual and expected bumper positions
in a crash increased with slope steepness. Steep-sloped ditches not only promoted
override conditions due to vehicular launching over the SBP, but there was also a risk of
the vehicle contacting the front slope and redirecting up the back slope, causing a
redirective “leap” into or potentially over the barrier.
A risk analysis was conducted based on median terrain to determine bounce-over
likelihood in 6:1 V-ditches wider than 40 ft (12.2 m). When allowing for a 20%
difference between observed and actual bounce-over frequencies, vehicles were over 10
times more likely to underride the barrier than to vault over the barrier on slopes of 6:1 or
flatter. Medians with 4:1 slopes more commonly resulted in “bounce-over” penetrations
and overrides.
Some recommendations have been made regarding critical barrier placement in
medians when considering the NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH impact safety
standards [26]. However, most prior crash testing studies were conducted using the
NCHRP Report No. 350 or MASH crash test conditions at roadside departure. Due to the
wide distribution of crash speeds, CG trajectory and orientation angles, and median
slopes on a given section of road, barrier placement recommendations must be broad and
incorporate a large spectrum of possible vehicle crash conditions.
All median barriers are roadside objects, and crashes with any roadside object can
potentially pose a risk to occupants of errant vehicles. It was noted that for high-tension
cable barrier systems, more than 50% of all severe injuries or fatalities were not caused
by rollovers or penetrations. Even for low-tension cable barrier systems, the barrierrelated A+K crashes constituted a minimum of 30% of all serious or fatal crashes. As

295
such, it is believed that a reduction in nuisance crashes into cable median barrier can also
dramatically decrease the frequency of serious vehicle-to-barrier crashes.
12.4 Full-Scale Crash Testing
12.4.1 Background
Full-scale crash testing guidelines have advanced significantly since the
introduction of such documents as NCHRP Report No. 153 [54] and the Transportation
Research Circular (TRC) No. 191 [55]. Prior to the acceptance of NCHRP Report No.
230 [56] in 1981, crash testing was largely conducted ad hoc and according to
engineering judgment. Standardized testing vehicles and impact conditions were required
according to the criteria presented in NCHRP Report 230, but those guidelines were
based on historical estimates of the practical worst-case impact scenarios, using
subcompact small cars and large sedans as test vehicles.
As the number of light trucks and utility vehicles increased in the late 1980s, it
became apparent that updates to the crash testing criteria were necessary. With the
introduction and acceptance of crash testing criteria proposed in NCHRP Report No. 350
in 1993 [29], the standardized vehicles used to evaluate roadside appurtances at any test
level were changed to an 1,808-lb (820-kg) 820C small car and a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg)
2000P pickup truck. These vehicles were selected for several reasons: (1) the small car
had a low mass and front hood height, which could increase risk to occupants due to high
decelerations, occupant compartment deformation, or underride; (2) the larger and
heavier 2000P vehicle was useful for testing structural adequacy of roadside appurtances;
and (3) the 2000P pickup truck was susceptible to instability, even rollover. These
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guidelines remained in effect for well over a decade, until MASH was accepted in 2009
[30].
With the introduction of MASH, criteria for conducting and evaluating full-scale
crash tests were proposed based on real-world studies of more than 890 run-off-road
crashes [21]. Vehicle selection was determined based on the 2nd and 95th percentile
vehicles purchased in the United States based on data collected from vehicle sales
between 2000 and 2004. A 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) 2270P pickup truck and a 2,425-lb
(1,100-kg) 1100C small car were chosen as the most representative vehicles using similar
arguments as were used following the acceptance of NCHRP Report No. 350. An
optional mid-size 1500A vehicle weighing approximately 3,300 lb (1,497 kg) was also
proposed if it was believed that barrier systems would be susceptible to crashes with this
sedan-type vehicle.
12.4.2 Crash Observations
The vehicles selected for use in full-scale crash testing according to the criteria
presented in NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH were not selected based on a
historically poor performance with certain systems. As a result, crash tests have rarely
been conducted with the most critical vehicle types or crash conditions.
It has been frequently stated that the increased scrutiny applied to cable median
barriers examined in this study places the barriers at competitive disadvantage with
respect to other barrier systems. However, cable median barriers were the only barriers
which show favorable performance on 6:1 slopes, and have the potential for application
in steeper slopes. Cable median barriers will continue to be less expensive to manufacture
and install in divided medians than other median barrier types. If the concerns addressed
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in this study are satisfactorily addressed, the associated reduction in severe crash risk
would make cable median barriers the safest barriers available for use on divided
roadways.
Furthermore, this study should be used as a springboard to apply this type of
system-specific analysis to other barrier systems en route to more specific,
comprehensive guidelines for roadside safety appurtance testing that can accurately
predict worst-case scenarios and prevent serious crash occurrences. Without sufficient
scrutiny applied to barrier system containment failures and methods to prevent such
events from being propagated, it will be impossible to reduce the current rate of roadside
fatalities with any meaningful and purposeful direction. In time, all barrier systems
should be subjected to scrutiny on a crash-by-crash basis.
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CHAPTER 13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Cable median barrier crash data were collected from 12 state DOTs and analyzed
to determine mechanisms of cable median barrier containment failures resulting in
penetration and rollover crashes. It was determined that the composite rate of passenger
vehicle penetration through cable median barriers was approximately 9.9%, and rollover
occurrence was approximately 8.1%. Causation was also identified, and the crash
database was segregated by predominant failure mechanism contributing to barrier
penetration or rollover. By creating categories of penetration-related and rollover-related
containment failures, the mutually exclusive rates of penetration and rollover were
determined to be 9.3% and 5.1%, respectively. This observation led to a composite CMB
containment failure rate of 14.6%.
Adverse weather conditions were determined to significantly reduce the
propensity for rollover and penetration crash frequency. Barrier penetration and rollover
rates were decreased by approximately 35% and 70%, respectively, during rain or snow
precipitation. However, when roads were wet or snow-covered, penetration propensity
was decreased by 6% and 49%, respectively, and rollover frequency was reduced by 76%
and 47%, respectively. It is evident that friction has a significant effect on crash outcome
in both penetration and rollover crashes. It was likely that the frictional contribution from
adverse weather events decreased CG trajectory angle into the barrier, which in turn
reduced the IS value of the crash during storms. The rate of penetration after storms was
very similar to dry conditions, since vehicles returned to nominal travel speeds. Lower IS
values at the time of impact somewhat reduced the likelihood of rollover and penetration.
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As a result, standard crash test conditions should not be altered from the nominally dry
condition used in full-scale cable median barrier crash tests.
CG trajectory and orientation angles at impact were explored through a limited
study of severe cable median barrier crashes in the state of Missouri. The high rate of
high CG trajectory and orientation angle impacts in the severe crash database indicated a
need to evaluate cable median barriers at higher CG trajectory and orientation angles. The
85th percentile impact condition for severe cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees
relative to a tangent line on the barrier. The currently-used 25 degree angle into cable
median barrier installations only corresponds to the 70th percentile CG trajectory angle.
Severe crash databases have historically been used to determine the “practical worstcase” impact conditions. These results are consistent with methods used in NCHRP
Report 665 [21].
The performance of each barrier system was not equal, but there was also no
“silver bullet” cable median barrier system. It was determined that the cable median
barrier type with the lowest rate of A+K crashes was the low-tension 3-cable median
barrier. The lowest rate of severity of high-tension systems occurred on the Safence 4cable median barrier; however, only one other TL-4 barrier was evaluated in detail. Of
the TL-3 high-tension cable median barriers evaluated, the Brifen WRSF had the lowest
A+K ratio for crashes. The highest frequency of A+K injuries was observed with the
Nucor 3-cable median barrier. With respect to only fatalities, both Nucor and Brifen
systems were involved in fewer fatality crashes than with the Trinity CASS system,
which was strongly related to the increased rate of rollovers.
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Insufficient information was present to make definitive conclusions about the
Gibraltar or Safence systems. The limited data available for Gibraltar systems suggested
a high rate of rollover crashes, which was consistent with the rollover model shown in
Figure 136.
Crash severities were related with containment failure rates, but the correlation
was limited. Although many fatalities occurring with cable median barriers were caused
by cross-median impacts or rollovers, other fatalities and serious injuries occurred in
capture or redirection crashes. The highest correlation of containment failure with crash
severity occurred with the 3-cable median barrier, with nearly 70% of all fatalities and
serious injuries related to either rollover or penetration. If containment failures were
equally reduced for every barrier system, the system with the highest expected rate of
severe crash reduction would be the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier.
Penetration mechanisms were discussed in detail, and causes of penetrations were
determined and analyzed for each system. The penetration mechanisms were classified
into fundamental groupings: diving, prying, override, bounce-over, system failure, and
large vehicle penetration events. Of these, the diving and prying penetrations were
common on every cable median barrier system, while override penetrations were
common on CASS and Nucor systems. Generic cable median barrier crashes had the
fewest number of override events, likely because of the weak top cable-to-post
connection, and insufficient data were available to make deterministic conclusions about
override penetrations for Brifen, Gibraltar, or Safence systems. Based on the analysis of
penetration mechanisms, higher bottom cable tension, lower top cable tension, stronger
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bottom cable-to-post connections, and weaker top cable-to-post connections were
recommended.
Furthermore, it was noted that every future TL-3 cable median barrier system
transition may require the use of 4 cables, with the bottom cable located approximately
13 to 15 in. (330 to 381 mm) above the ground. The bottom cable should have strong
resistance to lifting on the post, but must be safely overridden when vehicles pass over
the cable. To reduce the propensity for override penetrations, the top cable should be
located a minimum of 35 in. (889 mm) above the ground.
Short post spacing was not strongly correlated with increased resistance to
penetration. The smallest post spacing observed in the database was located in Missouri
on a stretch of low-tension, 3-cable median barrier. For approximately 1 mi (1.6 km) of
barrier, the post spacing was reduced to 4 to 6 ft (1.2 to 1.8 m) on center. The barrier was
located adjacent to one shoulder and protected vehicles from entering a median with
estimated 4:1 slope. However, two severe penetrations still occurred in this segment in a
three-year period, both from the vehicles in adjacent travel lanes. If post spacing alone
could prevent penetrations, it is statistically unlikely that a barrier with this small post
spacing would encounter two severe penetration crashes in a 1-mi (1.6-km) stretch of
roadway in only three years. As a result, it is unlikely that the reduced post spacing
utilized on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier can prevent penetration crashes
without additional modifications, such as stronger cable-to-post attachments.
Some systems, such as Brifen WRSF and Gibraltar, rely on cable engagement
with the flanges of adjacent posts in addition to or in lieu of strong cable-to-post
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attachments. In these systems, post spacing may have a more significant effect on
penetration propensity than in the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier.
Rollover causes were also explored in detail. Whereas penetration events tended
to occur in similar patterns based on barrier type, rollover events were similarly
irrespective to barrier type. Rollovers which occurred on cable median barriers were most
commonly caused by interaction with median slopes, high orientation angles at impact, or
tripping on post members. Several other factors, such as trailer attachments and tire loss,
were also briefly discussed. However, it would be infeasible to uniquely accommodate
most of these infrequent rollover causes. As with penetration events, rollovers caused by
impacts with large vehicles were not addressed, since no barriers in this study were
designed to accommodate semi-tractor trailers.
Barrier improvements to reduce risk of rollover included the use of weak
collapsing posts, reduced overall cable tensions or differential cable tension, and graded
medians which favor moderate (i.e., 6:1 to 8:1) slopes for medians of 40 ft (12 m) or
wider.
Cable median barrier installations are being erected annually at a rapid pace.
Many cable median barrier systems resulted in reductions in severe injury and fatal
crashes due to cross-median crash reduction. Nonetheless, modifications to full-scale
testing conditions, barrier design, and roadside design must be made to ensure optimal
performance of each barrier system. By implementing these design changes, it is
expected that at least 50% of all cable median barrier related severe crashes could be
mitigated, and that penetration rate by passenger cars could be reduced by as much as
80%.
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CHAPTER 14 RECOMMENDATIONS
14.1 Modifications to Barrier Designs
14.1.1 Cable-to-Post Attachments and Vertical Positions
An untested design concept has been proposed by researchers to address cable
median barrier containment failures and involves a stratification of cable-to-post
attachment strengths for high-tension cable median barrier systems. The stratification
methodology is an attempt to reconcile post strength, post bending moment, vehicle
geometry, vehicle crush strength, and principles of controlled redirection via
energetically-favorable capture zones on the vehicle for optimum redirection
performance for any barrier, whether located in a V-ditch or on flat ground. This design
methodology would implement low-tension cables with low-strength cable-to-post
attachments at the tops of the posts to minimize risk of excessively damaging the
occupant compartments of small cars involved in cable barrier crashes. The upper vertical
cable release loads should be low to prevent roof crush. Likewise, the upper horizontal
cable release loads could be less than or equal to the load required to form a plastic hinge
in the base of the post. Using this design principle, the top cable-to-post connection
would be the weakest, but vehicles could still be redirected with a single, top cable.
The bottom cable on the posts could likewise have cable release loads which is
proportional to the load required to initiate plastic hinge formation at the base of the post
and should be located no higher than 15 in. (381 mm) from the ground. The vertical
resistance for the bottom cable to be pushed down should be lower than vertical cable
resistance to rising up the post flange. Because of the low bottom cable height and
resistance to vertical uplift, underride events will be less likely. Furthermore, most
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lateral force on the vehicles applied by the cables. Common S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) post
sections used with low-tension cable median barrier systems should be weakened, and
improved cable-to-post connections should be utilized in order to experience a significant
improvement in safety performance. Bottom cable-to-post attachments permitted frequent
underrides and occasionally through-cable penetrations. Both of these penetration types
would be significantly reduced if the bottom cable-to-post attachment was strengthened.
The top cable-to-post attachment appeared to be optimal for the low-tension, 3-cable
median barrier since overrides were infrequent on this system. This cable-to-post
attachment strength should be evaluated based on cable tension and height above the
ground. Note that the nominal mounting height for the top cable in all low-tension, 3cable median barrier systems in this study was 33 in. (838 mm).
14.1.2 Cable Tension
One design alteration, which may alleviate some rollover propensity caused by
high-orientation angle crashes into high-tension cable barrier systems, is to reduce cable
tension. A reduction in cable tension would decrease the lateral force imparted to a
vehicle at the point of impact. Vehicles entering a V-ditch frequently have a pitch and roll
displacement associated with the angled orientation in the ditch. As a result, interaction
with cables in the ditch may cause an increased trip propensity due to roll and pitch
moments imparted to the vehicle by the cables. Lower cable tension would permit a more
gradual cable engagement with the vehicle and thus may reduce rollover propensity.
14.1.3 Number of Cables
One design improvement which would aid a low-tension, 3-cable, TL-3 median
barrier system would be the addition of a fourth cable. The added cost of the fourth cable
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is an initial fixed cost which would not greatly increase annual maintenance costs
associated with barrier repair. However, the anticipated safety improvement obtained by
considering an additional cable is expected to be very high. Cost savings due to reduction
in severe injuries and fatalities should far exceed the increased cost that the additional
cable would add to system installations, as discussed in Chapter 10.
In steeply-sloped medians or to reduce the rate of tractor-trailer penetrations, a
fifth cable should be considered for every cable median barrier system.
14.1.4 Summary of Design Improvements
Several cable design improvements for cable barriers are recommended for
further evaluation and are shown in Table 35.
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Table 35. Summary of Barrier Design Improvement Recommendations
Barrier System

Nucor NU-CABLE

Trinity CASS

Component

Problem

Recommended Design Improvements

Cable to Post
Attachments

Strong attachment prevents cable release after post
is struck or deflects, causing continued engagement
and post pullout from the ground or post fracture.

Eliminate nut from upper and middle clips. Redesign lower clip to
release at a load near to the bending capacity of the post.

Post Embedment

Frequent post pullout from ground or sockets.

Cable Heights

Insufficient number of cables to prevent
penetrations.

C-Shape Posts

Frequently contribute to rollover.

Post Slot

Cable Spacer

Cable to Post
Attachments
Brifen WRSF
Cable Weave

Blue Systems Safence

Override
C-Shape Posts
Post Slot
Cable Spacer
Post Spacing

Gibraltar
Post Strength

Cable to Post
Attachments
Low-Tension 3-Cable
Median Barrier

Extend embedment depth to optimum length determined by
component testing. Deepen embedment in socket to optimum length
determined by component testing.
Increase the standard number of cables in the TL-3 design to 4.
Place the top cable at least 35 to 38 in. (890 to 965 mm) above
ground, and the bottom cable at approximately 13 to 15 in. (330 to
381 mm).
Drill weakening holes at ground line in corners of post to facilitate
post collapse and reduce the strong-axis yield moment. Consider
breakaway alternative instead of post deformation as primary failure
mechanism.

If vehicles make first contact with post instead of
Weaken the flange or web via slot or saw cut adjacent to middle or
cables, posts can be pushed down while still retaining
upper cable(s) to reduce risk of posts pushing cables downward.
cables, increasing rollover propensity.
Vehicles which "dive" under cables are subjected to
Add additional bottom cable to prevent underride. Consider
large vertical loads which can crush occupant
independent cable suspension within the slot or removal of at least
compartments or increase ridedown accelerations.
one cable from the slot.
Add physical attachment to resist vertical displacement of bottom
Bottom cable attachments using "roller" to maintain
cable. Lower bottom cable height to 13 to 15 in. (330 to 381 mm) to
cable height contributes to diving and prying
reduce underride potential. Vertically separate 2nd and 3rd cables in
underride failures.
TL-3 system.
Cable weave on bottom cable has contributed to
Consider eliminating bottom cable weave or reduce height of bottom
rollover when wheel on impact side of vehicle
cable.
overrides cable and causes pinch point at post.
Large passenger vehicles can override system.
Increase height of top cable in TL-3 system.
Similar concern as Trinity CASS.

See comments on Trinity CASS.

Large post spacing significantly increases risk of Decrease standard post spacing. Limit maximum post spacing to 10
penetration by reducing lateral constraints on cables.
ft (3.0 m) on centers.
Tube post section does not completely collapse on
weak-axis impact and forms ramp contributing to
rollover.
Bottom and middle cables release from posts at low
loads, causing extensive cable displacements when
one cable redirects vehicle, and can increase
penetration propensity.

Cable Heights

Barrier is susceptible to diving and prying underride
failures.

Post Strength

Post strength frequently contributes to rollover.

Add weakening element to tube posts to completely collapse after
impact.
Increase bottom and middle cable pullout load vertically and
horizontally. Consider use of a retrofit strengthener which adds
pullout resistance.
Add fourth cable between 13 and 15 in. (330 to 381 mm). Apply
stronger cable-to-post connection resisting vertical uplift and back
side pullout.
Slot, cut, or alter posts to make weaker. Apply weaked tube or pipesection posts which will flatten completely when impacted.

14.2 Barrier Placement in Medians
Many medians have slopes which may vary widely, even within a section
spanning only one mile (1.6 km). As such, it is impossible to know a priori the actual
slope in front of or behind a barrier before it is installed in the median. Thus, every
barrier system should be crash tested and evaluated on the front and back slopes of a 4:1
V-ditch in the most critical configurations, which were determined and are discussed in
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Reference 19. Crash testing on the 4:1 slope or in a narrow 6:1 V-ditch may still be
necessary if it is recommended for use on slopes shallower than or equal to 6:1 because
of median geometry variations. These matrices should more adequately ensure that cable
barriers can accommodate errant vehicles traversing sloped medians under tracking
conditions.
Note that placing cable median barriers along both shoulders will not necessarily
prevent all penetrations, cross-median crashes, or rollovers. Penetration crashes were
nearly as common when barriers were impacted at the shoulders as occurred in the center
of the ditch. Rollover crashes commonly occurred with low CG trajectory angles but high
orientation angles. Rollover frequency was also greater when cable barriers were located
adjacent to shoulders than in other locations since roadways typically have higher-friction
surfaces which can increase the tripping moment on the vehicle and cause larger changes
in CG trajectory angle with the same steering input applied. Whenever convenient, it is
recommended that cable median barriers be placed as close to the center of the median as
possible.
14.3 Full-Scale Crash Testing
14.3.1 Full-Scale Crash Testing on Slopes
Due to the wide range of possible impact conditions which could occur on any
cable median barrier, a variety of underride and override barrier impact conditions should
be considered likely unless impacts with similar conditions cannot be observed with
regular frequency in real-world crash databases. Override penetrations, underride
penetrations, and rollovers were observed for barrier systems regardless of approach
slope, back slope, and median placement. Using crash data as indicators, it will likely be
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necessary to utilize much of the crash-testing matrix recommended in Reference 19.
Testing in accordance with these matrices will likely prevent many future penetration and
rollover crashes.
14.3.2 Impact Conditions
Based on the impact conditions observed in this report, the 85th percentile CG
trajectory angle involved in serious cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees. Since
the severe crashes followed the trend of all penetration crashes, based on the observation
of Missouri and North Carolina data, full-scale crash testing to evaluate propensity for
penetrations should be conducted at the higher CG trajectory angle of 39 degrees in
future testing.
Based on the plot of impact angle shown in Figure 11, many rollovers in Missouri
were observed when the initial orientation angle was approximately 45 degrees. In fact,
the only severe crashes which occurred with orientation angles between 35 and 55
degrees were either penetration or rollover crashes. An orientation angle of 45 degrees is
recommended for full-scale crash testing, since crashes occurring at CG trajectory angles
greater than 10 degrees were frequently oversteering crashes.
In order to test system susceptibility to low-CG trajectory angle, high-orientation
angle crashes with SUV and light truck vehicles, the 50th percentile CG trajectory angle
of 18 degrees is recommended. This angle is lower than the current 25-degree angle used
in full-scale crash testing, but it should still be representative of a practical worst-case
impact condition when combined with the 45-degree orientation angle.
The currently-used impact speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) appeared to be
representative of the 85th percentile condition, although an actual speed distribution was
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not available. Impact speed estimates in each crash were provided by responding officers
in Ohio. The median estimated impact speed was 60 mph (97 km/h), and the average
estimated impact speed was 58.1 mph (93.5 km/h). Furthermore, the speed limit on
interstates in Ohio was only 65 mph (105 km/h). This data suggested that impact speeds
used in full-scale crash testing should not be reduced.
14.3.3 Vehicle Selection
The crash testing of cable barrier systems according to the TL-3 test criteria found
in NCHRP Report No. 350 may not have been tested with the most critical vehicles.
Although it may be argued that the 2000P pickup truck used in NCHRP 350 crash testing
is critical based on vehicle analysis results, barrier systems should also be evaluated with
widely-purchased vehicles which have the greatest propensity to cause barrier failure.
Many of the vehicles shown in Table 26 are no longer being produced. As a result, an
analysis of newer vehicle features consistent with the critical features identified in
Chapter 7 should provide guidance for future vehicle crash testing efforts.
Very few small car crash tests have been conducted under recent impact safety
standards on cable barrier systems. These crashes were not believed to be critical. Based
on crash data collected in this study, small car crashes were only critical if an occupant
made contact with the barrier, the vehicle penetrated over, under, or through the system,
if cables crushed the occupant compartment or caused rapid decelerations, or if the
vehicle tripped and rolled over. All of these conditions were infrequent in the available
database of real-world cable barrier crashes. A small car test would likely waste valuable
research money without providing much critical barrier performance insight.
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n
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62.1
1

39

45

3-11A

62.1
1
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45

3-11B

62.1
1

7

7

Vehicle Class

Descripttion
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on level, flat terrain unless otherwise specified. These tests are intended to supplement Vditch testing of cable median barriers [19].
However, current limitations on crash testing procedures may limit the ability of
agencies to conduct non-tracking and partially-skidding crash tests. Until the necessary
apparatus are developed to conduct crash testing with the recommended impact
conditions, full-scale crash tests should be conducted at the CG trajectory angles
identified in Table 36 and in fully-tracking conditions. Additional research to develop
crash testing apparatus to conduct full-scale crash tests with off-tracking conditions will
be necessary.
If the roadside safety community intends to reduce the number and frequency of
cable median barrier containment failures, updates to existing testing criteria should be
considered to reflect the more realistic “practical worst-case” impact scenarios. Whereas
data per each system were not historically available, better data are now available to
guide the redesign of systems to obtain the maximum possible safety improvement. The
matrix provided in Table 36 is expected to cover the most critical crash conditions. Test
no. 3-10A may incorporate a small car if a small car is shown to be most critical, but
currently there is no plan to incorporate a separate crash test specifically for small cars.
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